COLOMBIAN POLITICAL CULTURE
THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER AMONG MEMBERS OF THE Conservative and Liberal parties defined Colombia’s political culture early in its national existence. Eduardo Santa claimed a generation ago that Colombians are born with party labels on their umbilical cords, a testament to the intensity of partisan identification.1 From small towns to national society, partisan politics bifurcated Colombian society into patterns that have lasted for generations. This political culture shaped nineteenth-century Colombia in both negative and positive ways. Partisan competition contributed to endemic political violence and repeated conflicts at the local, regional, and national levels. However, Colombia’s modified democratic tradition, one of the oldest in Latin America, is in large part sustained by historical patterns of partisan mobilizations. Strong party affiliations, coupled with deep regional identities, meant that unlike most other Latin American nations, no Colombian group could monopolize power. The origins of the Conservative and Liberal parties, the extent of their programmatic divisions, and the factors that shaped their nineteenth-century evolution are subjects of oft-times intense debate.2 Discussions concerning the degree of influence of socioeconomic or regional variables upon the formation of the parties are particularly heated. These points of dispute relate directly to the interpretations of the political activity of Colombian artisans.
A distinguished company of social scientists traces the origins of the Conservative and Liberal parties to the socioeconomic positions of their founders.3 Luis Eduardo Nieto Arteta, the earliest leading proponent of this interpretation, asserts that reactionary social groups, which included large landowners and landowning religious communities, struggled to maintain colonial institutions in order to protect their privileged economic, political, and social positions. These groups coalesced by the late 1840s into the Conservative party to ward off the anti-colonial sentiments of merchants, artisans, slaves, and small agriculturalists. The efforts to reform remnants of colonial institutional structures, both in the 1820s and 1840s, eventually galvanized this latter group into the Liberal party.4
Charles W. Bergquist argues that long-term economic trends, interpreted through the lenses of dependency theory, fundamentally modify this landlord/merchant scenario, although it retains the primacy of economic interests in party formation. First in Coffee and Conflict in Colombia and then in Labor in Latin America, Bergquist maintains that economic interests, especially as they relate to the export sector, altered the development of social classes and their political trajectory. Bergquist focuses upon the late nineteenth-century period, when coffee emerged as the primary export commodity. In a retrospective analysis, Bergquist contends that agro-export and mercantile interests dominated the Liberal party from the 1840s onward. After that time, “diverging economic interests” that developed over the course of the nineteenth century, chiefly around the failure of tobacco, the rise of coffee production, and the persistence of traditional agricultural interests, shaped the distinct “philosophical and programmatic positions” of the Colombian upper class, divisions that he finds in competitive programs of political economy. Pro-export groups, in his analysis, suffered under the restrictive policies of Miguel Antonio Caro’s fiscal and economic Regeneration, only to find political allies in the government of Rafael Reyes, which enacted policies that lasted until the Depression of the 1930s. Contending economic interests and ideologies are visible, according to Bergquist, in late nineteenth-century political strife, especially preceding the War of the 1000 Days.5
A growing chorus of regionalists takes exception to these interpretations. Both Helen Delpar and James William Park recount the multiple non-economic factors that helped shape party alignments, most of which can be traced to regional differences.6 These scholars utilize Frank Safford’s thesis that access to institutions of power at the beginning of the national period served as the primary determinant of party alignment, an interpretation that is sensitive to the geographical and social structures that underpin regional power networks. Institutional power favored some regions over others; proximity to colonial centers of educational, political, or ecclesiastical power shaped a Conservative orientation aimed at maintaining institutions that enhanced one’s “life chances.” Conversely, persons in those regions located at a greater distance from power centers were more likely to be Liberal, and to favor reforms that would enhance their access to power.7 Safford’s work effectively collapses the supposed distinction among merchants, landowners, and professionals that sustains socioeconomic interpretations, pointing out that most elite members wore several occupational hats during their lives. Just as in early imperial Brazil, Conservatives and Liberals came from the same social groups and often took opposing stances on issues for reasons other than class.8
This concept explains the general lack of ideological conflict between Colombian Liberals and Conservatives. In terms of political structure, few officials questioned the theoretically contractual nature of government or the concept of popular sovereignty, although the extent of active citizenship caused some disagreement, as did the degree to which strong central authority was needed to offset the ignorance of the masses–or regional power seekers. No one, at least after the decline of the bolivariano faction in the 1830s, thought seriously in terms of an aristocracy. Both parties distrusted the military as an institution, but not to the extent that they would reject the aid of military leaders favorable to their cause. In general, economic policy generated few disputes in the first generation of Colombian political life. Divergent appraisals—realistic versus optimistic—of the government’s fiscal situation actually stirred more debate than did the issue of which economic orientation was proper for the state. Liberal economic reforms, begun in 1845 under the nominally Conservative Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, drew support from most congressional representatives, a consensus that undermines the analysis of Nieto Arteta.9
Liberals and Conservatives separated only on the programmatic issues of church-state relations and social welfare issues. According to Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, Conservatives tended to hold a corporate worldview that gave a fundamental social role to the church. Corporate philosophy subordinated the individual to the church, which both embodied and guarded universal morality. Traditionalists maintained that while morality was an inherent part of the human being, individuals could never rationally comprehend morality in its fullness. Religion did encompass its totality, and the church was to act as the guardian of moral knowledge. Liberals, by contrast, tended to adhere to an atomistic philosophy, holding that individuals could determine the morality of their actions without the aid of the church. These opposing philosophical systems led directly to disputes regarding the proper social function of the church. Closely related to this issue was the role of the Society of Jesus. Conservatives valued many Jesuits as luminaries who served to maintain and expand the proper position of the church. Education, as a corollary to this religious question, engendered considerable disagreement. Santander’s 1826 Education Plan, based upon Benthamite teachings, was strongly opposed by those politicians later identified with the Conservative party both at the time and also when Santander tried to revive the plan in the government of New Granada. When Conservatives won the War of the Supremes (1839–42), Mariano Ospina Rodríguez promptly issued an educational plan informed by more traditional standards. Not surprisingly, the 1870 educational reform process caused a similar uproar.10
Liberals argued that educational institutions that imposed clerical authority hindered the individual from maturing to the point of sound decision-making. Not surprisingly, Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism dominated the philosophical approach of the first generation of Liberals.11 Second-generation Liberals were even more committed to an individualist ideology. José María Samper defined his interpretation of dejar hacer (laissez-faire) as “the aspiration to found the exclusive autonomy of the individual, limiting the action of the government to provide security, to repress violence against the law, and to impart justice.”12 Significantly, liberal economic and political philosophies, shaped by men of both parties, dominated the score of years after 1846, when the administration of Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera opened the Liberal Reform era.
