6

The Unionization of Black Labor, 1947–1953

INTRODUCTION

After a fitful start, the African Mineworkers’ Union (AMWU) expanded dramatically. By 1953, it had to its credit a large membership, a successful three-week strike, and a veto of the tribal representatives. During these years, it entered into a long period of ambivalent relations with the African nationalist movement as well. The contradiction between union solidarity and political neutrality has led scholars to question the degree of class consciousness among the black miners. Most studies assume the unitary nature of the mines and mine compounds created an industrial parochialism which obscured both working-class indentity and the need for class-based political action to protect worker interests.¹ There is evidence, however, that the stabilized miners used the union to develop both worker consciousness and commitment to trade unionism among the African copper miners. Furthermore, the more highly skilled miners began to recognize that workers should join political parties to fight for class goals. Though constrained by corporate and state antagonism to union political activity, these miners urged Union support for the emerging nationalist party on the grounds that their plight would not improve until Africans controlled the government.

COMPANY OPPOSITION TO THE UNION

The companies were less sanguine than government in their assessment of African trade unions. Management regarded trade unions “as a real menace,” and initially hoped to forestall full unionization.² At the Johannesburg Conference in December 1946, both companies “stressed the dangers and difficulties attending the implementation of the Government policy and [decided] to slow it down as much as possible.”³ The companies urged the labor department to introduce collective bargaining techniques through the works committees, which had replaced the boss boys’ committees and the clerks’ associations in 1946. The committees had about 15 members, representing different departments. Most members had been in a boss boys’ committee or clerks’ association; a number were tribal representatives.⁴ The Chamber tried to convince Comrie to meet with the works committees, and to gradually teach them trade union principles.⁵ The mines hoped this would divert miner interest in trade unions, and neutralize Comrie’s presence on the Copperbelt.

However, the higher-grade black miners and the European Mineworkers’ Union opposed such a policy. Goodwin and Maybank continued arranging meetings with interested African miners to establish African branches of the European union. They circulated pamphlets on trade unionism in the compounds, and held regular meetings outside the compounds. The African branches continued meeting at Nkana and Luanshya. By the time Comrie arrived in 1947, it was clear that trade unions, with or without European workers, were going to be established.⁶

Government and Colonial Office officials pressed the companies to support an African union, fearing African branches of the European union might be established at any time. They worried about the potential bargaining power of a multi-racial union, and the possibility that it might threaten future copper revenues, and consequently the transfer of surplus to the metropole. Government officials, and some legislative council members, believed a government-monitored African union would be easier to control.⁷ They also warned that subversive radical influences from South African socialists might have unpleasant consequences. Placing the need for social order above the short-range desires of the mines, the government rejected Chamber arguments for worker committees, and bluntly informed the companies that “it was not for the Government, nor the Chamber, to lay down how the African Union should conduct themselves.”⁸ The labor commissioner insisted that “the advice of the Trade Union officer must be available to any African, individuals, or groups, who ask for it.”⁹

These threats, along with continued efforts by the European union, finally persuaded the companies to abandon their opposition. Management reluctantly conceded the inevitability of some kind of African trade union, and suddenly Comrie found “management’s attitude leaves nothing to be desired. The change is almost embarrassing.”¹⁰

The companies then joined forces with the labor department to stop the European union by warning the black miners to ignore European union leaders. Working through the tribal representatives and the works committees, the officers played on the long history of abuse and suspicion between the races. The alliance between white and black miners was too fragile to withstand such pressure. Black miners were easily persuaded that “the European miners had sweet tongues, but didn’t mean what they say.”¹¹ On a more pragmatic level, Katilungu opined that African interests would suffer in a multi-racial union dominated by whites. He and Namitengo did not rule out the possibility of eventual amalgamation between the two unions, but for the time being, the Africans decided to form their own union.¹² Goodwin reported that “when I went back to hold a normal branch meeting [at Nkana] I was snubbed. A similar thing happened at Luanshya, where I had formed two branches also. . . . Once the African union was organized by Comrie, we [the European union] couldn’t even get close to it. We couldn’t even liaison with it because of the influence from the colonial administration. . . . Scrivener did a lot to keep us away. He got regulations supported by management that you had to get written permission if you wanted to enter the compound. All this was against us.”¹³ Those Africans who continued to support the Europeans were soon shouted down by their fellow workers, and a few were even dismissed.

Despite this cooperation, the companies still opposed rapid unionization among the miners. Management saw Comrie as a dangerous radical, bent on stirring up unreasonable demands among the black miners. In meetings with government and labor department officials, management questioned whether “unionism was really wanted or understood by Africans,” and demanded that “unions not be pushed forward artificially.”¹⁴ The companies tried in every way they could to slow down the pace of unionization. Sometimes the compound managers refused Comrie and his followers a place to hold meetings in the compounds. Company spies attended meetings, and the companies sent their often highly inflammatory and inaccurate reports to Lusaka. The Chamber also opposed the establishment of a full-time union secretary and a closed shop.¹⁵

