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The Copper Industry in the Colonial Period

THE SETTING

When the British South Africa Company (BSA) took over Northern Rhodesia in 1889, the Copperbelt was a sparsely inhabited, narrow strip of country, about 80 miles long, in the north-central section of the country. About 4,000 feet above sea level and approximately 13° south of the equator, the rocky infertile soil discouraged productive farming. The infertility, however, was compensated for by the rich mineral deposits, particularly copper ore,¹ which had been worked by the local Lamba people since the seventeenth century. By the late nineteenth century little mining occurred, and visitors described the area as a “flat, barely undulating land, covered with mile upon square mile of thin but tall forest, which for the most of the time obscures a traveller’s view and tends to give an impression of ever-expanding monotony.”²

By the end of the colonial period in 1964, the Copperbelt had five bustling industrial centers, three smaller mining towns, and a population of about 544,000 people. Ndola (pop. 89,000) was its manufacturing and commercial center as well as the provincial capital. The largest city on the Copperbelt, Kitwe (popl. 90,000), had grown up around Rhokana (Nkana) mine. Due to its central location, Kitwe developed more retail, service, and administrative functions than the other mining towns. Smaller mining centers developed at the three other large mines on the Copperbelt: Chingola (Nchanga copper mine), Mufulira (Mufulira copper mine), and Luanshya (Roan Antelope copper mine). In 1964 these towns had populations of 48,000, 73,000, and 62,000 respectively. Smaller towns grew up at Chambeshi, Kalulushi, and Chililabomwe, but they were purely mining centers.³

Clearly a major transformation had occurred on the Copperbelt during the colonial period, a transformation that altered both the Northern Rhodesian economy and the working world of many Northern Rhodesians. This study will examine the impact of the transformation on the attitudes and behavior of those Northern Rhodesians who worked in the mines, with particular emphasis on the gradual development of class consciousness and class actions among the copper miners.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When the British first entered Northern Rhodesia, they encountered five major peoples: the Lozi, Tonga, Bemba, Ngoni, and Kazembe. Centered on the Kafue flood plains, the Lozi Kingdom was a hierarchical state based on cattle, agriculture and trade, and extensive use of slave labor. The Tonga in the south practiced mixed farming, and lived in large unfortified villages with central enclosures for their cattle. Using Zulu war tactics, the Ngoni had set up a powerful state in southeastern Zambia, where they augmented agriculture and cattle herding with raids and tribute from neighbors. In the nineteenth century the Bemba had turned their warrior tradition to good use, and raided far and wide for slaves and ivory. The Kazembe of the Luapula region also joined this trade to the east, but they declined in importance relative to the Bemba, who became the terror of the northeastern plateau.⁴

At the Berlin Conference in 1885, the British successfully pressed their claim for central Africa. Eager to block Portuguese and Belgian expansion, in 1889 the British government gave Cecil Rhodes a charter for his British South Africa Company, which gave him mineral rights and the authority to make treaties with African rulers giving the Company administrative powers. Rhodes, who had made a fortune in South African diamonds, immediately sent Company representatives north to take over the area’s potential riches. By 1891 border disputes had been settled, the Company’s occupation rights had been recognized, and in 1897 the area was officially named Northern Rhodesia.

The Company set about administering the territory for its own profit, but soon realized the low-grade ores discovered at Broken Hill and Ndola (Bwana Mkubwa mines) would never yield significant profits. Company officials began to see Northern Rhodesia as a labor reserve for mines in Southern Rhodesia and Katanga, where the Belgian copper company, Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK), provided jobs and freight traffic on the BSA-controlled railroad linking Katanga with South Africa. In order to force Africans into wage labor, the Company levied taxes and permitted corporate recruiting. It also encouraged white farmers and traders to settle in the territory to supply food and trade goods to the mines, and the settler population slowly increased, reaching 3,500 in 1921.⁵