Jaramillo Uribe’s insights on the generational influences further illuminate nineteenth-century Colombian politics.13 He asserts that the traditional or Benthamite mentalities that shaped the “independence generation” resulted in disputes over education and the church, although the desire to mold a united nation moderated these divisive issues. A second generation, nurtured on the writings of the Romantics and less prone to compromise, came to power in the late 1840s. The more avid Liberals of the day were labeled gólgotas in the early 1850s and Radicals after 1855.14 Liberals dominated the political scene with few exceptions until the 1870s. Conservatives assumed the role of the not always loyal opposition. Several key leaders of the Liberal generation of 1849 underwent remarkable political transformations. Both Núñez and José María Samper began their political lives as avowed gólgotas, only to moderate their views in the 1860s. Together they led the Independent Liberals of the 1870s before proclaiming themselves Nationalists in the 1880s.15 This movement away from idealist attachment to extreme liberalism paralleled the rapid decline of the political influence of the Generation of 1849.
The shortcomings of liberalism spurred a pragmatic backlash, which was evident in the third generation and in the 1886 Constitution. The adaptations by politicians after the 1870s bridge, to a certain degree, the analytical space between advocates of the socioeconomic and regional schools. Laissez-faire economic policy had not produced an export bonanza that would sustain economic development, nor had many individuals felt comfortable with the absence of the church as a social mediator. During the Regeneration, which began in the 1880s and lasted until the 1910s, coalitions attempted to produce an effective political structure that would prevent the bloodshed of the earlier years. The policies of first the National party of Rafael Núñez, José María Samper, and Miguel Antonio Caro, then of the quinquenio (five-year regime) of Rafael Reyes, and last of the Republican Union illustrate the increased tendency toward cooperation in this generation. (The fierce fighting of the period indicates, however, that coalitionists were by no means the sole political actors during these years.) Consensus slowly emerged among the parties concerning the need for a stronger central government and for direct state intervention in economic policy, especially to stimulate the expansion of coffee agriculture.
Just as the issues separating the parties were not wholly clearcut, some individuals are hard to place in either political camp. General José María Obando, identified as a santanderista liberal after 1832, split the ranks of those loyal to Santander in his 1836 presidential candidacy. Obando helped precipitate the Guerra de los Supremos by his support of small convents in 1839, only to be exiled upon his defeat. Returning as a Liberal hero in 1849, Obando nominally headed the moderate draconiano wing of the Liberal party, which contributed to a major revolt against radical reformist gólgota Liberals and Conservatives in 1854. General Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera was identified as a Conservative, but his 1844 presidential candidacy and subsequent administration shattered the emerging Conservative party. In 1857, Mosquera ran for the presidency as head of the National party and two years later led the Liberal revolt against Conservative rule. After the 1863 Ríonegro convention, he was at bitter odds with the Radical faction of the Liberal party. In 1867, Mosquera imposed a short-lived dictatorship upon the Radical congress and by 1869 was again in league with Conservatives. Both Mosquera and Obando were more personalistic than party-minded in their approach to power. Obando had extensive support among the popular sectors of Colombian society, especially in the southwest regions of the country, and a strong network of clients. The military bearing and populist orientations of both generals might merit their classification as caudillos, but of a particular Colombian variant. In any case, it is clear that any understanding of Colombian history prior to 1870 must take into consideration personalism and the appeal of certain military leaders.
Men such as Núñez frequently founded third parties to express their own beliefs more independently. However, most of the third, and occasionally fourth, parties generally drew upon both the membership and ideological stances of the dominant groups. As with the National party of Núñez, these alliances could become potent political forces in their own right. More frequently, as with Mosquera’s National party, their impact was short-lived and their leaders quickly made their way back into the fold of one of the two parties. Third parties are an underappreciated component of Colombia’s political culture. They frequently forced the dominant parties either to accept third-party leaders into their ranks, or to unite to repress third-party challengers in order to maintain Conservative/Liberal control of the political apparatus.
The struggle between the parties offered artisans and others a limited opportunity to gain a formal voice within the polity. Elites needed clients in their struggle for power. In rural areas, the pursuit of clientage led local bosses (both lay and clerical) to create self-perpetuating Liberal and Conservative enclaves that have existed to the present.16 In larger urban centers, the establishment of clientage relationships fostered more competitive recruitment. Elite efforts to mobilize popular support for their party struggles first stimulated the participation of non-elites in the political process. Artisans and other middling social groups were, because of their status as voters,17 the principal targets of parties and factions trying to expand their popular support. Patrons and clients operated in a two-way relationship, which occasionally allowed non-elites, such as artisans, the opportunity to articulate their particular interests.
