5

The Struggle for Black Worker Representation

INTRODUCTION

During the 1940s the copper companies continued to depend on stabilization to guarantee a sufficient supply of experienced black labor. Despite the stabilized miners’ strike leadership in 1940, management assumed they could control these workers through established discipline systems, by pressuring troublesome individuals, and by providing some job advancement. As in the past, the companies underestimated the impact of industrial labor on the black miners, the widespread commitment to the struggle for better conditions and, most important, the capacity and determination of the stabilized miners, particularly the boss boys, to use skills learned on the mines in defense of their collective interests. Once again corporate labor strategy pushed these miners towards broadly-based collective labor action. Unlike studies which emphasize the role of the European union and the British Labor Party in the 1949 establishment of an African Mineworkers’ Union on the Copperbelt, this chapter argues that the introduction of an African union was also the result of deliberate collective action by the stabilized black miners, and that this action reflected important changes in class consciousness and commitment to class action among the mineworkers—changes that would have a profound influence on the African union.

LABOR SUPPLY AND STABILIZATION

When Britain entered WWII, the Northern Rhodesia copper mines expanded production for the war effort. The expansion further strained the tight labor supply by increasing the demand for experienced black labor. As we have seen, the Rhodesian Selection Trust mines already used a high proportion of trained black labor. By this time, Rhokana had come to prefer experienced miners as well, having found that “unskilled workers on the mines were decreasingly efficient,” and by 1944, the general manager admitted that “men with no previous experience of mining have very little hope of obtaining work at Nkana.”¹

In order to ensure adequate, steady supplies of experienced but inexpensive labor, both companies continued their policy of stabilization without urbanization. By the early 1940s even Rhokana’s management accepted the greater productivity, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of married stabilized labor.² Management, particularly upper level management, saw no reason to abandon this policy. After all, they traced the 1940 strike to the European miners.³

Both companies thus maintained a “married strength at the highest possible figure.” By 1946, the percentage of married workers at the Anglo-American mines almost equalled Rhodesian Selection Trust levels. The average length of service increased as well, although workers at the Anglo-American mines continued to have a higher turnover rate. In 1945, the average length of employment at Nkana was still 18 months, while Rhodesian Selection Trust miners averaged 35 months. In 1944, the number of employees who had worked over 2-1/2 years was 25% at Rhokana, 26.6% at Nchanga, 37% at Roan, and 34.9% at Mufulira.⁴ These figures are probably low for Anglo-American due to their bookkeeping methods. For example, at the same time that Scrivener reported a re-engagement rate of 16%, a government investigator (Lynn Saffery) found that 80% of his 1,017 informants had had two engagements at Nkana, and 16% had had three engagements. Saffery and Godfrey Wilson put stabilization rates on the Copperbelt at a much higher level than official figures.⁵ Their conclusions are buttressed by a labor department report from Mufulira which concluded that “the total number [of miners] with mining experience past five years must be large.”⁶

LABOR CONTROL AND STABILIZATION

Despite their belief that the 1940 strike had been caused by the Europeans, the compound managers were disturbed by the behavior of the more skilled, stabilized black miners during the strike. They recognized the dissatisfaction among these miners, and feared more resistence unless some concessions were made. As Spearpoint pointed out in a memo on native labor policy, “It is from the higher grade natives that we may expect labor troubles; they are the people who measure their wages against those of the Europeans, and it is mainly this class which we will have to satisfy if we hope to keep free of industrial upheavals.” Scrivener and Field came to similar conclusions.⁷

The compound managers advocated special treatment for the higher grade miners. They asked for “a bold recognition of the facts and an overhaul of the existing wage classification. . . . Meanwhile careful attention should be paid to the quicker advancement of skilled boys to their maxima.” Field and Scrivener took the bold step of proposing some form of representation for experienced miners. Field went even further, suggesting that these miners “should be housed and fed in a separate Compound, thus creating a class who will defend their own rights against natives not in this class.”⁸

The general managers and company directors overruled these suggestions, insisting that current labor strategy sufficed. They opposed further wage increases after the Forster Commission award (which reflected the still uncertain future of the copper industry, and pressures from a Colonial Office bent on securing a reliable low-cost supply of copper during the war). Instead, they set up a new wage structure which widened the wage gap between experienced and unskilled black labor. A three-tiered grade structure was created: grade A, most skilled; grade B, semiskilled; and grade C, unskilled. A special grade was established for the most educated clerks, but little else was done. While the companies agreed to follow the Forster Report recommendations (made by the Forster Commission which investigated the 1940 strike) for improving landscaping, rations, and recreational facilities, they rejected the need to improve housing.⁹ As late as 1946, at a joint conference in Johannesburg, managers from both companies concluded that “the provision of a better type of housing for allocation to boss boys is not necessary, and the provision of larger houses for employees with many children should be avoided for as long as possible.”¹⁰ They dismissed the need for pensions, bonus payments, and improved worker compensation.