The European settlers resented the Company’s restrictive land and mineral policies, and soon began agitating for an end to its rule. In an effort to reduce expenditures, Company officials suggested amalgamating the two Rhodesias, which only increased settler opposition. Assuming they could exert more power if Northern Rhodesia became a Crown Colony with a legislative council, the settlers appealed to the Colonial Office for help. Weighed down by administrative expenses, the Company agreed to hand over Northern Rhodesia as long as they could retain mineral rights in the northwest—a seemingly minor concession which would eventually yield enormous profits. In 1924, the Colonial Office took over the colony and set up a legislative council, which, although dominated by government officials, included five members elected by a predominately European franchise.

Colonial Office rule did little to change Northern Rhodesia. Britain was mainly concerned that the colony support itself and strengthen links with southern Africa. In order to encourage white settlement, the first governor set aside blocks of land for European use. It was mainly along the line of rail, which had the best soil and access to markets. African reserves were set up, mostly on inferior land. Overcrowding and food shortages soon plagued the reserves, pushing more Africans into wage labor. The new Copperbelt mines (started in 1926) and the European farms quickly absorbed this increase. Indeed, labor shortages plagued central Africa until the Depression.

After the Depression, the Northern Rhodesian economy expanded as did the size and affluence of the settler community. By 1943, the mines employed 32,805 Africans and 3,566 whites. European farming and trading expanded as well and by 1951 there were 37,097 Europeans in the country. That same year, the mines employed over 5,000 Europeans.⁶ The European miners organized a union to protect themselves from African competition, and joined other settlers pressing for greater representation in the Legislative Council. The settlers resented the way BSA royalties and British tax levies drained the colony’s resources and inhibited development. After the war non-officials gained a majority, but only because government nominated more of them. The settlers began to talk of amalgamating with the larger and more powerful Southern Rhodesian settler community, but the Colonial Office steadfastly refused a solution so inimical to metropolitan profits.

Africans in Northern Rhodesia opposed amalgamation. Unlike the mines to the south, the Copperbelt companies stabilized their more skilled black mineworkers. These men led two major strikes, fought for worker representation, and in 1949 became the leaders of the newly established African Mineworkers’ Union (AMWU). They knew about labor conditions in Southern Rhodesia, and did not want them brought north. The African petty bourgeoisie developing in the towns harbored similar fears, and the two groups set about establishing welfare associations to protect African interests in the towns. In 1946 these associations convened to discuss territory-wide political problems, and formed a Federation of African Societies. Two years later this became the Northern Rhodesian Congress, a forerunner of African nationalist political parties.

Frustrated by their inability to control the colonial state, and their fear of the growing African petty bourgeoisie and proletariat, leading settlers cast about for new solutions. They discovered that while Britain rejected amalgamation, it would accept a federation. The labor Government wanted only a guarantee that African political power would increase. In 1951, the Conservatives came to power. Less concerned about African interests, the Conservatives wanted the settlers, rather than Britain, to deal with African pressures for political and economic advancement. Once convinced by the mining companies and settlers that British interests would not be jeopardized, federation seemed an attractive solution.

Instead of appeasing Africans, the threat of federation stimulated an African drive for political power. Africans sensed that Southern Rhodesia would be the dominant partner, and feared an extension of Southern Rhodesian institutions into Northern Rhodesia. Everyone rallied to the cause. Political activity centered around the Northern Rhodesian Congress, which was renamed the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (ANC) in 1951. A former teacher, Harry Nkumbula, was elected president, and Congress set about organizing opposition to federation. The AMWU cooperated until the threat of massive dismissals forced it to abandon ANC plans for a national prayer against federation. Despite African protests, in August 1953 the Rhodesias and Nyasaland became the Central African Federation amidst promises of equal partnership and prosperity for all.