While sometimes irked by management resistance, government and labor department officials shared its misgivings about African unions. They especially worried that an idealistic Colonial Office might give too much power to African labor. Increasingly influential settler voices in the legislative council railed against misplaced Colonial Office paternalism. Sympathetic government officials, while supporting African trade unions, clearly looked to contain African labor action, and government officials pressed Labor Commissioner William Stubbs to keep Comrie under control, something Stubbs fully agreed with. As a result, Stubbs informed Comrie pointblank that “while it was his job to explain what trade unions were, the longer it took him to form one the better that I would be pleased.”¹⁶ Law was stationed at Nkana as senior labor officer, “to keep a friendly eye on Comrie.” This was particularly necessary from the administration’s point of view because Comrie had to work through an interpreter. “The administration was worried about him [Comrie] talking to interpreters and what the interpreters might say.” An early report that an interpreter for Comrie was translating “strike” as “fight” only increased government anxiety.¹⁷

Under this pressure from government and company officials, Comrie agreed to proceed slowly, but steadily, towards an African union. For his part Comrie preferred this course because of some earlier experiences in Germany, where he felt he had pushed unions prematurely.¹⁸ As a result, the labor department ruled that “if workers wished to organize, the department of labor would make available to them people who would help them in the techniques, the practices, of organizing, and help them with an understanding of the legislation over all labor matters. We taught them some of the basics of economics so they didn’t make ridiculous demands, and showed them how to read a simple balance sheet.”¹⁹ Comrie met regularly with his early followers, and drilled them in trade union principles. But there was no sense of urgency once the threat of a multiracial union subsided.²⁰

STABILIZATION AND THE UNION

Initially, the ability and determination of the black miners to establish a strong trade union movement remained in question. While interested, most African miners had remained aloof from the attempt to form a multi-racial union, and for some good reasons. There was no tradition of trade unionism among the mineworkers, only the history of two bloody strikes, and many workers identified collective industrial protest with shootings and death. For the unskilled short-term worker, unions remained very much in question. They “wanted to know what benefits would come from the trade union.”²¹ One person later recalled, “A lot of people were afraid to join the union because they thought if they quarreled with the companies they would be sacked.”²² Some of the tribal representatives opposed a union, fearing the loss of their own prestige, and discouraged union membership.²³

However, despite the cautious attitude of company and government officials and the initial reluctance of many black miners, within a few years the union had developed a large committed membership, organized a successful Copperbelt-wide strike, and voted the tribal representatives out of power in the mine compounds. How can we account for this development? Stabilization emerges as the necessary but not sufficient ingredient. The growing determination of all black miners to fight for higher wages, some support from government officials and the rise in copper prices with the 1949 devaluation of sterling certainly argued for unionism. At the same time, the stabilized more skilled miners provided both the leadership and support so crucial for the union’s rapid expansion.

After the war, the companies continued to rely on stabilization in order to provide the labor necessary for an increasingly copper-hungry world. By 1950, over 2,000 black miners on the Copperbelt had completed 120 months or more in the employment of the mining companies.²⁴ At Roan, in 1951, out of a total of 8,426 workers, 4,586 had worked two years or longer, and 2,321 had over four years’ employment.²⁵ Clyde Mitchell’s 1951–52 survey of Roan discovered that 42.3% of the miners were uncertain when they would return home (go home when wealthy, etc.), and 23.4% saw themselves as semi-permanent or permanent town dwellers.²⁶ Anglo-American figures were less complete, but still revealed increased stabilization. In 1951, Mitchell collected data from Nchanga which indicated that 49.2% of Nchanga’s African work force (5,649 men) had worked longer than a year on the mine, and that 19.8% of the work force had been employed longer than two years. The percentage of married workers among the higher grade miners rose correspondingly. At Nchanga, for example, miners employed longer than a year generally did more skilled labor, and a higher percentage were married as well.²⁷ By March 1948, 60.6% of Mufulira’s workers and 56% of Roan’s workers were married. Anglo-American lagged behind with 44% at Nchanga and 49.3% at Rhokana, but by September 1952, these figures had risen to 61% and 46.2% respectively. Soon after that, the Chamber of Mines set a maximum of 60% married labor at each mine,²⁸ Thus, by the late 1940s, at least 50% of the black miners on the Copperbelt could no longer be classified as migrant laborers, in that they had long established communal and occupational ties in the industrial area.

As we have seen, by the end of the war many of the stabilized miners accepted the need for some form of broadly-based collective labor organization. The same factors which encouraged this attitude continued to operate after the war. The rising cost of living, dependence upon wage labor, and expectations of lengthy residence at the mines pressed against low African wages, while experiences at work and in the compounds heightened awareness of worker identification and opposition to management. Individual and elite protests had proven unsuccessful, and many of the stabilized miners began to see trade unions as the only weapon for advancement. As Mwendapole recalled, “It wasn’t difficult to point out to these miners that when they got organized you will be able to improve this or remove that.”²⁹

It was from among the most skilled stabilized miners that Comrie found his most committed followers. He met many of them at a meeting of Scrivener’s “Brain Trust,” an interracial group of Europeans and Africans in existence since 1947 that discussed matters of mutual interest. Much to his surprise, Comrie “found extraordinary similarity between the more experienced African worker in the Mines and Europeans of various races in industry elsewhere.”³⁰ He was “impressed by the very intelligent standard of the questions and, above all, by the amazing frankness of the speakers.” He felt that “there is a minority . . . who are definitely well advanced and who hold very definite views on the position of the African generally.”³¹ He chose ten trusted men to help proselytize among the miners. They were chosen by their established reputation on the mines and became known as “the disciples.” Most of them had been out of the rural areas for over ten years, had more education than the average miner, and worked in group 6 or higher. Of the ten, two were Lozi, two Nyasa, one Coloured, and four Bemba. Most were either clerks or boss boys.³²