If the companies saw little reason to ingratiate themselves with the stabilized employees through material rewards, they were much concerned about securing the compounds. With this in mind, all mines agreed to follow the Forster Commission’s recommendation to adopt Roan’s system of tribal representatives. By 1941, 105 such representatives existed on the Copperbelt. Although company administrators admitted that the representatives “have a limited value and such as they do possess is reduced by the fact that they have little or no real status or authority,” they believed that “it is in our interests to make a success of the existing tribal representatives and prevent labor matters getting into the hands of the more irresponsible elements.” Management declared all compound conditions and general grievances the sole prerogative of the tribal representees, insisting they were the legitimate representatives of the miners.¹¹ Channeling discussions of work and living conditions for the mass of the work force through these men emphasized the mines’ refusal to accept Africans as permanent industrial workers.¹²

During the war years, the mines also invoked special moral and legal mechanisms to minimize worker protest. Absenteeism and desertion dropped dramatically after the establishment of the Emergency Powers in 1942, which gave the government the power to stop strikes and to jail recalcitrant workers.¹³ Propaganda for the war effort impressed the miners. Leading Africans in the compounds organized war support groups to raise money, stressing the need for industrial peace to “save the King.” Groups such as the Nkana-Kitwe War Fund Committee were very popular, and the miners took the war effort seriously. In 1943, for example, the Nkana-Kitwe War Fund collected £1,640 from the black miners, a large sum given the level of African wages.¹⁴

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMPANIES: THE CHAMBER OF MINES

In order to increase their control over labor and other matters of common interest, the companies established a Chamber of Mines in 1941. Several factors influenced this decision: the possibility of future strikes, fear of uncontrolled competition for labor, and the desire to influence government policy, particularly the new labor department. Based in Kitwe, the Chamber became a forum for hammering out a uniform labor strategy for the Copperbelt.

The Chamber standardized employment conditions in order to reduce the market bargaining power of black labor. A ceiling was set on the percentage of married employees as well as on the quality and quantity of married housing. Wage grades, bonuses, clothing issues, and allowances were standardized as well.¹⁵ The system standardized working conditions on the Copperbelt mines, thus reducing the rewards for changing employers and hopefully maintaining a cheap and stable work force at each mine.

The mines also recognized the advantage of presenting a united front to the Northern Rhodesian government. The Chamber coordinated relations with government officials and became the companies’ voice. The secretary of the Chamber maintained almost daily contact with Lusaka, and the chamber served as the meeting point for government and mine officials on the Copperbelt. As one might expect, Chamber representatives frequently participated in official meetings at Lusaka.¹⁶

The companies pressured the new labor department through the Chamber. The department had been established by the Colonial Office against the wishes of the provincial administration, and was part of a world-wide effort to establish labor departments throughout the British empire. Although it was planned before 1940, the strike precipitated its creation.¹⁷ Management worried that labor officers might be “tainted” with progressive ideas about African trade unions and other matters, and that visits from labor officers would encourage the more articulate African miners to express their grievances and ultimately organize unions.¹⁸ As one of the earliest labor officers discovered, “There is considerable suspicion that we are constantly trying, without full authority from Government, to rush ahead for some obscure ends of our own.” In order to forestall this eventuality, the Chamber pressured government officials to limit the activities of the labor officers, hoping to establish “a feeling that the Labor Department is bound in its actions by the goodwill of the Chamber.”¹⁹

Since the provincial administration had opposed the creation of a labor department, the companies easily controlled the new agency. Many of the provincial administrators worried that idealistic labor officers would disturb the delicate balance between settler and mining interests worked out by the colonial state. To ensure smooth relations between the department and the administration, early appointees were seconded from the provincial administration. The department deliberately hired men “who had an easy manner, . . . who would fit in and be useful.”²⁰ Under pressure from administration and mine officials, the department agreed that problems raised by individual workers, or groups of workers, would be directed to the compound manager. Questions of policy would not be discussed with Africans, nor would labor officers become intermediaries between workers and the mines.²¹ This reassured the administration, but the companies still mistrusted the new department. For its part, the Chamber maintained close relations with Lusaka in order to protect its autonomy.

