4

The Politicization of Black Labor: The 1940 Strike

INTRODUCTION

In 1940 another massive strike erupted on the Copperbelt. It was considerably better organized than the 1935 episode, for the strikers put forth coherent demands, and demonstrated remarkable solidarity as well as surprising organization. Scholars have explained these changes in a number of ways. While acknowledging that the 1940 strike was clearly an industrial dispute, Berger does little to investigate the roots of its development. Henderson acknowledges the emergence of an industrial leadership from among the underground supervisory miners, but returns once again to Bemba political consciousness for his explanation. Perrings emphasizes the deteriorating economic position of the more skilled miners and their consequent leadership role in the strike.¹ While it is clear that the growing proletarianization of the more skilled black labor on the mines was the key ingredient in the 1940 strike, other factors influenced worker behavior as well. The struggle of the European Mineworkers’ Union against capital, the welfare programs, and other experiences at work and in the mine compounds provided the stabilized miners with an understanding of collective labor action and the organizational skills necessary for successful labor protest. The intensity of mine life also increased worker consciousness among even the unskilled miners, making it easier for the more stabilized miners to organize large-scale labor protest. This chapter examines the manner in which these factors shaped the 1940 strike, and assesses the impact of the strike on black mineworker consciousness.

LABOR SHORTAGE, CORPORATE STRATEGY, AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

After 1937, expanding production once again created a labor shortage in southern and central Africa. The removal of copper production quotas that year allowed the mines to increase production. The need for labor rose accordingly, and between 1939 and 1941 the Copperbelt labor force increased by 30%.²

In an effort to control the outflow of Northern Rhodesian workers, the companies pressured government officials to limit foreign labor recruitment. Although sympathetic, government officials did not yet feel that the copper industry was sufficiently stable to warrant a complete moratorium on outside recruiting. Government officials still believed migrant black labor was an important source of revenue. While the Katanga border remained closed, Northern Rhodesians were still permitted to work elsewhere. In 1936, the government signed an agreement with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which declared that national labor needs must be filled before outside recruitment would be permitted. This agreement controlled recruiting, but could not stop the flow of voluntary labor. Southern Rhodesia, with its higher wages and close proximity, appealed to neighboring Northern Rhodesians. As we have seen, despite attempts to control the southward drift, laborers easily crossed the border. In 1937, the Pim Report estimated that 45,000 Northern Rhodesians worked in Southern Rhodesia, and the actual figure was probably higher. South African recruiting was reopened as well, but on a severely limited basis.³ As in the past, a small number of Northern Rhodesians worked in Tanganyika as well.

The 1935 strike had convinced both settlers and government officials that a settled African labor force in the urban areas was undesirable and even dangerous. Led by Senior Provincial Commissioner T. F. Sandford, government officials pressed the mines to maintain a migrant labor force. The administration also strengthened the Copperbelt police force and increased the amount of time district officers spent among the miners.⁴ Officials opposed improvements in wages, living conditions, or welfare and recreational facilities for fear this would draw people to the towns. Indeed, one official insisted that the miners “do not keep these considerable sums of money—they blow them in the stores at once; there is very little saving of cash.” Local canteen committees, consisting of the district commissioner and a few interested citizens, controlled expenditure of the beer hall funds to such an extent that even Sandford condemned them for their “cynical disregard of the persons most concerned, namely the African.”⁵

Because of their growing contribution to government finances, however, the mines increasingly dominated Northern Rhodesian policy. As a former law officer and district commissioner recalled, “In the 1930s, the mines were regarded as a wonderful thing. . . . The mines were the biggest and most positive thing around at that time from the point of view of the government. They were given a tremendous amount of rope.”⁶ The mines exploited both local and London contacts to shape Northern Rhodesian policies. For example, the head office interceded with the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London to ease a law which would have prevented blatant use of labor on Sunday at Roan. Company representatives dominated the Native Industrial Labor Advisory Board (NILAB), created in 1936 to advise government on questions directly or indirectly connected with the employment of labor under industrial conditions. The general managers even went to meetings to advocate company interests. At one NILAB meeting, for example, the Roan general manager convinced the Board to let Roan hold paydays on Sundays (to keep down absenteeism) over the strong objections of idealistic government officials. The companies routinely threatened less revenue to the colony if they didn’t get their way, which carried more weight in government circles than the need to placate African labor.⁷

Small wonder then, that when the mining companies decided that increased stabilization was their best answer to the labor shortage, the government reluctantly agreed to lend its support. NILAB adopted a laissez-faire policy on stabilization, and eased sanctions against keeping children on the Copperbelt. In 1937, the government expanded welfare facilities for urban workers, and as part of this program, limited the use of beer hall profits to medical and welfare facilities, reorganized the local beer hall committees, and set up a Central Native Welfare Advisory Committee to oversee the establishment of new programs.⁸

In order to allay government and settler fears of urbanized Africans, the mining companies adopted a policy of “stabilization without urbanization.” This explicitly denied stabilized miners the right to become permanent urban dwellers and presumed they would retire in the rural areas. The companies set up special programs, such as voluntary savings schemes and transport bonuses, to encourage rural retirement.⁹ The policy fit easily into the low-cost labor strategy of the companies, for it shifted the burden of social programs to the rural economy.