Initially, federation seemed promising to whites in Northern Rhodesia. African resistance had failed. Copper prices rose, creating more jobs; by 1956 over 7,000 Europeans worked on the copper mines. Prosperity attracted immigrants, and the white population rose from 49,000 in 1953 to 72,000 in 1958. The Europeans, however, could not stimulate expansion of trade and industry alone. African buying power would have to increase as well. A number of Europeans understood this, but faced formidable obstacles. The harsh land and sparse African population (4 million in 1975) inhibited growth. More importantly, Southern Rhodesia used its dominant position to monopolize the economic benefits of federation. Northern Rhodesian revenues were funneled into Southern Rhodesian projects, and by 1963 the territory had lost more than £97 million to the rest of the Federation. The economic arguments for federation diminished among Europeans and even more so among Africans. Increasingly, only fears of a black government kept Northern Rhodesian whites tied to the Federation.⁷

The Africans resented their inferior position in the Federation, and African nationalism soon revived. Radical mine workers called for political action, and in 1954 Congress supported the union’s campaign to stop management from removing its more skilled members. Management won with state support, and effectively forced the AMWU out of national politics until the early 1960s. Despite this dissaffection, by 1958 African public opinion against the Federation had been aroused, and Congress branches once again sprang up throughout the country. Support broadened as falling copper prices and declining construction constricted economic opportunities. New leaders determined to create an independent African state joined Congress and began to challenge Nkumbula. Led by Kenneth Kaunda, the young radicals split from ANC in 1958 and formed a new party, the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). In 1959 the party was banned and several leaders were jailed, but this only inflamed public opinion, and another party was soon formed, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Kaunda was released from jail in early 1960, and took over the leadership.

By this time, British officials and far-sighted settlers recognized the inevitability of majority rule in Northern Rhodesia. The Federation was crumbling under pressure from African nationalists and independence-seeking Southern Rhodesian whites. Some leading Northern Rhodesian whites realized African rule would be better than continued Federal maltreatment. The Colonial Office preferred a dependent black government in Northern Rhodesia to the headstrong settlers running the Federation. In 1961, the Colonial Office deliberately proposed a Northern Rhodesian constitution which would establish an African majority in the legislature. The Federal prime minister managed to get this revised, but only at the price of a UNIP civil disobedience campaign. After some violence, the 1962 constitution was revised again and UNIP agreed to participate. In October 1962 UNIP and ANC won two-thirds of the vote. The Federation broke up in late 1963, and soon afterwards UNIP won a decisive majority in the first election based on universal suffrage. The new government convinced the BSA Company to surrender its mineral royalties, and on 24 October 1964, Northern Rhodesia became the independent nation of Zambia with Kenneth Kaunda as president. ANC and other opposition parties continued until 1972, when Kaunda declared Zambia a one-party state.⁸

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTHERN RHODESIAN COPPER INDUSTRY

Cecil Rhodes’ dream of establishing a second Rand had proved an empty hope in the barren hillsides of Northern Rhodesia. Edmund Davis,⁹ an associate of Rhodes, discovered lead and zinc in 1902 at Broken Hill (now Kabwe) just below the Copperbelt region, and staked copper claims called Roan Antelope, Rietbok, and Bwana Mkubwa in the area which was to become the Copperbelt. But these prospects were overshadowed by the discovery of more easily treated ore in neighboring Katanga. Under the control of the Belgian mining company UMHK, Katanga was soon producing large quantities of low-priced copper.¹⁰

No attempts were made to utilize Northern Rhodesian copper until the rise in copper prices in the world market in the 1920s. The price rise induced Davis to seek more capital for his struggling Northern Rhodesian copper mine, Bwana Mkubwa. He managed to interest A. Chester Beatty,¹¹ an American mining financier based in London, whose holding company, Selection Trust Ltd., provided some funds in 1920.¹² In 1924 Sir Ernest O. Oppenheimer,¹³ founder of the Anglo-American Company of South Africa (AA), provided further assistance.¹⁴