The disciples and other early converts preached unionism within the compounds. All were well known and respected, and many were active in compound organizations such as welfare programs and church groups. As the strike leaders had done in 1940, the union leaders mobilized followers through contacts in compound organizations as well as family and friends, and networks. They even asked sympathetic tribal elders to lobby for attendance at union meetings. Indeed, some early union supporters were tribal representatives, such as Herbert Gwanda at Roan. As in the past, however, the stabilized higher-grade miners played the key role. They had the most to gain from a union, and the greatest commitment to worker representation. They led the union movement.³³

News of union meetings spread quickly through the compounds. Meetings soon became major social events, drawing large audiences. One informant recalled, “It was the union in those days, you know. And if union people called a meeting, you can even see men and women and children listening to the union men talking.”³⁴

Comrie’s support, together with the prestige of the early union leaders, reassured doubting miners. The meetings “made people feel happier and more hopeful.”³⁵ The experience of common problems in the compounds wove ties of sympathy between privileged and lower-grade miners, and made residents more receptive to union advocates. Work experiences helped too. Miners of all grades could see that on their own they had not been able to raise wages or alter corporate labor policies. All agreed on the need for higher wages, greater job security, and improvements in work and living conditions. They listened intently to the trade union organizers’ assertions that only a union could bring these desired improvements. This argument carried a great deal of weight with miners on all grade levels, and support for the union began to build at each of the mines. As one miner told Epstein, “I joined in 1949 because all the people I trusted and knew to be wise were the ones who were encouraging others to join—especially my tribesmen who were educated.”³⁶

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNION

The first success for Comrie’s followers came at Nkana, where a union branch was formed in February 1948. A few prominent supervisory miners resisted, preferring to follow Goodwin and Maybank, but Comrie’s arguments and the long history of abuse and racialism by European miners tipped the scales. The miners decided to establish their own union under Comrie’s guidance. Executive Committee elections were keenly contested. Lawrence Katilungu,³⁷ Simon Kaluwa, and Philip Simwanza won the positions of president, secretary, and treasurer, respectively. Except for Kaluwa, the candidates were either mine clerks or hospital orderlies. The prominence of stabilized higher-grade workers in the union movement reflected the politicizing effects of stabilization. While Katilungu’s underground experience and connections with Bemba royalty undoubtedly broadened his appeal, it was his experience as an industrial worker and his negotiating skills that sealed his election.³⁸

The Nkana Committee members worked long and hard, touring the Copperbelt in efforts to arouse support. Comrie came with them. “Many of the meetings [were] history lectures in which Comrie explained the history of the trade union in Britain, and of the growth of the Labour Party and how it succeeded. . . . It was a slow business stretching over the months with regular visits to each of the towns.”³⁹ The task was not an easy one. Compound managers were hostile and refused to provide meeting rooms, which held down attendance. The African Miner speaks of these men as “the first inspired, who did not mind when and how they slept, nor what and how they ate, wherever they went.⁴⁰

Gradually branches started at each mine. By May 1948, Mufulira’s had 300 members and an Executive Committee. A union branch formed more slowly at Roan, where some of the leading black miners continued working towards a multi-racial union.⁴¹ The higher degree of skill and longer association with European workers at Roan probably increased African receptivity to these overtures, a situation which Comrie found “most irritating.” Many distrusted the “Nyanja-cum-clerical element,” who comprised the majority of those interested in starting a union. The boycott also preoccupied many leading miners during 1947. However, by June 1948, a few keen members of the works committee and 150 Africans decided to form a union. Nchanga finally established a branch in late 1948. By that time, all four mines had branches, with a total membership of 5,000.⁴²

In March 1949, the four branches united to form the African Mineworkers’ Union. By that time, there were 3,200 paid members at Mufulira, 1,800 at Roan, 2,180 at Nchanga, and over 5,000 at Nkana. Although ultimate authority was vested in an annual conference of delegates from all branches, executive power rested with the executive council elected by the annual conference. The council consisted of about 21 members, who met at least four times a year. The supreme council—an inner core composed of the president, secretary, and treasurer—directed the union’s business with the consent of the executive council and the annual conference. The union president chaired executive council meetings and had a casting vote in meetings of the supreme council and conference. The general secretary, while subordinate to the president, had vast discretionary powers as well, which allowed him to build up personal followings along patron-client lines. A delegates’ conference, held at Nkana in March 1949,⁴³ elected Lawrence Katilungu, president, Simon Kaluwa, general secretary, and Philip Simwanza general treasurer. Robinson Puta was elected vice president, Jameson Chapoloko, deputy general secretary, and J. R. Namitengo, vice treasurer.⁴⁴

The companies signed a Recognition Agreement with the union in which they acknowledged the African Mineworkers’ Union as the sole organization representing African interests on the mines. Individual union branches had their negotiating rights curtailed, and the union was formally recognized as the spokesmen for all the miners in the copper industry.⁴⁵

The mines also agreed to a new manning structure, and a general wage increase in 1949. The grade divisions increased from three to eight, with grade 1 being unskilled. These divisions created greater opportunities for occupational mobility and a wider range of wage levels. Scales increased in each group as well, particularly among the higher groups. This settlement rewarded all miners, while reassuring the stabilized miners that their interests would be protected.⁴⁶