STABILIZATION AND THE MINE COMPOUNDS

The threat of a labor shortage in a period of expansion drove the companies back to their pre-Depression labor strategies of ensuring a steady supply of labor at low cost. Rather than return to recruiting, which was both expensive and inefficient, the mines sought to attract labor by less expensive means. To facilitate travel to the mines, the companies petitioned government to provide cheaper and more reliable transport services. They lowered physical standards for recruits and, most important, increased the percentage of stabilized workers. In order to attract such labor, the companies built more housing for married workers, and encouraged miners to bring their families to the mines. Between 1935 and 1939, the proportion of miners accompanied by their families increased by 17.2% at Rhokana, 15.9% at Mufulira, and 1.5% at Roan, where it had always been higher than at the other mines. Since many Northern Rhodesians preferred living with their families at the mines, the ability to bring their dependents attracted these workers away from southern competitors. Stabilization effectively lured experienced labor at a low cost to the mines.¹⁰

Longer average periods of employment soon followed. By 1938, 34.7% of Roan’s work force of 6,884 men, and 22.2% of Mufulira’s work force of 5,024 men, had been employed on the mines for over two years. To further encourage stabilization, management at the Rhodesian Selection Trust mines “informed all native employees that there would be no limit to the number of tickets they could accumulate.” RST also agreed to reinstate returnees at their previous wage levels. Although management at Rhokana preferred to limit workers to two-year contracts, by 1938, 26.6% of its work force of 7,030 men had been on the job for over two years.¹¹ Both mining companies were moving toward more stabilization, albeit at different rates.

The companies cooperated informally to avoid another pre-Depression wage spiral. They established a single wage structure for the mines in the region, and also agreed upon a general policy of footing the transport costs for long leave for workers who had completed 20 tickets.¹² They still assumed, however, that formal cooperation was unnecessary.

As a result, work and compound conditions remained the private preserve of each company. Competition continued as each mine devised its own system to attract labor at minimal cost. Competition for voluntary labor after 1937 once again forced the mines to acknowledge the desires of their black workers, and it was in the area of work and compound conditions that corporate strategy became most flexible. Corporate labor policies were limited by the fact that, as Spearpoint put it, the “natives today are very independent, they know their services are wanted, and that they can pick and choose their masters.”¹³ Except during the Depression, miners had “voted with their feet” by deserting when conditions displeased them, and compound administrators realized that “better living conditions” would amply repay the Corporation in the increased goodwill of the native employee.”¹⁴ However, management in London and Johannesburg pressed to keep labor costs down. By the end of the 1930s, the compound administrators were forced to walk a tightrope between the need for labor and management’s insistence upon low-cost labor. As much as possible the mines tried external solutions, such as limiting the flow of labor outside Northern Rhodesia, but as noted above, this policy was only partially successful. Compound conditions became a vital factor in attracting the necessary voluntary labor, and the result was a mixture of appeasement and minimal services.

This contradiction between cost minimization and labor needs was reflected in housing conditions in the mine compounds. Better housing was available for much-needed skilled workers. Roan built a model village consisting of large, double-roomed Kimberley brick houses which were "allocated to old respectable employees of the Companies as a reward for good service.” Mufulira also built some better houses for longer service miners, mine police, and tribal elders. Even Rhokana and Nchanga expanded their married housing in 1939 in order to attract experienced miners.¹⁵ But for most miners housing remained overcrowded and inadequate. Building programs at each of the mines tried without much success to keep abreast of the increase in employees. The district commissioner at Nkana complained that “although building seems to be going on continuously, there never seem to be sufficient accommodations.”¹⁶ Anglo-American mines were the worst offenders. At Mindolo compound singles’ quarters in 1940, workers had less than the legal minimum air space per person. Nchanga in 1937 was overcrowded “to the point of illegality,” with housing built for four people housing ten. Though plentiful at Rhodesian Selection Trust, mine housing was still overcrowded. When married miners complained, management at Roan advised workers “to partition their houses with curtains for privacy between children and parents.”¹⁷

The mines once again began to expand welfare and recreational facilities. Before 1937, welfare had not been improved for fear that “the natives will all want to stay in town.” Scrivener even believed “welfare work on the Copperbelt is in danger of being over done.”¹⁸ The efforts of the United Missions in the Copperbelt (UMCB) to interest mine and government officials in welfare had been coldly received. The missions had found themselves “up against a brick wall in local negotiations,” and the mines particularly worried about programs they could not completely control. However, with the re-emergence of a labor shortage, the mines once again turned to welfare and recreation, and turned to the UMCB for help.¹⁹

The companies instituted special programs for wives and children. The wives of the missionaries residing at each mine, together with two specialists, Dr. Agnes Fraser and Miss Monty Graham-Harrison, set up classes for women. The UMCB ladies saw their role in a more progressive light than management, which preferred to teach women skills to stretch their mates’ low wages. Determined that miner wives “see the worthwhileness of the good life,” they taught them sewing, hygiene, laundry, handicrafts, cooking, home decorating, and sometimes reading and writing lessons. Their classes were aimed at the “better class of women,” as one more attraction to keep skilled married workers on the mines.²⁰ The mines also set up schools and recreational classes for children in order to satisfy the parental concerns of their married workers. Management realized good facilities for children would hold skilled educated workers, most of whom had high aspirations for their children. The UMCB established primary schools at the mines after 1937, and these schools became an important drawing card for experienced labor.²¹

The UMCB also developed special recreational programs for experienced miners. Under the watchful eye of management, the team set up schools, libraries, lantern-slide shows, debating clubs, and other activities. Reverend Moore established a printing press for vernacular books, and in 1936 he sold about 1,000 books per month. By 1938, four libraries were in operation, and evening classes in English and other subjects drew enthusiastic if sometimes irregular audiences at each of the mines. Lantern-slide lectures run by Moore were quite popular as were debating societies.²²

Sports programs were expanded to attract and amuse the mass of the mine work force. At Mufulira in 1937 as many as a hundred men came twice a month to David Greig’s physical education classes, and even greater numbers played football despite limited facilities. Spearpoint and others established a Central Native Football Committee in 1937 to regulate competition for the Governor’s Cup, and by 1939, 80 registered adult teams competed in Copperbelt leagues and competions.²³