New prospecting soon revealed large deposits of sulfide ore at workable depths just below the topmost layers of oxide ore. Following the discovery in 1911 of a flotation method drastically lowering the cost of processing sulfide ores, the Copperbelt ores became a highly lucrative investment opportunity, and systematic mining began.¹⁵

The early capital for Rhodesian copper production came primarily as a result of European and South African reaction to the American strangle hold on the world copper market. In 1926, eighteen major American copper producers and ten foreign associates had agreed to limit production and control sales through a new organization, Copper Exporters Inc. (CEI). It fixed the export price of American copper, and acted as a clearing-house for foreign transactions. Between 1927 and 1929, CEI controlled 85% of world copper production, and in 1930–31 it boasted 78% of it. European buyers answered with a strike against the Americans in 1929, and also poured investments into Northern Rhodesian copper properties in the hope of selling directly to the European market without American interference.¹⁶

Two mining interests were firmly established on the Copperbelt by 1928. Beatty, backed by large infusions of capital from American Metal Company, formed the Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST) as a holding company for multifarious activities in Northern Rhodesia.¹⁷ American Metal sent Arthur D. Storke, one of their senior mining engineers, to watch company interests in London. Throughout the colonial period, American Metal representatives participated in RST board meetings and technical advisors visited the Copperbelt four or five times a year to check on the mines and give technical advice. This was all done with a light touch. “American Metal’s policy was to let the RST companies manage themselves,” although the Chairman, Harold Hochschild, influenced RST at a number of crucial points.¹⁸

That same year, AA Company grouped its various interests under a new holding company, with capital of £2,500,000, called Rhodesian Anglo-American Ltd. Finances were arranged in London, while technical, buying, and other services were organized by AA headquarters in Johannesburg.¹⁹ In 1931, the refinancing of the AA holdings brought in new capital and talent through the addition of Rio Tinto headed by Sir Auckland Geddes²⁰ and the Messrs. Rothschilds. Geddes provided the Company with important connections in the British Government and Washington, and encouraged cooperation between the Rhodesian Selection Trust mines and AA holdings. The Rhodesian AA Company changed its name to Rhokana Corporation Ltd. in 1931, with Geddes as Chairman, Ernest Oppenheimer and Edmund Davis as Deputy Chairmen, and Leslie Pollak and S. S. Taylor as managing directors in South Africa and London, respectively.²¹

The new copper mines were soon divided between the two major investors on the Copperbelt. Beatty’s Selection Trust incorporated the Roan Antelope and Mufulira mines in 1927 and 1930 respectively. The AA Company established the Rhokana Corporation in 1931 to manage Nkana mine. In 1937, after a series of difficulties, Anglo-American incorporated the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., which eventually became the second-largest open pit copper mine in the world.²²

RHODESIAN COPPER AND THE WORLD MARKET

By the time Northern Rhodesia copper entered the world market in 1931, the Depression had drastically cut overall world demand. Copper accumulated in the producer countries during the slump. Prices dropped precipitously from £112.635s per ton in 1929 to £27.25s per ton in February 1932, and a 4¢ per pound tariff on copper imports effectively closed the American market to foreign production. Both Nchanga and Mufulira closed, and the two remaining mines sharply cut back production.²³

Because of the low costs of both the sulfide production process and African labor, Rhodesian copper still had a competitive advantage on the world market. The earliest copper from Rhodesia (blister copper) could be landed in Europe for 3.5¢ per pound (£23 per long ton). Comparable copper from America cost 9–10¢ per pound, while South American blister copper could be landed in New York City for 9.96¢ per pound.²⁴ This gave Rhodesian producers an important competitive edge, which Oppenheimer claimed could even withstand a price war with other copper producers. Indeed, by 1935, copper from Northern Rhodesia could be produced and landed in London for £20 per ton, with further expansion and efficiency promising even lower prices in the future.²⁵