The companies, both individually and through the Chamber, also maintained regular contact with the Colonial Office in an effort to influence policy in their favor. During the war, this was easily achieved. Britain needed copper, and anything interfering with copper production was immediately suspect. As Harold Macmillan bluntly informed Creech Jones in Parliament, “For the period of the war I want copper and a great deal of it.” In response to Creech Jone’s questions about black labor conditions on the Copperbelt, Macmillan admitted that although small improvements could be made, basically the best the Colonial Office felt it could do for the African at this time was “to aim at a little unobtrusive infiltration [into better jobs and wages] without saying too much.”²² More dramatic improvements might threaten industrial peace, something the British government would not accept in wartime.

MAINTAINING CORPORATE AUTHORITY IN THE COMPOUNDS

Management at both mines carefully monitored outside influences on their black mineworkers as well. Company representatives protected corporate interests on the township management boards by establishing the principle of non-interference in industrial matters. Reassured by their congruity of purpose, the mines gradually allowed the township management boards to control more of the welfare services for their workers. This dependence upon the townships lowered welfare costs so that in 1945 Rhokana only spent £164 on welfare, in contrast to Roan, which hired its own welfare officers and spent £1,270.²³ By the end of the war, both companies questioned the need to provide welfare services at all. Although realizing that “welfare work has a close bearing on the general tone of compound life,” and that “anything which will keep [the black miner] engaged in his spare time will no doubt tend to restrain any vicious proclivities which he may possess/’ management saw no reason to increase their share of amenities “unless some useful results will eventuate for such action.”²⁴ As long as the township management boards respected corporate authority, the companies welcomed their services.

But the companies’ management strictly controlled the activities of the UMCB Team, which was suspect because of its connections with liberal British opinion, and its financial independence. This suspicion was further aggravated by two Team members, Moore and Bedford, who criticized the companies at the Forster Commission. The mines reacted to these statements by refusing the 1940 UMCB offer to direct all mine welfare programs. The companies limited UMCB activities to education, libraries, and programs for women and youth. Those missionaries who threatened mine policies were pushed off the Copperbelt.²⁵ Arthur Cross, the Team leader, was informed that “it would be helpful if the Societies’ representatives would confer with the Mine Management before making statements, the accuracy of which may be in doubt, or which may deal with controversial matters affecting the Company’s and their relations with the Natives.”²⁶ Management made it clear that the Team could work on the mines only if their activities remained within corporate constraints.

The companies also used their influence to challenge, and often remove, Europeans who interfered with labor relations. Corporate power quickly came down against those who challenged the status quo. One of the first victims was the outspoken UMCB missionary, R. J. B. Moore. The mines convinced District Officer A. T. Williams to reject Moore as headmaster of the new Kitwe school. Moore discovered to his chagrin that “it seems that anyone who knows too much about these mining compounds is a marked man. Godfrey Wilson . . . has just written saying he had had to resign for this same reason, coupled with conscientious objections.”²⁷ Despite the Team leaders’ regard for him personally and for his ability and the quality of his work, Moore was transferred out of the Copperbelt the next year.²⁸

Similarly, the Chamber quickly challenged Labor Officer William Saffery’s critical report of conditions on the mines. Despite some compound manager support, the Chamber’s critique, which was widely circulated, questioned both Saffery’s knowledge of the nation and his use of statistics. It accused him of using a standard of living table “designed to maintain a person, or persons, in health, comfort, entertainment, social life, and in some degree, luxury.” The Chamber disagreed strongly with his assessment of mine housing, rejected his claim of widespread malnutrition in the mine compounds, and refused to accept his conclusion that miners could not live on their present income.²⁹ Having countered the report, the mines moved to suppress it, and had their way. The labor department agreed to withhold the report from circulation on the pretext that it was merely an inter-departmental preliminary study. Requests for copies from outside Northern Rhodesia were refused. Saffery was carefully kept away from the Copperbelt, and soon turned to South Africa.³⁰

In 1945 the companies reacted to government social welfare officer Archibald Elwell in a similar manner. In 1944, Elwell had been sent to Northern Rhodesia by the Colonial Office as the first official government social welfare officer. Posted in Kitwe, he soon aroused the suspicions of the European community by befriending the Africans. In a memorandum on “The Development of African Social Welfare Services in the Urban Areas of the Copperbelt,” Elwell advocated extensive reorganization and expansion of Copperbelt welfare services, an expenditure of about £50,000 per annum for ten years, and the creation of African Welfare Sub-Committees which “should feel free to discuss any subject they may so desire, political or otherwise.”³¹ Both the mines and the government balked at these proposals. The mines claimed Elwell’s suggestions would increase “the population of undesirable people in town and . . . foster detribalization at a time when it may still be possible to retard such an unwanted feature in African social life.” Matters came to a head in January 1946, when Elwell accepted the Kitwe African Society’s invitation to speak on trade union organization. The mines immediately accused him of seditious behavior, demanded his removal, and the general manager at Rhokana barred him from the mine compounds. The Kitwe Management Board’s Native Affairs Advisory Committee dismissed him from the committee, and asked “that he disassociate himself from all Welfare activities in this area.” The Secretary of the Kitwe African Society, Joseph Achiume, was removed by the district commissioner, and by 14 February 1946, Elwell had been reassigned to Livingstone in disgrace, his welfare proposals tabled indefinitely.³²