CORPORATE EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE AFRICAN MINEWORKERS’ UNION

Despite the signing of the Recognition Agreement and the favorable wage settlement, the companies worried that the fledging union would begin to make “unreasonable” demands. In order to avoid this, they contrived to contain union activities. The companies renewed efforts to advance more skilled black miners into formerly white-dominated jobs on the assumption that advancement and not trade unionism was the real goal of the stabilized higher-grade miners.⁴⁷ Management at both mines hoped new job opportunities would divert these miners from union activities. Since these miners were both the most ardent union members and the most experienced organizers, diverting them had the potential of inhibiting the union movement. The companies also stood to gain by the substitution of cheaper black labor, which they were more anxious to achieve now that an African trade union threatened to raise black labor costs.

An abortive conference in 1947 among the European Mineworkers’ Union, the government, and the mine bogged down over the European union’s insistence that Africans doing formerly European jobs receive equal pay. Without that condition, European union leaders claimed advancement was merely a cover for cheap labor substitution. Both government and company officials balked, claiming that African labor was not yet capable of equal performance on the job. Management insisted that the principle of African progression “resolved itself into one of sociological or public policy/’ and therefore was a matter for government. The companies wanted a public declaration by the government supporting the principle of African progression, and an eventual legislative solution.⁴⁸

The companies pressed the Colonial Office for a commission to study the issue in hopes that its recommendation favoring African advancement would supply the rationale for legislation. In 1948, the Colonial Office set up a commission, headed by Andrew Dalgleish, a veteran British trade-unionist, member of the Forster Commission in 1940, and participant in the 1947 talks. His willingness to accept advancement without equal pay during the abortive three-party talks had aroused the wrath of the European union. As a result, the Europeans refused to cooperate with the commission, but it went ahead and, after careful evaluation, recommended that 54 categories of work not performed by Africans could be opened up either immediately or after a period of training.⁴⁹

However, political changes in Northern Rhodesia undermined the possibility that these recommendations would be adopted by the legislature. The European community had been greatly strengthened in 1945 when a majority of 13 to 9 was granted to elected versus nominated Legislative Council members. Three years later, official and elected members were given ten seats each, and four seats were added for nominated unofficial members representing African interests, two of whom were Africans.⁵⁰ Also in 1948, the Council developed a convention whereby the consent of four unofficial members was given the same weight as the advice of all eleven. These changes greatly increased settler power, particularly that of the white miners. Increasingly government had to compromise with the European community in its daily affairs. As a result, when the Dalgleish report provoked an outcry in the Legislative Council, especially from labor leaders Brian Goodwin and Roy Welensky, the governor tabled the report until a more auspicious moment.⁵¹

The moment failed to come as Europeans in Northern Rhodesia were swept up in a move to establish a Central African Federation out of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Self-rule had long been a dream of the settler community, but their previous attempts had been rejected. However, when Welensky and a few other settler politicans raised the possibility of Federation, the Colonial Office responded more favorably.⁵² The mines supported Federation as well. As the federal issue rose to the fore, the mines became less willing to risk white miner anger over the advancement issue. Dalgleish recommended a three-party conference meet in August 1948 (chaired by Attorney-General Edgar Unsworth), but it soon foundered on the equal pay issue. After unsuccessful attempts to mediate disputes, the government withdrew its support, declaring that it would wait for new developments, particularly changes brought on by Federation.⁵³

Although advancement fell victim to politics, the companies found other methods to frustrate the union. They lobbied for separate unions at each mine, arguing that “it is quite wrong at this stage for the Africans to organize on a Copperbelt basis and that for a long time to come each mine should have its separate Union which would negotiate only with the Management of that mine.”⁵⁴ When that failed, the companies resorted to general uncooperativeness. They also failed to install a phone in the head offices for the union, and refused to allow automatic deductions of union dues from the payroll until 1951. The general manager insisted that the African personnel managers act as intermediaries between union leaders and themselves, and rejected special privileges for the Union’s Executive Committee on the ground that they “would give the Executive Committee an undue sense of their own importance.”⁵⁵

In order to better handle union complaints, the companies reorganized the compound administration in 1949. They renamed the mine compounds mine African townships, the compound administration became the African personnel department, and the compound manager became the African personnel manager. The African personnel department now paralleled the European departments at each mine. The department heads advised European miners to handle African employees “very differently from the past.” Complaints against black workers were to convey “the bare facts only, no suggestions.”⁵⁶ Management hoped this procedure would minimize union accusations of victimization and other abuses.

The mines also strengthened the mine police. A limited number of police were given the power to arrest miners in the compounds “for affray, theft, and house breaking, not for illegal brewing.” This was a temporary measure until the Northern Rhodesian police could take over, reflecting management’s continued belief “that [mine] police have to be kept under constant supervision, otherwise they make more trouble than one would have without them.”⁵⁷ In an effort to counter police unreliability, and to ensure alternate sources of information, the companies sent hired informers to trade union meetings and other compound activities. Both union leaders and labor officers “were watched the whole time.”⁵⁸

The mines also increased the status and authority of the tribal representatives in an effort to divide the work force along ethnic lines and undercut union influence. Management insisted that compound conditions, and in fact anything not relating to industrial matters, remain the preserve of the tribal representatives, which pitted union against tribal leaders. As Field put it, “Any setback the union may receive will strengthen the tribal representatives.”⁵⁹ Many representatives opposed the union, fearing loss of their authority and willingly cooperated with the mines.