Gradually the Depression lifted and the mines began to recover. Mufulira reopened in October 1933, and production facilities expanded at all three major mines. Rhokana began construction on an electrolytic refinery.²⁶ Total production on the Copperbelt rose from 6,000 long tons in 1929, to 68,000 long tons in 1932. By 1935, the mines were producing 153,790 long tons, or 10% of the free-world production.²⁷

But fluctuating prices and erratic demand pushed even the competitively advantaged Northern Rhodesian copper mines into cooperation with other copper producers. In 1935, the Northern Rhodesian companies initiated a scheme to limit production in order to raise prices. They were joined by Rio Tinto, Katanga’s Union Miniere, Kennecott’s Chilean subsidiary, the Braden Copper Company, and three foreign subsidiaries of Anaconda, which collectively established production quotas of 20% and 30% on 1 May 1935 and 1 June 1935. The cartel encouraged “a large output sold at a moderate price, rather than restricted production at a higher price.” When copper reached £45 per long ton restrictions would be removed.²⁸

As the world moved towards war, the demand for copper rose briskly and prices followed accordingly. By the end of 1936, production lagged behind demand and all restrictions were removed. Except for a brief period from December 1937 to September 1938, Rhodesian production increased dramatically, and by 1938, Rhodesian mines supplied 13.42% of the free-world market,²⁹ ranking sixth in the Empire for value of mineral production.³⁰ The cartel remained in operation until 1939, when the British government assumed control of production and distribution. Copper prices were set at £43.50s per long ton, and production expanded rapidly to supply the equipment of war. In 1943 Rhodesian production peaked at 251,000 long tons, or nearly four times the 1932 output. The next few years were plagued by technical difficulties, and demand declined quickly with the end of the war, so that in 1946 only 182,000 long tons of copper were produced. The Copperbelt’s share of the free-world market fell to 11.05%, and the mines prepared for the “inevitable” postwar slump.³¹

Much to the surprise of the companies, demand for copper shot up after the war. The 1949 devaluation of the pound raised copper prices overnight by 44%, and the price of copper on the world market doubled between 1945 and 1947, moving from £62 to £131 per long ton. By 1955, copper sold for £352 per long ton on the London Metal Exchange, owing to demand from reconstruction projects designed to rebuild from the ravages of war.³² Although costs for producing Rhodesian copper had risen to £33.12s.50d per long ton by 1945, the world price sustained the competitiveness of Rhodesian copper.³³ By 1954, production on the Copperbelt reached a record 379,000 long tons, or 16.16% of free-world production. Two new mines, Bancroft and Chibuluma, opened, and Nchanga and Mufulira were enlarged; their production levels soon overtook the two older mines, Roan and Rhokana. By 1960, Northern Rhodesia was the world’s second largest producer of copper and in 1964 Zambia entered the world as a leading copper supplier with a yearly output of 633,000 long tons valued at £164,300,000.³⁴

PROFITABILITY OF THE MINES

Profitability of mining industries has always been limited by price fluctuations, the wasting nature of the asset, and the high risks. This has led mining investors to demand high returns on investment. The Northern Rhodesian copper mines were no exception to this pattern, but initial investments provided few dividends. For example, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. closed during the Depression and paid no dividends for thirteen years. Roan Antelope did not declare a dividend until 1935. The copper companies were not free of funded indebtedness until 1938, but by 1936 dividends began to increase. In 1937–38, Rhokana paid a 62-1/2% dividend, and Roan paid dividends of 80% and 20% in the same years.³⁵ However, most of the profits were reinvested in the mines. Before 1941, the shareholders’ total return had been about £17,000,000 after taxes on an investment of £25,000,000, a fact which pressured management to minimize production costs.³⁶