Patron-client relations offered non-elites a certain degree of economic and social mobility under special conditions. The premier example is that of Ambrosio López, born in 1809 to Jerónimo López and Rosa Pinzón. Jerónimo was a tailor in the employ of the viceroy and Rosa made chicha, a maize-based low-alcohol beverage. Ambrosio acquired both skills. Apprenticed as a tailor, Ambrosio joined the military in 1823, serving for four years, during which time he claimed that the “progressive” Santander became his “protector.” Ambrosio had a checkered career in the wake of the September 25, 1828, attempt on the life of Bolivar (allegedly masterminded by Santander), serving in the national guard and engaging in commerce—mostly in the production of aguardiente—during the 1830s. Ambrosio abandoned the progressive cause in the War of the Supremes to become a judge, alcalde (mayor), and captain in the guard during the Conservative presidencies of the 1840s. Ambrosio took an active role in the Society of Artisans, only to leave the organization in 1851. In the 1854 revolt by General José María Melo against the liberal constitution of 1853, Ambrosio supported Mosquera, for which he was rewarded with the position of director of waters in the capital during much of the 1860s. Toward the end of that decade, his skills in aguardiente production earned him a job at the Samper brothers’ distillery, Los Tres Puentes. When he died in 1881, the Diario de Cundinamarca hailed him as a life-long Conservative, although at one time Ambrosio called himself a Liberal Conservative. Ambrosio’s son, Pedro, became an important banker through his father’s Samper connection, and his grandson, Alfonso López Pumarejo, served as president of the country in the 1930s.18 Although Ambrosio identified himself as a tailor throughout his life, his rise is related to his political abilities and connections. First with Santander, then with Mosquera, and finally with the Samper family, Ambrosio worked his way up the social ladder, leaving his family well positioned. Ambrosio López’s case is clearly unique, but it illustrates the ways by which political clientage afforded the opportunity for social mobility.
In the early national period, due to Colombian political culture, urban craftsman were more politically driven than their European counterparts but less so than their equivalents in the United States at that time. Artisans were at the forefront of the political struggle for United States independence and continued to play an integral role in urban politics until the middle of the nineteenth century.19 While Colombian artisans played a less significant political role in their independence movement, the general acceptance of republican principles (though not always their practice) quickly integrated craftsmen into the network of urban politics. The political activity of craftsmen was significant particularly in the formative period of the country’s political culture. The same pattern is visible in other Latin American nations to a limited extent. By contrast, the rejection of republicanism in Restoration Europe (save in modified form in England) denied craftsmen a formal voice in European polities, even while changing economic patterns subjected artisans to extreme pressures. The political role of European craftsmen tended to be more explosive, especially in the uprisings of 1830 and the revolutions of 1848, and more directly linked to socioeconomic issues.
Popular Recruitment and the Formation of Colombian Political Culture
The vision of a Gran Colombia that would maintain the unity of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela faded in the late 1820s, as even Simón Bolívar’s charismatic and powerful leadership proved unable to hold pressures for regional autonomy at bay. Bolivar’s dictatorial propensity, moreover, generated powerful opponents who, on the night of September 25, 1828, attempted to assassinate the Liberator.20 Although Vice-President Francisco de Paula Santander was never proven to have taken part in the conspiracy, he was charged with the crime and sentenced to death, a penalty commuted to exile. Bolívar’s death in late 1830 signalled the permanent collapse of Gran Colombia and, after months of civil war, the creation of the Republic of New Granada. Santander returned from exile in 1832 to serve as New Granada’s first president.
The Granadian Constitution of 1832 established a moderately centralized system of government. Local and regional governments shared power with central authorities, but most policy initiatives came from Bogotá. Regional alliances played an important role in national politics, especially those of the Cauca and Cundinamarca. The formal authority of military leaders was reduced, but not their effective say in local or national affairs. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches shared responsibility for the management of government authority, but the executive retained extraordinary powers for use in emergency situations. All in all, the Colombian Constitution of 1832 was not so different from its predecessor of 1821, save perhaps that it affected a much-reduced territorial extension.21
President Santander’s often harsh methods of rule and his appointees fomented considerable political divisions. Partisan camps developed when Santander attempted to impose General José María Obando as his successor in the 1836 presidential election. Obando’s militarism and his alleged role in the assassination of Independence hero Antonio José de Sucre22 alienated many in the political elite. These included José Ignacio de Márquez, whom Obando had bested in the 1834 vice-presidential election and who again opposed Santander’s favorite. Vicente Azuero, a santanderista, also refused to support Obando and stood as a civilian option to the Caucano general. These factions reflected earlier divisions between followers of Bolívar and Santander, as well as the alignment of loyalties during the abortive dictatorship of Rafael Urdaneta following the breakup of Gran Colombia. Bolivarianos had lost most of their influence in that ill-fated effort, leaving the field open to persons loyal to Santander or those of more independent hue, such as Márquez.23 Márquez polled more electoral votes than Obando in the 1836 presidential election, although not a majority, which, according to the constitution, meant that the final decision for Márquez was made by the congress.
These same factions redoubled their efforts in anticipation of the 1838 vice-presidential and congressional elections, which were held amidst controversy over the content of public education and the extent of religious influence in Granadan society. Here, for once, ideology entered the fray. Santanderistas from both the Azuero and Obando camps—the so-called progresistas—set aside their differences and prepared to oust Márquez loyalists. The latter’s followers, the moderados, joined in an alliance with the church (in spite of Márquez’s reputed anti-clerical attitudes). These political coalitions sought to enlarge their electoral base by the active recruitment of non-elite voters, which for the first time brought artisans openly into the political process.