GOVERNMENT WELFARE PROGRAMS ON THE COPPERBELT

As we have seen, the government expanded welfare facilities in the towns. In accordance with the rural orientation of the provincial administration, public programs emphasized the temporary nature of African urban residence. Activities centered on short-term amusements, particularly sports, cinemas, and beer drinking. UMCB Team members set up appropriate activities with newly hired welfare officers. The government established native advisory committees, made up mostly of tribal elders from both government and mine compounds, to work with the township management board canteen committees on welfare programs. This policy underscored the transitory nature of the African urban experience by emphasizing traditional authority. The programs thus provided Africans with adequate but spare services for the duration of their stay in town.²⁴

The Colonial Office supported this development. Colonial Office officials had been embarrassed by the interest that the 1935 strike provoked among certain members of the Labor Party and other concerned groups and individuals in Britain,²⁵ who blamed much of the unrest on the de facto color bar which blocked the ambitions of increasingly articulate and organized African miners. Colonial Office officials feared that amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would only aggravate this problem and obstruct the transfer of profits from the copper industry to the metropole. Several reports confirmed these fears. Major Orde Browne’s study of Northern Rhodesian labor conditions called the white miners a “sort of human wipsnade including some fine specimens of rogues.” The Pim Commission sent out to investigate the financial and economic position of Northern Rhodesia in 1938, criticized the inadequate provisions for Africans. When yet another commission, led by Lord Bledisloe, rejected the feasibility of amalgamation in the near future, the Colonial Office readily accepted its advice, relieved to be able to maintain a humanitarian position while assisting a key British industry.²⁶

In order to control African workers and other potentially disruptive urban dwellers, the Colonial Office suggested improving social services in the urban areas. But it was rather cautious. The Colonial Office’s “tendency was to accept the advice of the man on the spot unless there was some positive reason to the contrary. . . . Leaving the initiative to the man on the spot was part of the traditional British attitude towards overseas administration.”²⁷ Consequently, it gave little concrete direction to the Northern Rhodesian government. In this case, however, Colonial Office policy dovetailed with corporate labor strategy and the state’s need to maintain order, and was thus readily adopted by government officials.

Both companies supported the expansion in urban government services, but expressed concern that the programs might interfere with industrial discipline. In order to assuage their fears, government officials agreed to respect the authority of the compound managers and left them in complete charge. At the same time, the mines maintained some control over government programs through membership on committees and direct links with Lusaka. Company representatives on local welfare committees and township management boards assured a voice for corporate policy on that level. Difficulties that couldn’t be solved locally could generally be resolved by a call to the appropriate officials in Lusaka, and such calls were routine.²⁸

Once confident of their control, the mines increasingly relied on government welfare facilities. By 1940, government officials even complained that “there appears to be a growing tendency for the mines to shift their responsibilities for the provision of welfare and recreational expenditures onto canteen funds.” Although occasionally lamenting the low percentage of beer hall funds spent in the mine compounds, compound officials basically liked the system.²⁹ They could hardly criticize an arrangement which underwrote some of the cost of stabilization without threatening corporate policies.

CONTROL OVER A CHANGING WORK FORCE

Disciplinary methods on the mines had to be eased in order to attract and keep labor. As much as possible, Spearpoint fined workers rather than dismissed them.³⁰ Anglo-American mines made greater use of dismissals and bonus deductions to control troublesome miners, but used less coercive measures when feasible.³¹ Both companies relied on the beer halls and recreational programs in the compounds to “give some healthy occupation for . . . [the workers’] leisure hours and train them in good habits and good citizenship and discipline.”³² Despite the increase in stabilization, management at both companies agreed with Scrivener’s assessment that the disciplinary system on the mines was quite adequate “to curb the mass tendency [of miners] and [to] foster individualism.”³³

Indeed, both Anglo-American and Rhodesian Selection Trust management underestimated the consequences of stabilization. Despite the clear leadership role of the more experienced miners in the 1935 strike, management dismissed the possibility that further stabilization might lead to collective labor organization. They insisted that the strike was simply an overreaction to a poorly planned tax announcement for, like most colonialists, mine administrators did not perceive Africans as creators of their own history. They blamed desertions and disobedience on the “childlike stubborness” of the miners; Spearpoint even compared his miners to “mischievous school children.” Management at both mining companies believed the African “must have some sort of individual development himself. . . . He must have a mind of his own and the power to reason of his own, and until he has got that he cannot be effective as a mass.”³⁴ And any such development was expected to be a long, slow process.

The companies were more preoccupied with the emergence of labor organization among the European mineworkers. A European Mineworkers’ Union was established in 1937, and, like its counterparts in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, it violently opposed corporate efforts to advance African workers into formerly European-dominated jobs. The union had some powerful leaders who were tough negotiators, and their demands for a closed shop and de facto color bar threatened corporate efforts to keep costs to a minimum.³⁵ African labor looked peaceful by comparison.

Both Rhodesian Selection Trust and Anglo-American management saw no reason to modify compound policies in order to control stabilized African miners. They refused to consider any form of industrial representation, confining the tribal representatives (at the Rhodesian Selection Trust mines) solely to domestic issues. Because of their higher percentage of stabilized workers, Rhodesian Selection Trust mines tried some new tactics aimed at elite workers. Both Roan and Mufulira printed small newspapers which emphasized corporate “good will” towards workers. Mufulira Compound Magazine, for example, encouraged worker cooperation, claiming that “it is through work that people are happy, and it is through work that people get what they most wish for.”³⁶ Anglo-American mines, with less stabilization, openly scorned such methods.³⁷ However, both companies assumed miner retirement in the rural areas, regular long leaves, ethnic division in the work force, and their compound discipline systems would defeat any propensities for collective organization. Government and Colonial Office officials agreed. They were convinced that any problems not solved through regular rotation of the miners could be handled by the police and provincial administration.