Profits soared after WWII. World demand pushed up the price of copper to its peak of £420 per long ton in March of 1956. That year Roan Antelope paid 100% dividends, Mufulira 125%, Nchanga 150%, and Rhokana 200%. The slump in copper prices in 1957 and 1958 reduced profits temporarily,³⁷ but markets recovered in 1959. By March 1960, copper prices were £250 per long ton. Profits increased accordingly. Nchanga reported an increase of 175% that year, with the effective net dividend rate up 124%.³⁸ When the new government of Zambia came to power, the mines were well-established and highly profitable enterprises that paid high dividends and owned rich ore reserves.³⁹ The future of the industry seemed secure. Despite partial nationalization of the industry in 1969, Anglo-American (now Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines) and RST (now Roan Consolidated Copper Mines) continue to mine copper in cooperation with the state holding company, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation Limited (ZIMCO).⁴⁰

THE COPPER INDUSTRY AND LABOR

Corporate labor policy in the copper industry has always been constrained by the nature of the production process and the position of copper in the global economy. Unlike gold mining, copper cannot be profitably produced by unskilled labor in small mining operations. Rather, it depends on having sufficient accessible high-grade ore, enough capital to develop it, and a reliable skilled labor force capable of mining and producing the copper. Of course, all mining companies strive to minimize costs, especially during periods of global economic contraction, but mining costs can be reduced most efficiently by improving labor skills, and then rationalizing labor through improved technology. This constant need to upgrade the skills of copper miners shaped corporate labor policies of the mining companies. It led to stabilization and expansion of African skills, and eventually to the substitution of some African miners for more expensive European mine labor, all of which had important implications for the development of the Northern Rhodesian working class.⁴¹

Initially most African labor in the copper mines was unskilled. Although there were 30,000 workers by 1930, labor arrangements were still fairly simple. African employees lived in compounds which were owned and controlled by the mines. The compound manager supervised all aspects of African labor. Although a small number of skilled miners worked for longer periods, most miners left within a year. Men contracted to work on the ticket system, in which they worked thirty days out of thirty-five or forty. The Africans were organized in gangs of ten to twelve men, with an African supervisor, or boss boy, acting as intermediary between his gang and the immediate European supervisor. Some of the boss boys even had blasting licenses.⁴²

In 1941 a new wage structure was created to provide greater inducements to skilled black workers by widening the differentials between the highest and lowest pay categories. Grade A included all workers who had undergone some training, those in highly responsible jobs, and those literate in English. Boss boys holding blasting licenses and first aid certificates, senior clerks, drivers, carpenters, and electric motor drivers were in this category. Grade B was an intermediate group with a certain amount of mechanical skill and knowledge, such as boss boys with blasting licenses, second-grade clerks, second-grade artisans, police corporals, and others. Grade C covered unskilled labor and all black workers not in higher grades.⁴³

In response to impending African unionization, in 1948 the companies established a more elaborate system of labor classification which provided for seven groups and a special group for surface employees, and eight groups and a special group for underground employees. Groups 1 and 2 were composed entirely of unskilled laborers, and made up more than half the labor force. Groups 3 and 4 were laborers, and served as promotion groups for less-skilled long-service miners. Group 4 included most African mine police, watchmen, caretakers, and other experienced workers. Groups 5 and 6 were semiskilled, such as carpenters, bricklayers, and other artisans without apprenticeships, while Groups 7 and 8 were the boss boys and mine clerks. In the special group were a few highly trained workers whom management hoped eventually could be promoted to replace expensive European miners.⁴⁴

In 1954, the companies finally forced the European Mineworkers’ Union (MWU) to permit African advancement into formerly European-controlled jobs. Those jobs remaining with the MWU were listed as “Schedule A,” and those released to Africans were “Schedule B.” Intermediate posts were created to bridge the gap between African advancees and the established African grades. Those grades were extended to 13, with 1–3 being unskilled, 4–7 semiskilled, and 8–13 skilled. The companies differentiated between supervisory, staff, and daily-paid miners. Supervisors’ main function was “to direct, control, inspect and assist the work of subordinate employees, although they may on occasion carry out manual or semiskilled work.” Staff employees’ “work mainly involves either the application of some degree of skill in clerical, health, welfare and training departments or calls for special trust in the handling of money or confidential matters or whose work, or the responsibility involved therein, is of a similar general nature to that performed by European staff employees.”⁴⁵ Despite violent protests by the African union, supervisory and staff employees were pushed into a separate association, the Mines African Staff Association (MASA). Since most advancees fell into these categories, this strategy weakened the union and put many of the most experienced miners in an organization without a strike clause.