Members of the church hierarchy organized La Sociedad Católica (Catholic Society) in May 1838 to forestall further encroachments into the terrain of the church and to amplify support for candidates sharing their ideological leanings.24 The Catholic Society stressed the importance of morality and religion in both state and society, expressing the regret that many officials did not stress the “proper” basis of moral order. The Catholic Society recognized the virtues of President Márquez, but feared that the forthcoming elections would introduce men of “irregular conduct” into public office.25 According to the Society’s newspaper editors, proper education, together with votes for Catholic representatives, would prevent the “infection” of foreign and atheistic ideas from spreading through the nation.26 The church’s campaign to infuse political debate with Catholic ideology extended into other areas of the country. Catholic Societies operated in Cali, Pasto, and Popayán, where the debate took on an air of ideological contention that persisted at least until the Conservative insurrection of 1876.27
While the Sociedad Católica in Bogotá made no direct appeal to the artisan class, its mobilization efforts undoubtedly attracted many craftsmen. Progressives, on the other hand, appealed openly to artisans for political support. La Bandera Nacional, the political mouthpiece of Santander, Lorenzo María Lleras, and Florentino González, claimed that moderado electors were simply clients of the president who voted as they were told in order to assure their continued employment. Progressive electors, it was alleged, were by contrast independent “patriots” who lived without having to “beg” from the executive.28 Moreover, pro-Márquez voters were said to include the rank-and-file of the military who would vote according to orders, since they could not read. Progressives published an electoral list of “honorable artisans and laborers” who “lived by the sweat of their brows,” men who, the editors claimed, voted only for the good of their country. The leading progressives, however, did not include any of the potential artisan electors in their official electoral list, despite the appeal for the votes of the craftsmen.29
The election’s results drove the two sides farther apart. Of the 1,481 votes cast in Bogotá, according to an unofficial tally, 1,356 went to moderates, 80 to progressives, and 45 to candidates judged to be neutral.30 The victors noted that despite efforts to recruit artisans to the santanderista cause through the use of socially divisive language (terms such as nobles and plebeians), craftsmen had favored the administration with their votes. Moderates claimed that political societies made a positive contribution to the electoral process, even while their control of the election process raised accusations of fraud from the progressives.31
In the wake of the electoral defeat, progressives began their own aggressive political instruction of the popular sectors. The Sociedad Democrática-Republicana de Artesanos i Laboradores Progresistas de la Provincia de Bogotá (Democratic-Republican Society of Progressive Artisans and Laborers of the Province of Bogotá) was therefore founded on June 17, 1838, to instruct the “different classes of the state in the maintenance of their interests, in the knowledge of their public rights; moralizing their customs, showing them the true philosophic road to the good, and identifying their interests with those of the state.”32 Four membership categories defined the 189 founding members of this organization: full (nato), instructor, honorary, and corresponding. Full members had to exercise a profession or mechanical art, or be dedicated to agriculture in some manner. Other members were required only to profess democratic-republican principles and to conduct themselves properly. Some 123 persons, including Santander, accepted honorary memberships.33
Artisans had little control over the direction of the Society. Isidoro José Orjuela, a tinsmith, served as president of the organization, but upper-class progressives such as Lleras and Juan Nepomuceno Vargas engineered the Sociedad’s programs and activities. Instructors of similar background, including Francisco Soto, Vicente Azuero, José Duque Gómez, Florentino González, Ezequiel Rojas, and Rafael Elisio Santander, endeavored to instill progressive political and social precepts, together with moral training, in its full members. Azuero, for example, professed that representative government was designed to further the common interest, not that of any specific group or family, and that democratic liberties were preeminently compatible with the church’s value system.34 Rojas expounded the utilitarian principle that happiness motivated human behavior. Correct conduct, Rojas explained, developed from the need to provide for the good of the family, or of those close to the individual. If one did not work or were lazy, hunger and vagrancy would plague both family and society. Work, on the other hand, gave the individual the means to pursue desires, provide for a family, and improve the general society. Rafael Elisio Santander, in his turn, tackled the knotty problem of reconciling progressive morality with the role of religion in society. His proposals suggested that the state sponsor such moral education with the aid of the church, though without intimating that the church should direct the program and without renouncing his own utilitarian convictions.35
The Democratic-Republican Society desired the “proper” social conduct of its members. Artisans and laborers were urged to celebrate fewer festivals and to complete promptly their contracted work. Craftsmen were warned on several occasions that gambling wasted both time and money and, since it added nothing to the general happiness (at least in the eyes of the utilitarians), should be abandoned. The initial editions of El Labrador i Artesano (the organization’s mouthpiece), included articles pertaining to industrial education such as those describing new techniques for the manufacture of sulfuric acid and incombustible candles, and for applying copper plating. Occasionally employment opportunities for blacksmiths, masons, and carpenters to work on a church in Zipaquirá, for example, were brought to the readers’ attention.36
The Sociedad’s proprietors made concerted attempts to convince its members of the value of their political participation. The organization’s intellectual leaders reasoned that since people were born with different talents and had varying degrees of wealth and comfort, equality before the law was crucial in order that all persons might satisfy their needs and desires without infringement upon the desires of others. Legislation alone did not guarantee such equality, according to the progressives; therefore, it became necessary to educate the “inferior classes” in the area of political participation as a barrier against the establishment of an aristocratic government reminiscent of the colonial period.37
Such blatant efforts to inculcate progressive ideology in Bogotá’s craft sector provoked strong opposition from members of both the church and administration. One pro-government newspaper ran a fictional account of a debate in a craftsman’s shop that derided the progressive effort to mobilize artisans as political allies. The owner of the shop had refused to join the Democratic-Republican Society, because he claimed that progressives sought only to use artisans as a ladder for their electoral ambitions. If they had a genuine interest in artisan political education, the fictitious craftsman asked, why had the effort only begun in 1838? Santanderistas had dominated the capital’s political scene since the early 1820s, giving them plenty of time to support artisan interests. The article suggested that the progressives’ “unemployment” was the principal cause for their sudden interest in artisans, rather than any real commitment to the needs of that class.38
After the June 1838 election, the Democratic-Republican and Catholic Societies engaged only in political education. It is noteworthy that both groups tried to instill into their members principles of good citizenship with the end of ensuring order and social harmony. Different ideological foundations guided their efforts, but they shared a common objective. The Catholic Society of Bogotá suggested that adherence to the dogma of the church, and submission of self to proper teachings, would achieve a moral social order replete with proper liberty. Progressives, on the other hand, placed their faith in the ability of people to determine for themselves those actions that brought them happiness; a mutual understanding of useful actions would then guarantee social harmony and prosperity. By either route, citizens would advance the welfare of the society as a whole. Thus, neither set of educational messages should be seen as subversive, or as purposely agitating social divisions.