AN UNEXPECTED EVENT: THE 1940 STRIKE

This complacency was shattered by a massive African strike on the Copperbelt in March of 1940. It followed directly upon the European Mineworkers’ Union strike at Mufulira and Nkana. The first intimations of trouble came on the 23rd of March when Nchanga workers struck for two days protesting a compound assistant’s assault on an African woman who accused him of giving her short rations. A witness recalled, “The [Nchanga] strike was to demand more money and better food and to protest the woman being carried in handcuffs from the store after shouting. The men felt very strongly about that. Queen Elizabeth would never be handcuffed and abused like that. Everyone was unanimous about stopping work. We had no trade union, but felt very close. Tribal differences were not important. We were all like one.”³⁸ The strikers returned to work at Nchanga only after management promised to reform the ration system, and to convict the guilty parties.

Other signs of African unrest soon emerged. Notices calling for a strike in the event of a favorable European settlement were posted at Nkana on the 24th, and on the 27th, the European strike was settled. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Chief Secretary for help, the mines announced a temporary war bonus of 2s6d per shift in hopes of calming discontent.³⁹

Roan and Nchanga, where no Europeans had struck, accepted the offer. Much to the surprise of both the mine elders and management, however, the African miners at Mufulira and Nkana refused the offer. On the 28th, Mindolo underground workers struck, but Mufulira and Nkana remained at work pending explanations of the offer. On the 29th, Nkana underground and Mufulira went on strike, and by the 30th, almost all workers at Mufulira and Rhokana refused to work. They remained on strike until the tragic attack on Rhokana compound offices which resulted in the killing or wounding of more than 80 workers. This violence broke the strike, and by the 8th the mines were once again running normally.⁴⁰

The strike differed from the 1935 stoppage in several important respects, notably in the nature of the leadership, the organization of the strike, and the clarity and consistency of the demands. These differences suggest the continuing development of worker consciousness among the African miners.

Unlike the 1935 strike, the leaders in 1940 were primarily “experienced middle-aged men.” Most were skilled or semi-skilled longer service miners, underground boss boys or capitaōs, rather than the clerks who dominated the 1935 leadership. At Mufulira the strikers chose a committee of 17 workers to represent them, of whom only one was not a supervisor. Most of them had worked on the mine at least two years, and nearly all were underground boss boys. At Nkana, the compound manager rejected as representatives the six boss boys elected by a crowd of strikers. However, Rhokana still had a definite core of strike leaders, again mostly older skilled miners. According to A. Musakanya, “Elliot Bwalya was the main leader of that strike.” He was an underground boss boy who both read and spoke English, and was one of the most influential English-speaking Africans at Nkana. Another leader spoke Bemba, Nyanja, Kika-banga (“kitchen Kaffir”), and English.⁴¹

The strikers rejected black miners associated with management, and ignored elders at both mines who tried to stop the strike. Edward Sampa, a Bemba elder in Nkana, was shouted down by his fellow “tribesmen” and told, “We will take no notice of what you are telling us.”⁴² The Mufulira elders were so ineffective that when the district officer and compound manager tried to negotiate with them, a crowd of miners collected outside “protesting that these fellows [the elders] were not saying what they wanted them to say and were merely letting them down.”⁴³ The strikers accused the mine police of collaborating against them. The March 24th notice posted at Nkana vilified the police for being “very overbearing towards us.” Another notice claimed that “the police—they are like Europeans here at Nkana. We should beat them. We are like slaves because of the police.” Nkana strikers attacked the mine police after the Rhokana shooting, claiming “you [police] associate with European mine management. You take information from us to management, you give it to management. That is unfair. And you are well treated, you get everything while we suffer.”⁴⁴ Similar accusations were made against the compound clerks, particularly Nyasa clerks. Elliot Bwalya told a Nyasa clerk that “we do not want to see educated people, because when you get educated you pretend to be white people, so we do not want to hear from you.” As Musakanya recalled, “The clerks were badly hated by the miners. . . . The clerks were well respected by Europeans. So the people think, those people are well respected, they were very much against them.”⁴⁵ Even more than in 1935, the strikers recognized and condemned collaborators, be they black or white.

This time the organization of the strike was strongly influenced by the previous European incident. The strike leaders had learned from the Europeans that the only way to get more money was to strike. The European miners’ behavior during their strike was a constant reference point for African strike leaders. Throughout the strike, the African leaders called for discipline and restraint “just like the Europeans.” They warned strikers and their dependents to refrain from violence, demanding “no fighting or argument—let us just go to our homes.” Reminding the strikers of European worker solidarity, the African leaders called for similar solidarity among the African workers. They urged compound inhabitants to cooperate and their posters directed people “to let no one say ‘I have no food’ or ‘I have left my work with only 2s6d.’ We will all help each other to find food.” The strike leaders assured the miners of success as long as everyone followed the European example “just to refuse to work and [to] say what they want.”⁴⁶

This strike was more widely supported than the previous one, with all miners firmly agreed upon the need for higher wages. The rapid rise in the cost of living had devalued the earnings of a labor force grown accustomed to a higher standard of living. As Reverend Bedford testified, “New needs have definitely developed here. I mention just a few of them, soap, clothing, furniture, better schools, books, things which were luxuries are now becoming necessities. . . . Certain commodities commonly purchased by the African have increased in cost by 40 to 50 percent. . . . On the other hand, wages have not increased in the same proportion as the rise in the standard of living.”⁴⁷ The stabilized workers’ dependence on wage labor increased their resentment of rising living costs, but even more short-term employees felt the pinch even more. Workers had discussed the need for a wage increase since early August 1939 and, as one of the lower grade miners explained, “They also thought about the 12s 6d—which ordinary labor gets because a person sometimes has children and he cannot give them all their wants, for himself, his children, and his wife.” The strike “was not chiefly for one particular class of workers, skilled labor, boss boys, or any ordinary labor, they all had one aim, one heart, because they wanted more money.”⁴⁸

In order to appeal to the entire black work force, and to maximize support for the strike, leaders at both mines deliberately coordinated a broadly-based wage demand, stressing the need to improve wages in general. Rhokana originally demanded a wage increase of 5s per day inclusive, or 2s6d a day plus rations. By the 30th, the Mufulira Committee of Seventeen decided upon 10s per day without rations, or 15s per day inclusive. They sent letters and messengers to Nkana, urging them to agree, and thereafter the workers on both mines made the same demand.⁴⁹ This figure was meant to open negotiations with the companies, and to provide a rallying point for the miners.