INDUSTRIAL PEACE DURING THE WAR

During the war years the mines successfully maintained labor peace. No collective labor protest marred relations with black labor. Most black miners went quietly about their work on the mines, more intent on keeping their jobs than anything else. Memories of earlier strikes, with their shooting and killing, dampened support for labor protest.³³ The Emergency Powers established in 1942 made strikes illegal; appeals to African patriotism undoubtedly helped as well. After 1944, cutbacks in the black labor force due to lowered production also increased anxiety over job security. As a result, absenteeism and desertion fell to new levels, and by 1946 the desertion rate at Rhokana was only 13.46 per 1,000 miners.³⁴

The tribal representatives remained within company guidelines, rarely questioning the authority of the compound manager. While passing on small complaints about rations, housing, and general compound conditions to the compound managers, the representatives concentrated on buttressing their own authority. They were concerned with maintaining orderly and stable compounds, where traditional authority was respected. As much as possible, they tried to solve domestic disputes in the compounds along traditional lines.³⁵ They railed against the urban native court assessors for usurping their prerogatives on domestic matters, and treated the boss boys’ committees as rival organizations.³⁶ This was precisely the role management had in mind for them.

Those workers most apt to organize collectively, namely the more skilled stabilized miners, became enmeshed in efforts to improve their position through special committees. As the compound managers had predicted, these miners agitated for some kind of representation soon after the 1940 strike. The supervisory workers, or boss boys, pressed labor officers to help them set up representative bodies to defend their interests. The labor officer at Mufulira, P.J. Law, found the boss boys “a very forceful body. . . . Most of them were experienced long-term miners, often having served 10 to 15 years. They were quite restive. They didn’t like the tribal representative system. They thought they should have a say.”³⁷ The underground boss boys at Mufulira even elected a committee of fifteen and asked for an office before the mines agreed to establish boss boys’ committees. At Luanshya and Nkana, the boss boys also pushed for representation, although Nchanga was slower to get involved. The boss boys at all the mines demanded direct negotiation with management over wages, work, and living conditions. They dismissed tribal representatives as the instruments of management, and insisted upon independent organization. As one of the labor officers observed: “The boss boys are tending to hang together more as boss boys than as Africans. They seem to regard themselves as quite apart from the ordinary worker. What they want to do is to bring up points in connection with their own condition apart from the ordinary workers.”³⁸

These arguments convinced the labor officers, and they advised the mines to permit some form of representation for the boss boys. Warning management that “the boss boys and clerk classes exert a very considerable influence over the masses and they are quite capable of inciting the masses to excesses to further their own intereses,” the Nkana labor officer, William Stubbs, informed the Chamber of Mines that “if some concession is not made to the boss boy class a more unreasonable demand may be expected before long.” He suggested forming associations to represent the boss boys and no one else. At the same time, he promised to “keep in the closest touch with the development [of these boss boys’ committees] with a view to obtaining to the greatest degree the confidence of the boss boys and to guiding any association of them along sane and moderate lines, while not neglecting to advise them how best they can further their own interests.”³⁹

With the help of some compound administrators, the labor officers won a reluctant Chamber over to their plan. Both Field and Scrivener supported the boss boys’ committees. Although opposed to African trade unions, both agreed that special provisions had to be made for more skilled labor.⁴⁰ The Chamber worried that the proposed Trade Unions Conciliation and Trade Disputes Ordinance of 1942 might allow the committees to register as trade unions. In that event, they foresaw neither government nor themselves having any further control over the committees. This fear was alleviated when opponents tabled the Ordinance in the Legislative Council. The governor reassured management that the boss boys would not be permitted to form a union. Their fears somewhat assuaged, the Chamber decided to accept boss boys’ committees as the “reasonable answer to the present situation.”⁴¹

Management carefully monitored the committees in order to limit their impact on the rest of the work force. Although favoring the committees, the compound managers worried that they might become springboards to a broader interest in trade unions. To avoid this, the compound managers attended committee meetings, kept a watchful eye on the proceedings, and made certain “there would be no artificial ‘shoving’ [towards trade unions] on the part of the Labor Officer.”⁴² In alliance with the governor and other provincial administrators, the Chamber kept the labor commissioner under tight wraps. It even demanded that a lecture précis be given to the compound manager in advance and that the lecture be subject to compound manager approval. The commissioner himself opposed this, but bowed to government pressure and directed the labor officers to cooperate. He reluctantly ordered an end to actions which might encourage trade unions.⁴³ This reassured the companies and, at least for the moment, maintained the social order so necessary to the colonial state.

STABILIZATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK WORKER REPRESENTATION

The absence of serious black labor protest during the war lulled the companies into complacency. With the boss boys’ committees securely under control, management assumed their present system would contain black protest for the foreseeable future. Yet, by 1946 the more skilled black miners set up junior branches of the European Mineworkers’ Union, and three years later formed an African Mineworkers’ Union. How can we explain this dramatic turn of events?

Most studies have invoked the intervention of the European union and the British Labor Party. Berger asserts that an African union was established because of “the ever-present tension between the Government and the white Mineworkers’ Union” rather than as a response to black worker unrest. She dismisses the role of the more skilled miners, insisting that the worker committees formed in the early 1940s “had not shown signs of turning into a mass organization.” Other authors stress the role of the British Labor Party, which came to power in 1946.⁴⁴ British politics and the formation of the European union clearly helped inspire the African Mineworkers’ Union, but initiatives by the stabilized black miners were equally important. These initiatives were primarily the result of experiences in the work place in the particular historical circumstances of the period.

The scarcity of experienced black labor enabled both boss boys and clerks to continue pressing for at least minimal improvements in their conditions of work. These miners felt entitled to special consideration from management. As one of them told the Forster Commission, “There were two classes of Natives, the younger ones and the older ones, and the older ones [i.e., experienced ones] should receive preferential treatment.”⁴⁵ Such higher-grade miners were increasingly aware of the need for some form of organization to protect their interests. Some of them joined the African welfare societies which resurged on the Copperbelt. Encouraged and guided by the UMCB, these societies attracted the most educated Africans from both the mines and the government townships. Their members were disillusioned with the government-dominated Urban Advisory Councils, and in 1942 set out to replace the Native Welfare Advisory Committees without government or company interference. The societies were ostensibly concerned with recreation and social welfare, but discussions inevitably strayed to such topics as advancement, the color bar, and trade unions. For example, in 1944 the Luanshya African Welfare and Recreation Society devoted “considerable time . . . to the question of the large-scale dismissal of African mine employees.”⁴⁶ Elwell’s speech to the Kitwe African Society drew a large and attentive audience, and members as a rule raised contentious issues with visiting lecturers. Meetings were large, well organized, and conducted in English. The use of English emphasized the educated status of members and their capacity to negotiate directly with Europeans. Members hoped this approach would bring a sympathetic response from government officials and, consequently, improvements for Africans in both political and economic life.⁴⁷

Most higher-grade miners perceived the futility of individual protest, and thus the need for organization at the work place.⁴⁸ They wanted improvements within the industrial context, and yet in 1940 had seen European strikers win important concessions, while Africans made minimal gains. The Europeans had a union and the Africans did not. The lesson was clear; African miners would have to establish some form of collective labor organization. As one informant recalled, “We could see that the Europeans got good pay because they had a union. We had no representation. That’s why African pay was so low. We knew we must get some representation to get more pay.”⁴⁹

As we have seen, the first rumbling of worker representation was from the boss boys who had established committees at each mine. Enthusiasm abounded; early meetings showed great promise. Agendas were drawn up, attendance was high, and discussions were spirited. The first meetings drew 200 boss boys at Nkana and 120 at Mufulira. At Roan and Nchanga, a labor officer’s idea for a “suggestion book” was accepted with alacrity. All the committees beseeched labor officers to teach them proper procedures for running meetings and voicing grievances.⁵⁰

Reflecting their limited consciousness, the boss boys’ committees initially demanded special treatment solely for themselves. They petitioned for separate and better housing, and for permission to return to their previous house after long leave in order to reap the benefits of earlier improvements and to maintain neighborhood ties. They asked for rations two or three times a week instead of every day, with pick-up in special lines.⁵¹ Complaints about working conditions focused on the special concerns of boss boys and other supervisory workers. The Mufulira Boss Boys’ Committee demanded special facilities at the mine skips, special badges for longer-service men, and preference over Europeans for leaving the mine at the end of the day. They wanted a change house, dry clothes, and a hot drink after work, the same as the European miners. All the committees denounced the meager compensation payments and inadequate medical care. They also demanded that silicotics be given light work instead of being dismissed.⁵²