An April 1839 petition to the congress, signed by 343 artisans, suggests that the mobilization efforts by members of the church had borne fruit. The petition called for a restriction of Benthamite texts and other “impious books” in education so as not to corrupt the good customs of the Colombian people. No ecclesiastical reform should be passed, according to the petition’s authors, without the consent of the church. Missionary colleges should be established to proselytize among the heathen, and a seminary should be established for clerical education. The petition also asked that the Jesuits be allowed to return to the country. The petition attempted to convince legislators that the interests of the church coincided with those of the state; it thus called on congress to reverse many of the legislative measures instituted earlier by Santander and his associates since the time of Gran Colombia.39 Although the precise relationship between partisan mobilization and the petition remains unclear, insofar as many of the signatories of the document were members of the Sociedad Democrática-Republicana, political boundaries seem not to have been firmly fixed among the tradesmen. It also indicates the influence of, and support for, the church among the city’s craftsmen.
Rather than addressing the artisans’ petition, in June 1839 the congress ordered several minor convents of Pasto closed. The subsequent pastuso revolt sparked the War of the Supremes, the first of the major civil conflicts of the nineteenth century. General Pedro Alcántara Herrán subdued the original rebels by August, only then to face General Obando’s rebellion, which allegedly favored the protection of religion and federalism.40 Not until September 1840 did the combined forces of Herrán, General Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, and General Juan José Flores of Ecuador defeat Obando, who was forced into exile in Peru. In the meantime, other “supreme leaders” (supremos), generally those of a more progressive persuasion, declared themselves to be against the government. President Márquez responded to the third wave of insurrection by placing Vice-President General Domingo Caicedo in control of the government. By mid-1842, finally, a troubled peace returned to the country.
Artisans assumed what would become an all-too-common role in the nineteenth-century conflicts, that of soldier. The Constitution of 1832 had stipulated that the National Guard would support the Army in times of civil emergency. Only active citizens could serve in the Guard, so that artisans made up the backbone of its forces. Some sources indicate that three-quarters or more of the Guard was comprised of artisans.41 Through Guard service, craftsmen supported the administration, but artisan support was also courted by progressives. When the northern provinces revolted in late 1840, progressives in the capital published several handouts that advised craftsmen that artisans had nothing to fear from a war that originated from the defense of religion. Artisans were urged to unite with the northern towns and demand an end to the fighting, a plea most seem not to have heeded.42
The war sharpened the political divisions that had first become visible in the 1830s. Personal antagonisms, wartime animosity, and ideological differences combined to define more clearly the alignment of political forces. Progressives, who constituted the foundations of the Liberal party, were either humiliated by defeat or were forced to bide their time until the advent of more favorable political conditions. With the death of Santander in 1840, Vicente Azuero in 1844, and Francisco Soto in 1846, a new generation of political actors would direct the progressive revival at the head of the Liberal party.
For the time being, however, moderates (now referred to as ministerials) ruled the country. They took advantage of their victory to reverse some of the legislative “errors” of the santanderistas. Their ideological preferences shaped the Constitution of 1843, which enhanced the power of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative, the judiciary, and local authorities. Suffrage requirements remained essentially the same.43 Ministerials decreed that teachers could select their own textbooks, thereby weakening Santander’s 1826 Plan of Studies. Bentham’s The Principles of Universal Legislation was banned outright as a university text.44 Mariano Ospina Rodríguez’s campaign to purge New Granada of utilitarian and other “immoral” tendencies included inviting the Jesuits to return to Colombian soil to serve, in J. León Helguera’s words, as a “corps of conservative shock troops.”45
The hotly contested 1844 presidential election belied the apparent cohesion of the victorious camp. Ministerials who recalled the seeming ineffectiveness of civilian President Márquez supported Mosquera, whereas those ministerials who distrusted military men (especially Mosquera) sponsored the candidacy of Rufino Cuervo. Opponents of the government, while subdued, lent their support to General Eusebio Borrero, as did associates of the dissident ministerial Julio Arboleda. In the end, Mosquera polled 762 electoral votes, Borrero 475, and Cuervo 250, while numerous minor candidates received the remaining 177 votes. Congress was once again called to service, and opted for Mosquera, the clear preference among the voters.46
The Society of Artisans
Mosquera proved a controversial president from the beginning. His authoritarian style alienated many potential allies, while his program of economic reforms served as the catalyst for the creation of the Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogotá. Lino de Pombo, as minister of finance, initiated widespread fiscal reform, transferred control of the government’s Ambalema tobacco monopoly to private hands, repealed the tax on gold exports, and adopted a new monetary system.47 Pombo’s successor, Florentino González, rapidly accelerated the liberalization of the economy. González’s hopes for Colombia’s economic future, outlined to the Congress of 1847, included proposals for fiscal reorganization, further currency reform, and the lowering of import duties, especially those on textiles.48 The long-sheltered artisan class would be forced to participate in more “productive” and “profitable” industries: “the cobbler will learn to lay bricks, the tailor to pole boats or to fish, the blacksmith to farm; and while they learn? And if they do not learn? They will succumb!”49
Artisans from both Bogotá and Medellín expressed their opposition to the proposed tariff revision through several petitions to the Congress, the most significant artisan-initiated political statements up to that time.50 The 219 self-identified “artisans and mechanics” that signed the capital’s petition claimed to represent the more than 2,000 families in the capital who would be hurt by the proposed legislation.51 Nevertheless, the Law of June 14, 1847, passed with strong bipartisan support and opened the door to less-restricted trade, even though some congressmen expressed concern over lost revenues. The new tariff schedule reduced rates by about 30 percent, abolished all restrictive duties on transit, and combined previous multiple duties into a single tax levied at a maximum of 25 percent of an object’s value as of January 1, 1848.52