The strike leaders justified their wage demand by placing it within the context of the general prosperity of the mines, the type and amount of work performed by Europeans and Africans, and the material returns for each. They accused the mines of not giving Africans a fair share of the mining profits. They drew attention to the fact that “we perform here the highest types of work, but yet are not well paid. Mufulira mine started about 15 years ago. When the Bwanas came here they had very small houses of grass, and today the whole of Mufulira is as we can see. It has very good buildings. It shows the Africans that this mine is improving, but yet the maximum or the minimum pay of Africans has not been changed.”⁵⁰ The strikers insisted that they did work that was just as important as the Europeans. In fact, they claimed “they were far more capable of work than a European and that the Europeans who were put over them were incompetent and lazy and abusive.”⁵¹ When management rejected this argument, the strikers challenged the companies to let the Africans run the mines alone for a shift, with no Europeans except the surveyors and the electricians. The strike leaders assured management that such a test would prove that African miners deserved higher wages and better compound facilities.⁵²

The strike leaders also asked for special concessions for higher grade miners. Reflecting their own occupational positions, they insisted that wages should reflect the different types of work done by African labor. They realized that “there are some people who work with their minds, some work with their hands, different work and the mines should say how much the different classes should get.”⁵³ The strike leaders demanded different starting pay for various grades of work. They complained that “the highest paid African labor did not get the recognition it should,” and that since they were married they “should have better houses, and a new scale of higher wages should be introduced.”⁵⁴ The Mufulira leaders complained that the high death rates from silicosis and related diseases for long-term underground workers entitled them to adequate compensation and pensions.⁵⁵ These special demands did not undercut commitment to an overall wage increase, but reflected the concerns of the growing number of higher-grade workers.

This time the strike leaders made even more effective use of the compounds for strike organization than had occurred in 1935. They put up signs in the compound urging people not to worry about food or money, and “to come to an understanding with each other so that the thing should be done.” Mass meetings were held on the compound football fields to inform miners about the progress of the strike and instruct them on tactics. When the leaders feared the strike might be broken by force, they convinced the workers to sleep out on the football field together, and by April 3rd a “crowd of between 5,000 and 6,000 slept out in the football field” at Mufulira. Similar events occurred at Nkana. Not only did this express and reinforce solidarity, it also served as strike discipline, for it isolated strike breakers.⁵⁶ If a worker chose to sleep in his house at Mufulira, “he was beaten up and he had to go and sleep on the football ground where it was made impossible to go to work.” Leaders went about the compound “shouting out in the night and going round the huts at night and passing the word round that anyone who went to work would be punished.”⁵⁷ Much of the coercion was psychological rather than physical, although a few strike breakers feared for their lives to such an extent that they slept in the bush after work.⁵⁸ Thus in this strike, the African workers even more effectively utilized the compound structure to facilitate communication, mobilize collective action, and maintain solidarity.

The organization of the strike reflected its widespread support among the African mineworkers. Neither Mbeni nor Watch Tower had to be used to mobilize the work force. This time, the different ethnic groups helped arrange some meetings. Edward Sampa heard the head of the Bangweulu people tell them “to continue strongly in what they were doing until the Bwanas give us more money.”⁵⁹ The strike was organized primarily along class and occupational lines, and not ethnic and racial lines. Strike leaders appealed to the work force as a whole, rather than to ethnic groups within it. The result was a strike in which, according to an observer, the workers “displayed a degree of cohesion and solidarity that can only be described as remarkable.”⁶⁰

T. F. Sandford, who walked freely among the strikers, “was struck with the great respect they were showing to people in authority. Their relations with the Compound Manager seemed to be excellent, and with the District Commissioner at Mufulira they were on the friendliest terms.”⁶¹ At Mufulira, the strike leaders were in firm control. They convinced all the workers to hand in their certificates at once in order to keep the mines from weakening the strike by discharging workers. “The whole thing was carefully arranged by the strikers themselves so that there should be no cooperation anywhere at all with the mine.”⁶² The organization at Mufulira was so thorough that the workers refused to go back to work until after the Committee of Seventeen told them to. The mines claimed the Seventeen lost their grip at the end, but evidence from the Commission contradicts this. At Nkana, the control of the strike leaders was less obvious, but still largely effective. “A small minority of the Natives at Nkana had established an ascendency over the minds of their fellows,” to such an extent that they were able to get a whole crowd to turn away from Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, the African representative in Legislative Council, and the compound manager. In the compounds, visiting Europeans tried unsuccessfully to get information from workers.⁶³ When meeting with a large group of miners at Nkana on Sunday, Labour Commissioner Howe noticed that “they were much too quiet for Natives in such circumstances,” and he “wonder[ed] how it was going to end.” Nkana leaders even convinced the strikers to hand in their registration cards when Scrivener threatened to stop rations and pay on April 2nd. Even the day of the shooting, no disturbances occurred until a crowd of strikers faced a pay line for strike breakers. Some looting occurred the following night, but this was limited to attacks on the mine police and non-strikers.⁶⁴

The strike leadership also exhibited considerable negotiating skill. A well-known British labor expert concluded that “on the whole [the leaders’] behavior clearly showed that they are fumbling after the techniques of collective bargaining, and that with suitable guidance they would adopt it with advantage to themselves and their employers alike.”⁶⁵

The most remarkable aspect of the strike was the unanimity and solidarity of the strikers in the face of considerable intimidation, both from the physical presence of police troops and the intransigency of management. Nkana management refused to meet with strike leaders or to consider any compromise. This left management trying to negotiate through mass meetings. In frustration it threatened to cut off rations, which only heated tensions.⁶⁶ At Mufulira, on the other hand, management spoke with representatives of the strikers, and its moderation, coupled with the compound staff’s manipulations, undoubtedly assisted the peaceful conclusion there.