Despite friction between MASA and the union, in 1961 the two joined forces to demand a unitary wage scale for black and white miners. The government appointed a Commission, chaired by Sir Ronald Morison, which suggested increasing wages in order to close the gap between African and European wages. Progress in this direction came to a halt in 1964, when the mines were permitted to base their Zambianization plans on a dual-wage scale with separate rates for Africans and Europeans.⁴⁶

THE IMPACT OF THE COPPER INDUSTRY ON THE NORTHERN RHODESIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

The copper industry was confined to a very small segment of the Northern Rhodesian economy. The highly technical nature of the industry and its export orientation limited the growth of secondary industries. Mining equipment was usually purchased abroad; the skilled European labor force spent much of their large salaries on expensive imported goods; and transportation difficulties and poor land limited economic opportunities outside the line of rail. The secondary industries that did develop catered to the small expatriate communities along the line of rail. Copper dominated the export market, being responsible for 86.5% of the value of all exports between 1945 and 1953 and roughly the same proportion during the Federation years.⁴⁷

This dominance inevitably linked the financial status of the Northern Rhodesian Government with the prosperity of the copper industry. The mines were the largest taxpayers in the country, and when corporate profits fell so did government revenue. In the 1930s the industry even bailed out the government with early income tax payments. This relative dependency increased after WWII when corporate taxes to the government nearly doubled.⁴⁸ When the Anglo-American and RST companies moved their headquarters from London to Salisbury in 1951 and 1953 respectively, the government share of revenues rose once again. But this windfall was soon swallowed up by the Federation, as Northern Rhodesia subsidized the rest of the Federation at an average annual rate of £8 million.⁴⁹ The British South Africa Company royalty rights also deprived Northern Rhodesia of much needed income.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, what revenue Northern Rhodesia had remained firmly tied to the prosperity of the copper industry.

The dependence upon copper revenues shaped Northern Rhodesian government and Colonial Office policies. While settler complaints spurred the Colonial Office takeover of Northern Rhodesia in 1924,⁵¹ the colonial state was primarily concerned with facilitating primitive accumulation and the transfer of surplus to the metropole. Since the copper industry was far and away the most important source of surplus for the government and for British stockholders, the Northern Rhodesian government was closely attuned to its needs, especially by the late 1930s when the long-term viability of the mines became more apparent. Not surprisingly, most government development projects after 1935 directly assisted the copper industry. Infrastructures relating to copper production and distribution received priority, and government townships were built near the mines to provide services which would attract a European labor force. When settlers, particularly the white mineworkers, opposed corporate policies, the Colonial Office generally supported the corporations. Even policies created to help the Africans, such as the Development Plan of 1947–57, were diverted to serve the needs of the European sector.⁵²

Like all states, however, the colonial government in Northern Rhodesia had to mediate between competing fractions of the dominant class. The settlers exerted some pressure through representatives on the Legislative Council, and some of the settlers and many of the missionaries had influential friends in London. Government officials often had little use for settlers, especially the Afrikaners, but they could not entirely ignore them.⁵³ As a result, the state made certain concessions to the settlers, as in 1928–29, when native reserves were set up to limit African access to land near important markets. A Maize Control Board, established in 1936, kept the maize price artificially high, which protected European farmers from small-scale African competitors. And while both settlers and African farmers suffered during WWII, settler influence increased in 1948 with the achievements of an elected majority in the Legislative Council.⁵⁴