Artisans then attempted to reverse the new law through political mobilization. Ambrosio López Londoño (tailor), Agustín Rodríguez (tailor), Dr. Cayetano Leiva, Francisco Torres Hinestrosa, and Francisco Londoño informed the jefe político (political boss) of Bogotá of the formation of the Sociedad de Artesanos in October 1847. The group was quite small at its inception, numbering only ten to fifteen principal members, all but two of whom were artisans.53 The Sociedad declared that it would work to repeal the Law of June 14 and “to promote the advancement of the arts and other areas that can help our well-being.” Membership in the Society was open to artisans, to aficionados of the trades, and to agriculturalists who, like the ideal craftsman, were envisioned to be independent small producers.54 Specific goals of the organization included steady work for all members, obedience and respect for the government, and various forms of instruction for the membership, to include democratic theory, military skills, principles of justice, and religious training.55 Members were obligated to pay a three real fee each month, aid needy members, and use the right of suffrage only with the advice of the Sociedad. Members were cautioned not to present discourses disobedient to the laws of the land or to censure legal authorities, and they were to avoid discourse of personal, political, or religious issues.56 Despite the ban on political discussions, there is little evidence that the Society discussed anything else.
Opposition to the Sociedad developed immediately. The editor of the Catholic El Clamor de la Verdad refuted Ambrosio López’s claim that the Society was designed to help an oppressed and threatened class, stating that the “secret society” would only serve as a machine for someone’s electoral purposes. The editor commented that the group appeared to be an enemy of Christ, based on a reference by López to a banned book by Felicité de Lamennais.57 López denied any secret intentions on the part of the organization, noting that the Society was entirely open and had only the laudable objective of uniting the artisans.58 El Clamor de la Verdad then softened its editorial opposition to the Society, stating that its original objection had been only to Lamennais’s book. The paper praised the openness of the organization but reminded artisans to be on their guard because of the upheavals of the times.59
Six months after its foundation, the Sociedad underwent a fundamental transformation. The Society’s first director, Agustín Rodríguez, claimed that the Society had some three-hundred members by April of 1848, but reported that it was often difficult to meet the twenty-person quorum necessary for a meeting. The Society’s focus upon the upcoming presidential elections, which it thought could favor artisans’ interests, changed its character.60 On May 4, 1848, it met to consider which candidate to back in the June presidential election, which paralleled that of 1836 in its importance for the eventual political culture of the country.61
Mosquera’s undoctrinaire presidency had by now alienated many ministeriales and, by opening the Pandora’s box of reform, his administration had splintered the party. At least four presidential candidates emerged from the divided ministerial ranks. Mosquera’s vice-president, Rufino Cuervo, attracted the support of more moderate party members, but he did not appeal to conservatives, who instead favored Joaquín José Gori, who had led internal party opposition to Mosquera. Gori opposed the new tariff, primarily on the grounds that it would cause a large revenue loss for the government, and was consequently supported by many artisans. Two generals, Eusebio Borrero and Joaquín Barriga, also sought the presidency. The leading progressive, who had been at the group’s forefront since the death of Azuero in 1844, was Florentino Gonzalez. His service in the Mosquera administration had alienated potential progressive support, however, although it attracted ministerial moderates such as Lino de Pombo and Julio Arboleda.62
The nascent Liberal party had been unable to reorganize itself during the early stages of the Mosquera administration. They now, however, took advantage of the ministerial split to select war hero José Hilario López as a unity candidate.63 General López calmed the fears of those remembering the ineffective peace-keeping efforts of Márquez ten years earlier. López was closely identified with the popular General Obando (who was still in Peru), but he did not share Obando’s stigma of having revolted. López was, in any case, in the country and available for the election. Moreover, the general lacked a forceful personality, a trait young Liberals hoped to utilize. Quite significantly, in spite of the divisive nature of the campaign, the platforms of the various candidates did not differ in any major degree.64
Liberals sought to use the Sociedad de Artesanos as a potential platform for the revitalization of their party. Many spoke at the Society’s meetings, where they promptly assumed a dominant role in its deliberations.65 Some speakers presented the ideas of French thinkers such as the Comte de Saint Simon, Pierre Josef Proudhon, and Louis Blanc, or of the Revolution of 1848, news of which had just reached New Granada. This has led some historians to argue that the programs of the Sociedad and these French thinkers shared many common points.66 (However, as discussed below, the young Liberals used socialism only rhetorically, while in fact favoring an individualist society with little or no state intervention.67) In addition, the Society listened to its guests’ opinions on the various candidates. Francisco Javier Zaldúa spoke in favor of the progressive López; José de Obaldía praised Obando; and Ezequiel Rojas pledged his endorsement of López, claiming that the general would return Colombia to the legality of the days of Santander.68
The Society’s election committees reported their findings to the membership on May 15, 1848. Francisco Londoño, now director of the Society, personally favored Gori, but a lengthy discussion led to an agreement to support López. The Society’s adherence centered on his demonstrated capacity to preserve the peace of the country.69 The Sociedad made no mention of López’s political program, only that he represented liberal principles. Acting on a proposal by Ambrosio López and José María Vergara Tenorio, the Society reaffirmed its decision to work for López’s election at a meeting on June 10, 1848.70 It accordingly appealed to artisans of the Province of Bogotá, acclaiming López as a fighter for liberty, a soldier of the people, and a Catholic democrat. “Citizen General” López was said to favor elimination of laws that benefited only the privileged and speculators. The Society’s cause, which was said to be that of the people, was triumphing in Europe and America and, with López, would triumph also in Colombia.71 (The influence of young Liberals can clearly be seen in the language of this appeal.)