STABILIZATION AND THE STRIKE

The greater effectiveness of the 1940 strike suggests changes had been occurring among the African miners. How can one explain the more coherent set of demands, the well-organized direction, and the wide concensus on tactics to be pursued in 1940? Why were the strike leaders able to organize themselves so much more effectively than just five years before? What had happened to encourage new organizational skills? Why the widespread support and worker solidarity during the strike?

The answers lie in the intensity of mine labor and the growing percentage of stabilized miners on the Copperbelt. For reasons which will be discussed below, the black miners not only perceived their common interests, they also had acquired the skills and information necessary to organize collective labor action.

While the figures on stabilization for this period are on the low side, they are deceptive. Nkana figures are particularly suspect due to a policy of classifying rehired miners as “new” employees. Scrivener’s random sampling of 42 Nkana miners in 1938 discovered that 30 of these men had left their homes in the rural areas before 1920, 8 between 1920 and 1925, 3 between 1925 and 1930, and only 1 in 1930.⁶⁷ Agnes Fraser, who spent much of her time in the mine compounds, claimed that “I suspect that unwittingly or wittingly the Mines are badly misled on the subject of the temporariness of their employees by the way they move from one camp or company to the other.”⁶⁸ Arthur Cross also believed “there is a very large number of Africans who have not seen their homes for 10 or 15 years but have moved about in the industrial area during that time and whose wives and families have paid only brief and infrequent visits home.”⁶⁹

The encouragement given to married workers increased the tendency towards stabilization. Compound officials facilitated temporary marriages by neglecting to demand legal proof of marriage. Women could live with temporary “husbands” as long as they pleased. Although unattached women could make a living as prostitutes, only registered dependents were permitted to live in the compounds. Most women preferred to live with a man, and since women were in short supply, changing partners in the compounds was easy, even for older women. Many women exploited the situation by going “boldly from man to man, living with each for a few months, and getting what they can out of them.” If a woman did not like the treatment she received from her “husband,” she could, and often did, find a more generous partner. Women seem to have become a source of competition among men, who were forced to provide a higher standard of living for their wives, or risk losing them.⁷⁰

UMCB classes and missionary schools encouraged women to emulate Europeans. These were particularly popular with “the better class of women,” who set the standards in the compounds. By 1940, many women were hanging pictures on the walls, putting up curtains and racks for dishes, and furnishing their houses with beds, tables, and chairs. European clothing became a much-desired mark of status. Many a divorce or desertion centered around complaints of inadequate wardrobes.⁷¹ These new standards increased miners’ dependence upon wages. Those workers with the highest wages attracted the most desirable women. Although miners grumbled about women spending all their money on clothes and other goods, most miners continued to compete for their favors.⁷²

Other factors pressured married men to remain on the mines. Interethnic couples frequently remained in town because partners could not agree where to live outside the Copperbelt. It became easier to remain at the mines. According to Dr. Audrey Richards, many women preferred town life, and pressured their husbands into staying.⁷³ Many educated parents stayed at the mines so their children could take advantage of the schools. After the strike, Ernest Muwamba expressed the feelings of these workers when he reported that “the educated people and others who see the value of education also spoke about the pay, that it should be higher than that because they wanted to have their children educated.”⁷⁴ Parental concern for childrens’ education was reflected in the greater stability of the school population. In the UMCB schools, two out of seven Copperbelt school children were there more or less permanently, and over 90% of the 2,500 students had been on the Copperbelt over five years.⁷⁵

As we have seen, these stabilized miners already tended to identify with one another. They also increasingly perceived and resented their collective exploitation. Many of the stabilized miners, particularly those with families, saw themselves as permanent or long-term industrial workers. As one miner testified, “We work for Europeans and we are now used to that life.”⁷⁶ They no longer accepted poor work and living conditions as temporary inconveniences and demanded to be rewarded solely on the basis of their performance as industrial workers. Such miners valued their labor power in relation to the work of other industrial workers, both black and white.

Daily experiences working in the mines taught African miners how to measure their work against that of other miners. The type of job done and the skill required, as well as the productivity of the worker, became the measure of a man’s worth. Many an African miner observed the fact that he did more work than his better-paid European supervisor.⁷⁷ After all, skilled African miners frequently performed work similar to that of Europeans, and they resented the wage differentials. The gap between European and African living standards disturbed the stabilized workers, because it did not reflect the difference between European and African productivity. Stabilized workers were uniquely positioned to perceive this discrepancy. As Field testified, “The more [the clerk] knows the more he believes he is not getting what he should get.”⁷⁸ Increasing dependence on wages in a period of rising living costs made this discrepancy all the more unbearable. By 1940, most stabilized workers agreed with Julius Chattah’s complaint that the money he received “is not good—not for the work I am doing according to my capabilities.”⁷⁹

One can legitimately ask why this heightened awareness among the stabilized miners led to general strikes at Roan and Mufulira. Given the shortage of experienced labor, why did not experienced miners return to their pre-Depression strategy of individual mobility in the wage labor market or, at least, confine their labor protests to the privileged sector of the black work force? A number of factors rendered this approach useless. Most important, the unitary wage scale on the Copperbelt limited opportunities to improve wages by changing employers. Miners evidently learned that occupational mobility was best achieved in one’s place of employment, where good performance was justly rewarded. Family and community ties built up over long periods of employment also inhibited worker mobility. More than ever, stabilized miners tended to seek improvements within the work context.