Most important, the companies pressed government labor officials to maintain control over the union. They complained to the government that African personnel managers were losing “much of their ability to command respect and obedience among the African labor force.” The companies even sent highly inaccurate reports to government officials which contributed to “this feeling growing up in Lusaka that something terrible was happening in the Copperbelt.” In addition, they pressured labor officers and the provincial administration into persuading union leaders to be “reasonable and limit their demands.”⁶⁰

The governor and the provincial administration supported management’s efforts to control the union. The governor even personally reprimanded Roan’s branch chairman, Alfred Mwalwanda, for “rude behavior.”⁶¹ Government officials willingly joined the mines in an effort to moderate labor department support for the union. The labor commissioner thus directed all his subordinates “to instill in the minds of representatives of African Trade Unions that truculent and offensive behavior can only harm their cause.” Even Comrie was ordered “to assist in the development of good industrial relations between employers and employees.”⁶² The more idealistic labor officers’ concern for African labor was circumscribed by the state. The colonial government and the settlers wanted African unions to contain African labor rather than to protect it. As in so many other parts of Africa, labor officers increasingly became mediators between management and labor rather than advocates of labor.

THE UNION AND COLLECTIVE LABOR ACTION

Still union leaders pressed for improvements. Working within the guidelines set by the Recognition Agreement, branch leaders met regularly with African personnel managers to discuss such issues as alleged victimization, unfair discharges, assaults, work, and compound conditions. The supreme council negotiated with the Chamber over issues affecting the mines as a whole, although sometimes Katilungu intervened when local discussions reached an impasse. Between 1949 and 1953, the union engaged in over thirty separate disputes, and organized more than twelve strikes, one of which was industry-wide.⁶³

Union membership increased dramatically. In 1949 about 19,000 miners out of a total work force of 36,972 belonged to the union, and in three years membership rose to 25,000, or over 80% of the black mine work force.⁶⁴ While the greatest number of trade union members were in Groups 1 and 2, the higher-grade longer-service miners had the highest percentage of union membership (see Table 8). At Nchanga, for example, 67.3% of African miners making more than 150 shillings per ticket belonged to the union, as opposed to 30.7% of those making between 25 and 49 shillings per ticket.⁶⁵

In 1952 the union proved that it could organize Copperbelt-wide strike action. The 1952 strike revealed both increased solidarity among the workers and improved organizational skills among union leaders. Fully 79% of union members voted to strike when the union called a strike ballot after wage negotiations with the Chamber broke down early in the fall of 1952.⁶⁶ Despite disputes within the leadership over the proper political stance for the union, union leaders and union members closed rank behind Katilungu in support for the strike. The union set to work organizing a strike plan through committees at each mine. Strict rules were imposed. “They were not to move in large numbers, not to listen to any rumors, as much as possible to keep in the house or go into the bush for hunting; to use the time as much as possible in gardening, to keep away from beerhalls and from drunkeness. In case of any wild rumors, the section leaders were to be consulted.” Section committees set up picket lines. A meeting called on October 19 at one of the Rhokana mine welfare fields drew the largest crowd ever on the Copperbelt. Union leaders addressed the crowd, and Katilungu told the audience, “This meeting is a symbol of labor unity on the Copperbelt. . . . It represents the culmination of long and difficult struggle by the Africans.” He asked everyone to “respect the spirit of this struggle,” and told the crowd “I have put my finger on the mouth of the gun which killed our brothers. I promise you one thing, no rifle will be shot at anyone if you follow my orders.”⁶⁷

The strike proceeded as planned, and for three long weeks the union maintained strict discipline. Almost no one was to be seen, F. M. N. Heath, the District Commissioner at Luanshya, noticed that African picket men were on guard at the entrance of the Mine Townships,

but there were no passers-by to attract attention. As you drove past the rows of huts where the strikers lived there was hardly a sign of life. Not even the children, who normally would be playing in the yards and along the roadsides, were to be seen. There was no one moving about. The Mine Officers were deserted. . . . Throughout the day the atmosphere remained unchanged as if human activity had ceased. . . . There was no excitement and no crowds gathered at street-corners. No one seemed interested in the mine lying silent across the valley.

The strike continued in this manner for nearly a month. Miners and their wives cultivated their gardens for food, and occasional public meetings provided instructions and moral support.⁶⁸

When the companies finally agreed to arbitration, the African union accepted an offer from the European Mineworkers’ Union to bring out Ronald Williams, legal advisor to the British National Union of Mineworkers to help with the talks. Under Maybank’s direction, the European union supported African demands, and worked closely with the African union and Ronald Williams to bring about a favorable settlement.⁶⁹ The African union, in turn, supported the European union’s position on equal pay for equal work, (something they had also privately negotiated with the union in 1950).⁷⁰ The African union not only organized its workers in collective labor action, it also proved itself capable of recognizing interests in common with Europeans.