A vocal segment of the capital’s craft community preferred Gori to López. A painter described López as too susceptible to outside forces and unlikely to sustain the dignity of the office. By contrast Gori, according to the painter, fit the role of a republican president: a dignified, experienced, and moderate man of laws, one who could direct the nation to rational progress. Moreover, Gori was not the candidate of Mosquera, an identification that all candidates sought to avoid in this election.72 Artisans who supported Gori took issue with the Society’s support of López, cautioning potential voters not to be misled by promises that López would repeal Mosquera’s tariff legislation and that he would deny foreign artisans entry into the country. After all, as one handout reminded its readers, such powers were constitutionally reserved for the congress and not the president. Artisans were cautioned not to put faith in men whose interests were opposite to their own, men who, allegedly, ridiculed the artisans in private and who would abandon them when they were no longer needed. One handout ended with the prophetic phrase: “Time will disillusion you.”73 Artisan members of the Sociedad were allegedly being manipulated by outside forces, while the few craftsmen who did understand the situation were said to be resigning from the organization. Agustín Rodríguez, for example, who favored Gori, reportedly handed in his resignation as president of the Society, only to have it rejected.74
The Sociedad de Artesanos formally rebutted these charges. Its board of directors protested insinuations that artisans were unable to make political assessments by themselves. They could, and would, refuse to be misled by individuals who only wanted to divide and exploit the artisan class. A “great majority” of the organization’s members was said to support López.75 Interestingly, the Society’s response used the word members instead of artisans—and said nothing about the defection of Rodríguez, who was at the time on the Gori electoral list.76
When the presidential election finally took place, no candidate obtained a majority. López led the national count with 725 electoral votes, Gori garnered 384, and Cuervo totalled 304; other candidates, mostly ministeriales, shared 276 votes. Once again, congress would select the president from minority candidates. Together ministerial candidates received the greatest number of votes, but the election clearly demonstrated the deep fissures in their ranks. López won 102 of the 242 votes in the province of Bogotá, Gori 95, Cuervo 27, and 18 votes were garnered by others. Despite the efforts of the Sociedad de Artesanos in mobilizing support for López, he fared worse in the capital than he did in its province; Gori tallied 31 votes, López 12, Cuervo 8, and Mariano Ospina Rodríguez 1.77 These results clearly revealed the strength of the Gori candidacy in Bogotá, which, when coupled with various pro-Gori announcements in the press, suggests that artisans in Bogotá were not completely swayed by the Society’s electioneering. The artisan alliance with the young Liberals who backed López was far from secure even at this early date. Nonetheless, the Society of Artisans had demonstrated its potential as a political action group, a role that would be expanded in the coming years.78
Meanwhile, political tensions rose in anticipation of the selection of the president by the congress on March 7, 1849. One paper claimed that a “certain” group of people was trying to spread the idea among the pueblo that an aristocracy existed in Colombia, and that it should be ended just as it had been in France. Artisans were warned of the motivations behind such propaganda and reminded that if craftsmen had not yet been elected to high office it was due to their lack of education, not to the system’s rigidity.79 Ambrosio López responded that artisans could see perfectly well that an aristocracy of politicians who lived off public monies did exist. Insulting the artisans’ intelligence did not, López concluded, contribute to public tranquility.80
The Sociedad de Artesanos held meetings almost daily after mid-February 1849 to prepare an election strategy. The agreed-upon approach “was to frighten the weak [members of Congress] and do nothing more.”81 The Society approached the governor of the province in early March to request arms for its members so that they might serve as a standing militia, ready to defend the country’s republican institutions at a moment’s notice. The arms were denied to the Society, but it was reported that they purchased all the pistols, knives, powder, and ammunition in the capital.82 While the credibility of this report is questionable, it does illustrate the anxiety aroused by the Sociedad and its plans for the 7 de marzo. Anxiety was not calmed when a group of artisans entered the congress on March 2 and shouted down Conservative speakers.83 Such activities recalled to many minds the incident that had occurred a year earlier in Caracas, when a government-inspired mob invaded the Venezuelan congress, killing several deputies and members of the guard and bringing congressional resistance to President José Tadeo Monagas to an end. Fears of a caraqueñada led Mosquera to prepare for similar disturbances in Bogotá. The five-hundred-man Fifth Battalion was charged with maintaining order. On the night before the selection, cannons filled with grapeshot were placed at key intersections of the city.84
The 7 de marzo presidential selection is one of the most disputed in Colombia’s history. Although Congress was not scheduled to open until 10:00 A.M., a large crowd came much earlier to the spacious church of Santo Domingo, where the selection would be held. First to enter were the artisans, next the goristas, then the cuervistas, and finally the students, who sat nearest the congressmen. The various sides were said to be about equally represented. A barrier of heavy tables separated the audience, estimated at 1,600 people, from the congressmen.85 The session opened on time and the voting began. At the end of the first round of voting, both López and Cuervo had received 37 votes, and Gori 10, which removed him from the contest. In the second round, Cuervo improved his total to 42, López to 40, and 2 votes were blank. At this point many people in the crowd thought that Cuervo had won. The tumult that swept the audience was calmed only when José de Obaldía leaped to the top of a table, shouting “¡Todavía no hay elecciones!” (There are not yet elections). When order was restored, the third round of voting began. Due to insistent shouts by the audience, it took over two hours to complete. At its conclusion, López had 42 votes, Cuervo 39, and now 3 votes were blank. The last vote was that of Mariano Ospina Rodríguez, which according to traditional accounts read: “I vote for General José Hilario López so that the deputies will not be murdered.” At this time, about 3:00 P.M., the spectators were expelled from the church. The crowd, now swollen to 4,000, waited outside in the rain. At 5:00 P.M. it was announced that the fourth round had resulted in the same tally as had the third, which, according to the Constitution, meant that the leader received the blank votes—General José Hilario López was president-elect.86
López supporters in the plaza were overjoyed. Celebrations among progressives lasted far into the night. The next day El Aviso praised the conduct of the crowd and proclaimed:
Long live the Congress of 1849!