The mining companies also closed off the possibility of individual protest by refusing to negotiate separately with stabilized miners for better wages and living conditions. Instead, they continued to minimize differences among the black miners. Although stabilized miners received better wages and housing, the differential existed within a narrow range.⁸⁰ In 1941, unskilled labor could make a maximum of 50s per ticket, while skilled underground labor made a maximum of 100s per ticket. Even Special Grade miners rarely made more than £2 per month. Authority at work and in the compounds still ultimately devolved onto Europeans. Skilled workers had some leverage against quick dismissals because of the labor shortage, but this “protection” was easily broken. All of these policies were designed to limit divisions within the black work force in the hope that they would help keep peace.⁸¹

The stabilized miners began to identify with other black workers. The futility of individual protest forced them to recognize the need for collective labor action. As an early trade union leader recalled, “Even the more educated miners . . . knew the workers must join together to fight, otherwise they would not succeed.”⁸² During the strike, the strike leaders repeatedly called for solidarity among all miners. They stressed the common interests of black workers, and condemned those who collaborated with management.⁸³ Strike demands were carefully formulated to reflect the interests of all black miners, suggesting an understanding of both the identity of interests between long- and short-term miners at this time, and the need for collective labor action.

However, the key difference between the 1940 and 1935 strikes was not so much the increased awareness of collective exploitation and the need for collective action, but the ability and determination of the more stabilized miners to do something about it. The stabilized miners were in a position to exploit the opportunities to learn organizational and leadership skills at work and in the compounds. They had both the time and the self-interest to learn skills which might help them improve their status within the industrial hierarchy. The 1940 strike proved that these skills could be put to use in collective labor action as well.

The stabilized, higher-grade miners developed organizational skills while working on the mines. Most of them supervised groups of miners; they gave orders and enforced discipline as part of their daily routine. The dangers of underground work dramatized their authority, which reinforced their importance. Cooperation and obedience to authority were necessary for survival, and by its very nature mine work reinforced both the solidarity of the workers and the leadership of the higher-grade African miners. Not surprisingly, the more skilled workers were highly respected, and often emulated. More than any other workers, they were able to “mould the minds of their less coherent tribesmen in the industrial areas.”⁸⁴ The occupational hierarchy, therefore, not only taught skilled miners how to organize, but also accustomed less-skilled workers to cooperate with them.

Opportunities to learn leadership and organizational skills existed in the mine compounds as well. The mines misunderstood the UMCB Team’s commitment to racial equality and leadership training, and the ability of African miners to use it for their own ends. Management had been reassured by the Team’s claim that they only wanted “to supply healthy safety valves for the superfluous energy of this large population, so that instead of using their leisure gambling, gossiping, or fighting, they may be given constructive ways to fuller character and personality.”⁸⁵ However, management and the Team differed over the meaning of a “fuller character and personality.” The Team believed Africans and Europeans were inherently equal, expecting Africans would ultimately enter the industrial world as equal partners with Europeans, albeit in the distant future.⁸⁶ Even the most conservative member of the Team, Arthur Cross, advocated “bringing [the African] more into active participation in the conduct of his own affairs.” The Team was concerned with the long-range effects of their programs, as well as immediate goals. They saw themselves not only as teachers, but also as participants in two-way conversations. They wanted Africans and Europeans to meet “on the basis of the individual quality and achievement of that person rather than on the basis of his race.”⁸⁷ To facilitate this, they established “places where the Team and the Africans meet at leisure to chat, discuss, exchange minds, probe questions arising from current readings and so forth.” Discussions included such controversial topics as trade unions and the color bar.⁸⁸

The Team wanted to give Africans the chance to develop skills which would ultimately allow them to participate more fully in the industrial economy. The UMCB Team geared many of its courses to that need, and set up specific training courses for those miners with potential leadership skills. For example, in 1938, Greig and Moore spent three months training future club secretaries for their recreational and social welfare programs. The next year Greig trained African welfare officers to help in the welfare centers, and ran classes for African football referees. The missionaries trained women leaders as well. The Team established committees of concerned African miners at each of the mines to advise and guide the recreational and welfare programs. The Nkana African Social and Welfare Committee helped arrange lectures, choirs, boxing, concerts, and other activities. Greig reported that the committee “is proving increasingly capable and reliable.” A similar group was established at Mufulira in 1938. UMCB members also encouraged bright young men in their classes to continue their education.⁸⁹

Many of the stabilized miners took advantage of these opportunities. They had both the time to become involved and the ambition to obtain skills which would improve their position in the occupational hierarchy. It was these workers who dominated the UMCB programs. For example, most captains of compound sports activities were higher-grade miners.⁹⁰ Competition in football and other sports sharpened leadership and organizational skills. Stabilized miners dominated the debating societies, club activities, and adult education, all of which taught interested participants parliamentary procedures and oratorial skills which could be used for organizing large groups. Several informants who later became important leaders in the African Mineworkers’ Union reported receiving crucial support and encouragement from UMCB members. Mwalwanda at Roan even said that “Greig is the person who brought me up,” and went on to observe that Greig “had a very great influence among the African people.”⁹¹ Chembe Phiri and Patson Kambafwile, both eventually union leaders, were strongly influenced by Frank Bedford, the UMCB missionary at Mufulira.⁹² Many of the early union organizers worked with the Team in the mine welfare programs. Godwin Lewanika,⁹³ Paul Gwamba, Joseph Mubita, and A. Musakanya are a few notable examples.