Later in 1953, the union once again proved its capacity to mobilize the mineworkers by organizing a campaign to abolish the tribal representatives in the mine compounds. This came in the wake of the companies’ plan to expand the number of representatives by creating a Copperbelt Tribal Council. Most of the representatives welcomed the idea, hoping it would stop the highly resented incursions on their authority by court assessors, trade union officials, and political leaders.⁷¹ On 11 December 1952, the council held an inaugural meeting at Wusikili. The African personnel managers informed members that the mine committees would receive funds for compound welfare, and that they would “have district responsibility as a sort of Town Council and . . . [the mines expected] them to engage more and more in the welfare of the people living in the Townships.”⁷² The Council was to act as a workers’ representative for all problems outside the work place. This threatened union authority, and the union leaders reacted immediately. They called meetings in every mine township to denounce the tribal representatives as traitors to the union and federal stooges. Branch officials asked miners to pressure tribal representatives to return their gowns, and to stop cooperating with the companies. At Nchanga, violence nearly broke out when Robinson Puta, secretary of the Nchanga union branch, threatened recalcitrant representatives. Union leaders demanded the abolition of the tribal representatives, and asked the Chamber to put the issue to a vote. Reluctantly, the companies agreed to a secret ballot in March 1953. The union leaders expected the same cooperation they had received during the recent strike, and they judged correctly. The miners rejected the representatives by a resounding vote: 84.1% of the labor force voted, and 96.9% voted against retention.⁷³

THE UNION AND AFRICAN NATIONALIST POLITICS

During this same period, African nationalism was growing in Northern Rhodesia in response to the European bid for federation. Africans in Northern Rhodesia feared that Southern Rhodesia would dominate the Federation. They knew Southern Rhodesia well, and had no desire to see its institutions adopted in their own country. In resistance to federation, the 1948 annual meeting of the Federation of African Societies transformed itself into a political body, the Northern Rhodesian Congress. In 1951 the congress was renamed the Northern Rhodesian African Congress, and Harry Nkumbula was elected president.⁷⁴

Many unionists joined the party. In 1952, Congress set up a Supreme Action Council to plan and, if necessary, to order a total withdrawal of labor in order to cripple the colonial government. Both the president and the secretary of the African Mineworkers’ Union held seats on the council and endorsed its aims.⁷⁵

Some of the leaders of the African Mineworkers’ Union organized closer cooperation between workers and Congress through the Trade Union Congress (TUC). Formed in 1951 under Comrie’s guidance, the Congress had fallen into disuse under Katilungu’s leadership. Capitalizing on this neglect, the Puta/Chapoloko faction of the union turned the TUC into a forum for anti-Federation propaganda. Both Robinson Puta and Jameson Chapoloko opposed the separation of political and industrial issues. They called on African workers to unite against the colonial state in a movement for national liberation. The TUC maintained a political subcommittee which included a number of prominent branch leaders from the AM WU. It formulated plans for rallying worker support behind the nationalist movement.⁷⁶ Chapoloko even spoke of a Federation-wide TUC. While dubious about Southern Rhodesia, Chapoloko “hoped they would get such an organization going within two years, with Nkumbula as President. Thus uniting under Congress they would be able to gain a stranglehold on the economy.”⁷⁷

Despite both the structural and ideological congruence between the African Mineworkers’ Union and Congress, union leaders were divided on the question of political involvement. The more militant among them preferred close cooperation between the union and Congress, while Katilungu and the moderates were more circumspect. Katilungu stopped the Supreme Action Council’s call for a political strike in February 1952 because it would interfere with an industrial dispute then in progress on the mines. He refused to cooperate with Puta and Chapoloko’s plan to call a strike at Nkana protesting the deportation of Simon Zukas, a European involved in the ANC and an advocate of worker political involvement. When management dismissed Chapoloko and others involved in the strike, Katilungu did not protest. Later in March 1953, Katilungu withdrew the union’s support for Congress’ two days of national prayer to protest British support for federation. Katilungu claimed participation in the strike would bring massive dismissals and threaten the union. He believed the union’s job was to fight for a better position for African miners, and so refused to countenance political action which might endanger worker interests.⁷⁸

THE UNION, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND CLASS ACTION

This contrast between the African union’s aggressive pursuit of collective labor action in the industrial sphere, and its ambivalent relations with Congress, has long puzzled scholars. Most Copperbelt studies have accepted Epstein’s hypothesis that the distinctive, unitary nature of mine work and the mine compounds produced a parochial group consciousness which encouraged commitment to trade unionism, but obscured class identity at the workplace and in the political arena. Berger even questions the existence of group solidarity among the miners and stresses the divisions within the union. Henderson is more aware of the miners’ role in the development of nationalist politics, but also questions the degree of class consciousness or even trade union consciousness among the miners.⁷⁹

Such scholars not only underestimate the consciousness of the stabilized black miners, they also underestimate their commitment to forming a broadly-based worker organization and the ability to bring along fellow miners in this effort. In addition, they devalue miner belief in nationalist politics.

As we have seen, the early union leaders were stabilized miners, most of whom already supported worker solidarity and collective labor action. Comrie’s lessons on trade unionism further clarified this perception. As Mwendapole recalled, “Comrie taught us that we must organize ourselves, that when we got organized we could improve this or remove that.”⁸⁰ A number of Comrie’s early followers recalled being deeply affected by his lectures, particularly his insistence on the need for worker solidarity.⁸¹ The very structure of the work force, moreover, forced the stabilized miners to identify with the work force as a whole. Although a larger percentage of the higher groups belonged to the union, there were more lower group members. At Roan, for example, 46% of Groups 6 through Special Group (6% of the work force) were union members, while 19% of Groups 1 through 4 (85% of the work force) belonged to the union. However, Groups 1 through 3 held 60% of the union membership.⁸² The numerical preponderance of less-skilled miners kept the union leaders from adopting an exclusivist orientation and all but forced them to stress solidarity regardless of ethnic or occupational identities.