The Northern Rhodesian government tried to placate both the mines and the settlers by providing them with sufficient cheap controllable African labor. To that end, the state limited opportunities to earn cash in the rural sector by creating “native reserves,” neglecting transport facilities outside the line of rail, and controlling African access to European markets. Taxation drove men into the wage labor market, where they could obtain cash which was not available in the rural areas. Migration out of the rural areas further eroded the rural economy, and led to an ever-expanding need for participation in wage labor.⁵⁵ The state also supported a labor recruiting agency until the Depression created a glut on the labor market. In the wage sector itself, laws regulating labor organization and labor contracts gave Europeans some legal power over African employees. The state also permitted employers to control labor through Northern Rhodesian variants of the South African compound system, and in the early years virtually left the governance of the mine compounds to the copper companies.

Government officials offered limited services to Africans and cited these as proof of colonial benevolence. “A generalized, simple, yet persuasive ideology of imperial governance was fostered,”⁵⁶ which, however, ignored the fact that African taxes paid for most programs that directly benefited European employers.⁵⁷ Education provided the necessary skills for jobs not reserved for Europeans and health facilities increased worker productivity and reduced the danger of disease for European workers. Even the limited agricultural extension services subsidized labor costs. Although the early stabilization of mine labor gradually moved much of the burden of labor reproduction to the mine townships, the mines still benefited from the rural economy’s capacity to absorb the costs of retired and injured workers. The mines also reduced stabilization costs by tying wages and living standards for African miners to rural standards. More generally, the subsistence economy absorbed the mass of Africans not directly involved in wage employment and subsidized the costs of domestic servants, contract employees, and farm labor. This lowered the cost of living, increased the attractiveness of the Copperbelt to Europeans, and allowed the Europeans to claim the towns as their own.⁵⁸

On occasion, however, the colonial state had to oppose the short-term interests of both the mines and settlers in favor of the Africans in order to maintain social control. Some idealistic government officials, who took Colonial Office paternalism seriously, openly criticized European exploitation of the Northern Rhodesians. Officials concerned with “native” education and welfare were especially supportive of services for Africans.⁵⁹ In the 1940s, a labor department and African trade unions were established despite protests from the European community and even some government officials. Here, the Colonial Office took an active role. After WWII, the government expanded developmental programs for Africans and sought to co-opt the emerging African petty bourgeouisie.⁶⁰ While this behavior no doubt partially reflected a genuine concern for Africans among some Colonial Office personnel, it was largely the result of the colonial state’s need to maintain social control over the increasingly conscious and organized groups of Africans thrown up by the penetration of the capitalist mode of production in Northern Rhodesia.

The mines continued as a major force after the creation of the Federation, but the balance of forces changed. The Federation funnelled copper revenues into the expansion of Southern Rhodesian settler capital, reducing the economic and political position of the Northern Rhodesian settlers. The mines further weakened the Northern Rhodesian settler community by launching a campaign to substitute expensive white mineworkers with cheaper African labor. The companies moved their headquarters to Salisbury, and identified mining interests with the welfare of the Federation as a whole. The mines assumed they could neutralize African resistance to federation by improving rural conditions and co-opting the emerging African petty bourgeoisie, both in the mines and other sectors of the economy. The corporations and the Federal government underestimted the degree of hostility to federation, and the capacity of Africans to organize opposition. In the end, the very class of Africans created by the colonial state, especially the mining industry, spearheaded its downfall. The mines had wanted a multi-racial Federation to succeed, but they ultimately adapted to post-colonial Zambia and the vagaries of neo-colonial politics.⁶¹

CONCLUSION

The development of the copper industry in Northern Rhodesia had important consequences for the country’s political economy and its citizens. Those Africans actually employed by the mines were most directly affected by the copper industry. The next chapters will focus on the gradual development, or lack thereof, of new loyalties and actions based on the shared experiences of miners as they worked and lived on the mines in colonial Zambia.