Along with specific skills, the Team offered those Africans aspiring to a permanent urban existence an ideology supporting their right to at least junior partnership, and potentially equal rights, in urban life. They emphasized the basic similarities among all men and imparted a belief in equality. Although material arrangements limited the degree to which Africans could adopt Europeans standards, no inherent limitations were implied. These programs assumed Africans should adopt European living standards. The adoption of European sports in particular symbolized the right and ability of Africans to participate in what had been exclusively European activities. Some Europeans even came regularly to African games.⁹⁴ In a subtle way these activities countered the idea that Africans were merely “tribesmen” and temporary urbanites. Active participation in European culture developed a sense of belonging and permanency in the colonial urban environment.

However, it must still be explained why serious strikes did not erupt at Nchanga and Roan. Both of these mines had stabilized miners, many of whom became important leaders in the trade union. The same structural changes which encouraged the development of new attitudes and organizational skills among the longer-term employees at Mufulira and Nkana occurred at Roan and Nchanga as well. How then can we explain the absence of major strikes at Roan and Nchanga? They were averted partly because of quick compromises on the part of management. The two-day strike at Nchanga revealed both widespread grievances and the ability to organize a total work stoppage, but these were quickly defused by management’s willingness to prosecute the accused officials, investigate conditions, and promise improvements. The failure to strike at Roan is more difficult to explain. Perhaps the better facilities for stabilized miners made the 2s6d war bonus more acceptable. Informants suggested that the memory of the 1935 shooting inhibited the miners.⁹⁵ The absence of a European strike at both Nchanga and Roan was undoubtedly a key factor as well.

There is little doubt that the European union had a profound effect on the African strike leaders, and the stabilized miners in general. Because of their junior supervisory positions, these workers consulted with European supervisors on a daily basis. The elaborate chain of command underground, and the ever-present dangers, forced close cooperation among miners regardless of race. Many of the elite black miners also understood some English, and despite some efforts by management to withhold information about the European union, educated African miners easily learned about it.⁹⁶ Although European miners opposed the substitution of cheap African skilled labor, many of them sympathized with African grievances, particularly complaints about low wages. As one European miner told the strike commission, “all that is done with the Native is to exploit him. . . . That does not help him and it ruins us.” Some of the more radical union leaders anticipated eventual collective actions by African and European workers. They talked with supervisory black miners about trade unionism, encouraging them to plan for future unionization. As Brian Goodwin recalled, “Many of us wanted a multi-racial union in the future because we’d have won every strike.”⁹⁷ Those Europeans opposed to African trade unions still admitted that collective protest was the only effective weapon against management. Thus, whether intentionally or not, the European union stimulated interest in collective labor action.

The rhetoric and action of the European Mineworkers’ Union provided leading African miners with tools for opposing management. The European union spelled out an ideology of opposition to management, openly accusing the companies of attempting “at every stage to block us and beat us.”⁹⁸ The general secretary of the European union at Roan even “characterized the benevolent attitude of Mr. Ayer to his employees as an out of date subterfuge.” One European miner publicly accused the mines of controlling the Ndola newspaper “in an attempt to split the workers on numerous occasions.” He claimed that management “right from the beginning of the Union here, they have bought our leaders at various stages with the object of smashing the Union.”⁹⁹ Rhetoric such as this sharpened African consciousness of the opposition between workers and management.

Most importantly, the union proved to black miners that the strike was an effective weapon against management. The successful conclusion of the European strike, without violence, impressed the African miners. Repeatedly throughout the 1940 strike, African strike leaders insisted they were entitled to strike just like the Europeans. As we have seen, the organization of the African strikes was closely based on the European strikes, even to the point of striking at the same mines. This was not merely a coincidence. The African strike leaders deliberately tied their plans to the success or failure of the European strikes by announcing that the black miners would only strike after a European victory.¹⁰⁰ Thus, the European strike provided an important model for the black miners.

The importance of the European Mineworkers’ Union does not undercut the crucial role of stabilization in the strikes. Rather, a combination of factors emerges as the most likely explanation. The behavior of the strikers suggests considerable development of worker consciousness among all black miners. At the same time, stabilization produced a group of workers on the mines who sufficiently understood both their identity as workers and the need for collective action to follow the example of the European miners. The nature of the strike leadership and the sophisticated demands support this argument, as does the significantly better organized strike at Mufulira, with its larger proportion of stabilized miners. As an Anglo-American consulting engineer reported, “During the strike it was evident that the leaders or agitators exercised complete control at Mufulira, but at Nkana their control was not so marked.” He even suggested that some of the Mufulira strikers come over to help organize the Nkana strike.¹⁰¹ Thus, the struggle between white miners and capital provided the impetus for the black labor action in 1940, but the ability to carry out that action was the result of a growing worker consciousness among the black miners and the capacity of the more proletarianized miners to channel that development into organized labor protests.

CONCLUSION

Stabilization, not Bemba consciousness, was thus the key determinant of the 1940 strike. Stabilized workers strongly resented the gap between their wages and those of the European daily-paid miners, and in their search for higher wages and better working conditions, they gradually recognized the need for broadly-based labor action. The European Mineworkers’ Union, the UMCB and government welfare classes, the compound system, and the structure of production all provided opportunities to learn the organizational skills necessary to carry out such action. While the widespread and enthusiastic support for the strike suggests considerable worker consciousness among both short- and long-term labor, the control of the strike by more experienced stabilized miners points to the critical role of stabilization. To be sure, the links between stabilized miners and the rest of the black work force, and the commitment by stabilized miners to broadly-based collective labor action were still tenuous. But the strike was a turning point in the development of worker consciousness among black miners. The experience of the strike reinforced worker identification and further clarified the conflict between management and workers. The strike forced cooperation among the miners, while the shootings left little doubt about the fundamental conflict between workers and management. At the same time, the failure of the strike underlined the need for new weapons to wring concessions from the mines. In the next decade, the stabilized miners would turn their efforts to this goal.