In order to broaden its appeal, the union deliberately addressed problems which affected both lower- and higher-grade miners. After winning an initial wage increase in 1949, the union turned its attention to housing and compound conditions. Branch officials held regular interviews with the African personnel managers to discuss specific complaints. In 1949, for example, the Roan union branch asked for roofs over the latrines and showers, for wash slabs in the washing blocks, sluices in latrine floors, and doors for kitchens. The Supreme Council requested better housing and increased rations for everyone, as well as electric lights in compound housing. Wage demands always included advances for all grades. The union also demanded special improvements for higher-grade miners, such as special shades and gauze for better housing, an inclusive wage covering the cost of food, and improvements in special and improved-type housing.⁸³ Thus, as much as possible, the demands aimed to increase the union’s popularity with the entire work force.

The trade union leaders taught trade union principles and built commitment to the union through monthly public meetings. These meetings attracted large crowds; attendance ran as high as 8,000 or more. Fanny Musumbulwa recalled that “if union people called a meeting, you can even see men and women and children listening to the union men talking.”⁸⁴ The local Executive Committee ran the meetings, but rank and file participation in discussions was encouraged. Workers were reassured that “the changa-changa cannot discharge you for staying in the Union,” and in general were encouraged to believe that only the union could bring them more improvements.⁸⁵ Unity was also stressed. As one leader put it:

The union emphasized all people were workers, as one tribe. People felt very strongly about that. We had trade union leaders from different tribes. This broke up the tribal divisions. For example if someone said I’m from Ngoni, I’m from this and that, but when these leaders came to speak at the meeting, it doesn’t matter whether they are Bemba, Ngoni, for they all went to hear the trade union meeting, it was for the trade union not for Bemba, not for Ngoni, or any other tribe, but it was for everybody, and when the changes came they came for everyone.⁸⁶

At both the large monthly meetings and in the daily bustle of the branch office, union leaders denounced ethnic and occupational divisions, insisting that “there must be brotherly feelings and true fellowship in every Trade Union.”⁸⁷ These “lessons” helped to overcome ethnic and occupational differences and bred the capacity for class identity.

Union leaders also emphasized the stability of the black work force, the unequal rewards given to black and white labor on the mines, and the need to organize effective action to reduce these inequalities. As far as Katilungu was concerned, “Labor in the Copperbelt was stable.” He framed union demands on the assumption that African miners were full and permanent members of the industrial work force. This position legitimized union demands, for if African miners were fully committed industrial laborers, the union could legitimately claim the same rights and needs as European labor. The gap in remuneration between black and white labor, said the leaders, should reflect occupational differences rather than color. They also pointed to the readily visible differences in the living standards of black labor as proof for their argument. This in fact became a constant theme. For example, in 1951 Katilungu argued that “the Europeans employed on the mine were supplied with furniture and electric light, therefore it was not thought too much for the Africans to ask for electric lights in all houses.” A year earlier, the union demanded a profit-sharing scheme for African miners identical to that enjoyed by European miners.⁸⁸

The process of negotiating with the companies further sharpened worker perceptions. Management’s frequent refusals to accede to union demands clarified, and even dramatized, the class cleavages. The frequent deflection or outright refusal of union demands, support for the tribal representatives, the refusal to grant a closed shop, and the last-minute compromise on a profit-sharing scheme, together with frequent minor irritations, magnified awareness of management’s hostility. Katilungu expressed this when he complained that “the Union leaders . . . were surprised when they heard the Chairman continually say ‘no’ to their requests.”⁸⁹ With each unsuccessful negotiation, both union leaders and members grew more aware of the antagonism between workers and management.

Miners increasingly turned to branch officials for help with their problems. Matthew Mwendapole, a branch official at Nchanga, recalled that “there were always a lot of people in the office, all complaining about different things. I would go to morning council, and then I would stay there all day till 10 o’clock in the evening. People would come through complaining about this and complaining about that.”⁹⁰ Even unsuccessful negotiations failed to stop the union’s growth, for most miners perceived the futility of alternative forms of labor protest. They believed that the union was a weapon which would make management realize that “we are not people to play with.”⁹¹ Union leaders promised future successes if the workers remained solidly behind the union. Clearly this promise was enough, for by 1951 almost all miners were pro-union. As Mwendapole recalled, “Once the miners grasped the whole thing, that the Trade Union was the only tool, the only instrument of change, they became very committed to it.”⁹²

Commitment to the union and willingness to act collectively was undoubtedly encouraged by historical circumstances as well. The labor department quieted fears of company reprisals. Both the 1952 strike and the vote against the tribal representatives occurred during the government and Colonial Office campaign to “sell” Africans on the advantages of Federation. Consequently, government officials refused to support drastic measures to break the 1952 strike, the union’s ability to maintain control over the strikers and the threat of cooperation between white and black miners left the companies no real alternative to arbitration.⁹³ In this atmosphere, the mines could do little to affect the tribunal appointed by the Colonial Office. Indeed, despite testimony by the companies against a wage increase, the tribunal awarded a substantial across-the-board wage increase.⁹⁴ According to informants, this award and the successful veto of the tribal representatives proved union effectiveness, and increased support for the union.⁹⁵