At this point the committees showed no sign of becoming mass organizations. In fact, they willingly cooperated with both labor officers and management to obtain improvements for themselves, and expressed little concern for fellow miners. Such behavior may be seen as a pragmatic solution to a colonial industrial environment; it also reflected the boss boys’ identification with each other, as well as the restricted scope of that commitment itself. Their interest in collective bargaining and trade unions still precluded a wider interpretation of collective labor action.⁵³

At the same time, these complaints also revealed the boss boys’ deep commitment to industrial labor, and their determination to fight for recognition as a legitimate section of the industrial work force. The issues raised by their committees may appear petty, but it must be recognized that these were the grievances of a stabilized labor force. They signalled the end of a purely migrant labor force; the boss boys were fighting for a permanent position in the industrial work force. They rejected the validity of the dual wage structure, asked for equal treatment with white miners doing similar work, and demanded to know “why there was such a difference in the treatment of the Native and the European . . . as both the European and the Native worked under the same conditions.” They refused to accept managerial abuse and arbitrariness. Thus, even while speaking for themselves, the boss boys were transforming the role of mine labor.⁵⁴ They let management know that some black miners no longer would accept temporary, second-class status on the mines.

It was this commitment to industrial labor that eventually forced many of the boss boys to broaden both their consciousness and their base of collective action. As we have seen, management sabotaged the committees from the very beginning by limiting their subject matter and frequently ignoring requests.⁵⁵ By 1944, however, many boss boys had become disillusioned and attendance at meetings dwindled accordingly. At Luanshya the labor officer reported that the Roan boss boys were “disheartened by the lack of ability to get anything done.” Stubbs had a similar experience at Mufulira. He blamed the disinterest “largely [on] boredom and the absence of any real incentive; the committee had expected something more exciting than more meetings on tribal representative lines.”⁵⁶

The rising cost of living aggravated boss boy frustrations as well. In 1943 Saffery reported that the average-sized family on the mines could not live off the wages of the male head of household.⁵⁷ The situation worsened in the next few years, with the prices of commodities representative of African cash expenditure nearly doubling between 1938 and 1947.⁵⁸ This was particularly hard on the stabilized miners who depended largely on their wages. This decline in real wages was all the more bitter when compared with the rewards given to European miners. As one labor officer recalled, the comparison between European and African living standards “was a thorn in the side of the African mineworker. It went quite deep.”⁵⁹ This was particularly true for the more skilled miners, who realized they were perfectly capable of doing many European jobs, and felt they had “grown up” and “should be allowed to advance into positions of Mine Captains, Shift Bosses and Miners.” This situation even led Saffery to predict “serious upheaval” if it was not remedied.⁶⁰

Since cautious attempts at self-improvement failed, the boss boys began to recognize the need for bolder measures. The committees thus broadened the scope of their demands to the point that the labor officers complained that “they seldom bring up matters which concerned only themselves as a class.”⁶¹ They pressed for advancement for both skilled and unskilled workers, and demanded better housing, higher wages, better education, adequate compensation, and pensions for the entire black work force.⁶² They insisted that just as “the Europeans need money for food, clothes, education, or business, fare, pleasure and the like; the African needs these as well, if he or she is to live the real life and life indeed.”⁶³ The committees paired these demands with calls for regular joint meetings with all similar associations on the Copperbelt.⁶⁴

THE SEARCH FOR NEW WEAPONS

By the end of the war, the boss boys perceived the futility of cooperating with management. They were ready to try new methods to reach their goals.⁶⁵ As Labor Officer Richard Luyt recalled: “The interested [boss boys] . . . became frustratedly and impatiently aware that if they had to work with the boss boys’ committees the majority were going to be a drag around their head. They began to find that they had better look elsewhere.”⁶⁶

This frustration was shared by many other miners. The more stabilized miners, for example, had expected rewards for their patience and cooperation during the war, but were embittered when improvements failed to come and the rising cost of living cut deeper into earnings. Economic difficulties increased as war veterans flooded the job market. Incidents such as Elwell’s dismissal raised suspicions about the government’s concern for African welfare.⁶⁷ Leading Africans complained vociferously to Gore-Browne, so much so that he felt compelled to warn Legislative Council in 1945 that “the African is very conscious today of grievances.” A year later he repeated this warning and predicted dire consequences if something was not done. The district commissioner in Luanshya reported “feelings of frustration, if not actual exploitation, among both the intelligentsia and many of the less-skilled workers.”⁶⁸ Similar situations existed at Mufulira and Nkana.⁶⁹

At the end of the war, clerks at several of the mines organized associations. The Roan Clerks’ Association, formed in 1945, held three meetings over a six-month period, but suffered internal divisions and then desertions as rumors of an African trade union spread. Leaders of the association did help organize a boycott in Luanshya in 1946, which both provided leadership experience and emphasized the greater potential of broadly-based collective action.⁷⁰