Thus, by 1953 most miners recognized their identity of interests in opposition to management, and were prepared to act collectively to secure their group interests. Although daily social interaction in the mine compounds generally followed ethnic and occupational lines, these divisions did not inhibit worker solidarity during industrial conflict. In fact, during the 1952 strike the black miners proved themselves capable of transcending racial divisions by their alliance with white mine labor. This has been explained as mere middle-class aspirations, but such a view ignores the nature of the white miners on the Copperbelt, their long traditions of militant worker organization, and the capacity for white and black miners to understand their common status as workers. Such interracial cooperation is further proof of the degree to which consciousness of class position, commitment to class action, and willingness to form worker organizations was entrenched among the black miners by the early 1950s.

STABILIZATION AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG THE BLACK MINERS

What of the political consciousness of the black miners? We have seen that as wage labor on the Copperbelt became a permanent condition of life, class consciousness and commitment to class action developed as well. Following the approach used by Perrings and Gutkind,⁹⁶ one would predict the eventual recognition by these miners of the need to pursue class ends through political action. However, as already noted, the African Mineworkers’ Union refused to cooperate with the nationalist efforts. This apparent lack of interest in the nationalist movement has led scholars to question the existence of miner populist or a political consciousness. Indeed, the Copperbelt case has been used to attack the assumption of an inevitable link between political action and organized labor in Africa.⁹⁷

A closer look at the evidence suggests a different interpretation. True enough, management and the state were prepared to thwart union actions, despite conciliatory efforts surrounding the Federation campaign. Government officials might refuse to interfere in industrial disputes, but they had no qualms about stopping an alliance between the union and Congress. Labor officers and company officials insisted that the union must remain outside politics, and threatened dire consequences to worker advancement if this advice was not followed. Comrie made this one of his basic trade union principles, but his vision did not go unchallenged.

Katilungu’s behavior while President of the Union indicates as much. His involvement in the African National Congress (ANC), his growing suspicions of a corporate-state alliance, and his participation in the planning of Congress’s national prayer days indicate considerable commitment to political action by the union. According to an informant, he withdrew from the two-day protest only after his followers had been threatened with dismissal. The companies had already fired workers at Nkana for a political strike over the Zukas affair, and Katilungu realized this was not an idle threat.⁹⁸ In 1953, at the union’s annual conference, Katilungu warned the delegates that “he had heard at Caux that the government wanted to restrict the activities of the African trade unions. They only wanted an opportunity to show that they were deviating from the constitution.” He believed an unofficial strike supporting ANC might provide that excuse.⁹⁹ When faced with a choice between massive disruption on the mines and possible loss of employment for miners in an economy offering few alternatives, Katilungu’s decision to keep the union outside politics is understandable as a pragmatic solution to limited options, rather than proof of a lack of political consciousness.

The evidence from oral interviews and other sources reveals considerable commitment to the nationalist cause among miners.¹⁰⁰ There was widespread support for Congress among the miners during this period. As we have seen, many trade union leaders were active in both ANC and the Trade Union Congress. A leader of the trade union and Congress at Chibuluma recalled that “the trade union in 1951 was more a political party than a trade union. That is why the government did not like it.”¹⁰¹ Miners figured prominently in Congress, and used methods pioneered by the union to build political parties. The union “made people like the importance of meetings. We called big meetings. This was before the Congress came into being. People got used to meetings so when these things about the government were talked over, they went too.”¹⁰² As one informant stated, the trade union “was the mother of the political parties. She had only to guide it as children.”¹⁰³

Most miners supported the nationalist movement for the same reasons as other Africans. They believed popular self-rule would bring a better life for all Northern Rhodesians. They feared Southern Rhodesia would be the hegemonic force in the Federation, and had no desire to see its institutions prevail in their nation.¹⁰⁴

The limitations on miner political consciousness stemmed in part from the ambiguous connection between management and the state. Since the establishment of the African Mineworker’s Union in 1949, the government, or at least the labor department, had appeared to be impartial, if not openly favorable, to the cause of the miners. In 1953, for example, the Guillebaud Tribunal settled a strike in their favor, largely to mollify African discontent over the Federation issue. While outright coercion by government officials emphasized the special relationship between government and the companies, the alliance between government and management was still far from clear.¹⁰⁵ Even those miners who agreed with Simon Zukas that “a trade union must act politically in defense of its members” did not recognize the potential contradictions between the goals of the African union and the nationalist movement. Congress promised to improve the relative position of Africans and white men, and to stop the color bar, both fundamental tenets of the union.¹⁰⁶ The militants had no more revolutionary vision of society in mind at this point.¹⁰⁷ They simply advocated using the union’s organizational powers to support political causes in the belief that the African miners would gain from African political advancement. They recognized the need for worker political action, but did not yet differentiate between nationalist and class politics.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how the stabilized miners used the African Mineworkers’ Union to strengthen class consciousness and unionism among the black mine work force. At the same time, we have seen the limitations placed on the union by the government and the companies—limitations which forced politically conscious miners to shun union involvement in nationalist politics. This case reinforces the need to separate consciousness from behavior, and to study the development of both within a specific historical context.