Increasingly, the boss boys, the clerks and other concerned miners advocated some form of broadly-based worker organization. Labor department classes in worker cooperation, organizational procedures, and the proper presentation of grievances had taught boss boys and some clerks skills which could be transferred to a broader representational base. These lessons undoubtedly helped bring about African trade unionism. Both Stubbs and Law recalled frequent questions about collective bargaining and unions from higher grade miners at this time, and UMCB records indicate a growing interest in these subjects.⁷¹ During his brief stay in 1945, Elwell influenced a number of leading miners as well, providing both information and encouragement about collective action.⁷² Probably the greatest influence, once again, came from the example of the European miners. As the labor department bluntly reported in 1946, “There is a demand among the more advanced and intelligent African workers for trade unions; . . . there can be little doubt that it is due to an awareness that Europeans have formed trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining and they feel it is only by this means that they can be given an opportunity of improving their wages and working conditions.”⁷³

A number of incidents outside the mines also reaffirmed the ability of Africans to organize themselves. The massive railway workers’ strike in 1945 proved that Africans could effectively organize a widespread strike and sustain collective action in an orderly manner. The strike also revealed the possibility for multi-racial cooperation among workers, when the European railway workers not only supported African demands, but also loaned money to their black workmates.⁷⁴

The next year, the Luanshya boycott showed Africans could organize effective collective action on an urban-wide basis. The 14-week boycott against the stores in the 2nd Class Trading Area of Luanshya protested the rising cost of living and poor treatment meted out to African customers. Directed by a “Boycott Control Committee” composed of members of the Urban Advisory Council, the Luanshya African Welfare Society and mine employees, the boycott was virtually complete and apart from isolated cases went off without incident. The purpose was to force an official investigation and to “raise Africans’ wages in relation to the prices which the African has to pay for commodities.”⁷⁵ The miners did not strike during the boycott, but the Roan Boss Boys’ Committee threatened a work stoppage if the government did not appoint a study commission. The clerks’ association supported the boss boys in a show of solidarity.⁷⁶ As Gore-Browne had predicted, Africans increasingly recognized their potential economic power, and seemed more determined than ever to exercise it.⁷⁷

During this period of union resurgence, the Europeans also launched a campaign to establish a multi-racial union on the copper mines. This had long been a cherished plan of union leaders Brian Goodwin and Frank Maybank, who had been trying to convince the union to establish African branches since 1942. Both men believed that Africans would ultimately move up into more skilled positions, and they wanted to ensure it was done on the basis of equal pay for equal work. Both Goodwin and Maybank spoke primarily for white labor, but had the foresight to recognize the potential of multi-racial unionism. The government’s deportation of Maybank in 1943 halted their efforts but in 1945, while in London trying to get Maybank back into Northern Rhodesia, Goodwin learned from Sir Walter Tryne (C.O.) that the Colonial Office was about to send a trade union advisor to the Copperbelt. Goodwin concluded that “knowing how the Colonial Office administrators’ minds worked, it was going to be years from now and he was going to organize it mainly as a tribal elder system.” Upon his return, Goodwin informed the union council that the government was going to organize African miners “whether we liked it or not.”⁷⁸ He and Maybank (now back from exile) campaigned to incorporate the Africans into the European union, and soon won their point. In 1946 the union not only voted to delete clause 42, which reserved certain jobs by color, but also affirmed equal pay for equal work and promised to fight for trade schools to train African artisans. For the present, they offered black miners better living conditions and better pay.⁷⁹

A group of black miners, most of them boss boys, accepted the European union’s offer, and started setting up African branches at Rhokana and Roan. According to Brian Goodwin, these were soon “ticking away quite nicely;” they had a good chance of attracting African members.⁸⁰

Most scholars have either ignored this unlikely alliance or blamed it on the machinations of self-interested European miners.⁸¹ However, this overlooks very real changes that had been going on among the stabilized black miners. As we have seen, although these miners increasingly identified with the rest of the black miners as they came to realize the futility of exclusive unionism, they were gloomy about the prospects for an African trade union in the near future, knowing full well that “anyone who mentioned union in the African context before Mr. Comrie came was aiming for to get into trouble.” As Pascale Sokota recalled, “Mr. Elwell got into trouble. . . . He happened to mention the word trade union, and that was enough to get him into trouble.”⁸² Consequently, many of the more ardent advocates of trade unionism concluded that a multi-racial union was the only viable prospect for African worker organization at the time. The boss boys, moreover, associated on a daily basis with European miners, often on quite good terms. They could see they had more in common with the European miners than with management, and many avidly supported equal pay for equal work.⁸³ While never naively willing to accept the European leaders’ promises, and always somewhat suspicious of European good intentions, some of the higher-grade African miners could see they would be better off fighting management as part of a multi-racial union. As Stubbs revealed: “The Africans mistrusted the Europeans . . . but they were no fools. They were prepared to learn from anybody who would teach them.”⁸⁴ And the lesson was clear: a permanent work organization with the Europeans was preferable to no organization at all.

GOVERNMENT AND COMPANY REACTIONS

Until the European union began organizing the African miners, the Colonial Office and the Northern Rhodesian government assumed African unionization was a specter of the distant future. In 1945, the new British Labor Government did little to alter Colonial Office policy towards African trade unions. Party stalwarts advocated gradual development of worker representation, with the emphasis on gradual. In fact, in 1946 Andrew Bevan, a Colonial Office advisor on labor affairs assigned to Northern Rhodesia, reported that “the African in Northern Rhodesia is not yet ready for industrial self-government and that for some time to come he will need help and guidance in the settlement of his affairs.” The labor commissioner in Northern Rhodesia was in “complete agreement with Mr. Bevan’s memorandum,” claiming that “it will be difficult for some time to obtain true representation of the workers except on a tribal basis.” Legislative Council members echoed this opinion, with Gore-Browne the only dissenting voice.⁸⁵

Only when European union leaders and African miners began organizingjoint meetings did government and mine officials become alarmed. The leading African miners had already proven their capacity for collective action in 1940 and in the Luanshya boycott. Officials realized a multi-racial union was a distinct possibility in spite of the tradition of racial conflict on the Copperbelt. The recent cooperation between European and African railway workers further underscored this possibility, and by April of 1946, the labor commissioner was urging the chief secretary to support African trade unions. “If we do not adopt this course,” he warned, “I am sure we shall have trouble with irresponsible Unions.”⁸⁶ In June, Gore-Brown and Welensky came out in favor of African trade unions, and when Governor Waddington, Gore-Browne, and Welensky went to London for a constitutional conference on Northern Rhodesia, they advised the Colonial Office to support some form of industrial organization for African miners. Otherwise, they warned, the European Mineworkers’ Union would incorporate African miners into their union.⁸⁷ Despite opposition from the mining companies, the colonial state and settler capital insisted that state-dominated African unionism was necessary to maintain social order and the reproduction of the system, and they acted accordingly.

British officials responded favorably to these arguments. Labour Party leaders had long been suspicious of the white miners in Northern Rhodesia, and were easily persuaded of the dangers of a multi-racial union. Britain needed copper to rebuild after the war, and the government looked with disfavor on anything which threatened production. The new Secretary of State for the colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, was a well-known advocate of the African miners. He supported the Northern Rhodesian delegation, and in October of 1946 the Colonial Office sent a trade union specialist, William Comrie, to the Northern Rhodesian Labor Department for the express purpose of organizing African trade unions.⁸⁸

In Northern Rhodesia, Governor Waddington opened the new session of the Legislative Council with a formal commitment to African trade unions, and most legislative members were in full accord. Still convinced that European and African antipathy would block a multi-racial union, the copper companies worried that the cure would be worse than the disease. They complained that “nothing [could be] more harmful to the Territory than forcing trade unionism on the African in his unprepared state of development.”⁸⁹ However, this time Colonial Office policy and the colonial state prevailed, and Comrie arrived on the Copperbelt. An African Mineworkers’ Union had unexpectedly become a reality.

CONCLUSION

The mining companies failed to perceive the inherent contradictions of stabilization without urbanization. Along with the colonial government, the companies assumed they could contain the consequences of stabilization by avoiding a permanent black urban work force. Consequently, when the boss boys, and later the clerks, managed to establish committees to advance their own interests, management refused to cooperate. This decision had unexpected consequences. By frustrating boss boy and clerk attempts to gain a narrow victory, the companies inadvertently pushed the miners towards a broader conceptualization of worker identity and a heightened awareness of the opposition between management and workers—an awareness capable of transcending racial divisions. Having perceived the futility of an elite solution, these miners increasingly recognized the need for a broadly-based organization to advance worker interests. Economic conditions after the war in turn pushed these miners towards collective action. Caught between falling real wages and rising expectations after the war, the more proletarian miners searched with new vigor for weapons with which to confront capital. Some of the boss boys and clerks joined the European union, an action which ultimately precipitated the African Mineworker’s Union. Thus, contrary to Berger’s assertion that “African workers had shown little evidence of a wish to organize themselves independently,”⁹⁰ it is clear that corporate labor policies increased both worker cohesion and commitment to broadly-based organization. When the war ended and opportunities for collective action increased, these changes facilitated the creation of an African Mineworker’s Union in the coppper industry.