Long live the popular president!
Long live the people of the capital!
Long live the democratic artisans!87
The Society circulated a handout which proclaimed that the 7 de marzo would be remembered with the same patriotic enthusiasm as the 20 de julio; equality and fraternity had now joined Colombian liberty.88
Partisan Mobilizations: The Democratic and Popular Societies
The 7 de marzo opened a new era for both Colombia and the Sociedad de Artesanos. Members of the López government were quick to appreciate the potential of the organization as a mobilizing force in the creation of the democratic republic, in the support of the Liberal party, and in the cultivation of liberal beliefs.89 The Sociedad de Artesanos, now christened the Sociedad Democrática de Artesanos, became a tool of the Secretariat of Government, to whose head, Francisco Javier Zaldúa, it reported.90 Chapters of the Democratic Society were established throughout the nation in an effort to support the 7 de marzo regime. Sixteen Sociedades were founded in 1849, twenty-one in 1850, sixty-six in 1851, and nine in 1852—a sequence that highlights the importance of the organization to the Liberal party in times of civil strife (the Conservative insurrection of 1851) and in support of the reform measures of 1849 and 1850.
A López election society in Cali became the first Sociedad Democrática established outside of the Colombian capital. The Society attempted to prepare Liberal newcomers for vacant government positions immediately following López’s victory.91 Juan Nepomuceno Núñez Conto, who had championed the cause of Cali’s ejiditarios against local Conservatives the previous year,92 remodeled the caleño society along the same lines as the Bogotá chapter in mid-1849. The new Democratic Society declared its existence on the 20 de julio and immediately undertook an aggressive campaign to recruit the local populace into the Liberal party and Democratic Society.93 Contemporary authors, both moderate and Conservative, charged that “popular passions,” expressing both racial and economic tensions, were freely vented in the sessions of the Sociedad.94 Local Conservatives, who had dominated the Cauca provincial government through the 1840s, responded by the formation of the Sociedad de Amigos del Pueblo (Friends of the People). The Amigos del Pueblo and the Democratic Societies immediately clashed in street brawls, the most serious of which occurred on March 10, 1850. The Liberal governor, Manuel Dolores Camacho, though a decided friend and benefactor of the Democratic organization, so feared uncontrollable social violence that he banned meetings of both Societies.95
Beginning with the Society in Cali, Liberals in other provincial towns founded their own Sociedades Democráticas. By October, Societies from Cali, La Plata, Sogamoso, Cartago, and Facatativá had reported to the Democratic Society of Bogotá, which in turn promised to work with them. Ten other Sociedades had been founded by January 1850, when countrywide membership reportedly surpassed 10,000. Bogotá’s chapter membership was said to number more than 2,500, and Cali’s more than 2,000. The Democratic Societies thus became a national network dedicated to the reform principles of the 7 de marzo. Young intellectuals were sent throughout the country to address the various groups.96 In all but a few instances, notably those of Popayán, Cali, Cartagena, San Gil, Socorro, and Bogotá, the Democratic Societies were simply chapters of the local Liberal party, which included government employees. In towns such as Cali, the Democratic Society also functioned as a means by which the popular sectors might express local grievances. The administration endeavored to employ this national organization in numerous ways. Perhaps one of the most significant uses in the long run was the Societies’ relationship to the National Guard, the militia that supplemented the standing army. A September 1849 circular to jefes políticos throughout the nation instructed them to build a strong guard, composed of individuals loyal to the 7 de marzo.97 These frequently were the “Democrats” of the towns.
Conservatives in the capital city established La Sociedad Popular de Instrucción Mutua i Fraternidad Cristiana (Popular Society of Mutual Instruction and Fraternal Christianity) in December 1849 to counter the growing power of the Sociedad Democrática.98 In part, this body originated in mobilization efforts begun by the Jesuits after their readmission to Colombia in 1843. The fathers had founded an institute for artisan education and had established workers’ congregations, designed both for mutual aid purposes and to introduce “proper” spiritual and temporal values. Some reports suggest that the meetings of the Jesuit groups drew upwards of eight-hundred participants in the late 1840s.99 The Sociedad Popular was linked to the Jesuit congregations and to the Catholic Society.100 Its founders observed that Conservative lethargy, inaction, and disunity had allowed the Liberals into power. In order to assert the will of the “majority party,” the party had to unite, consolidate itself, and form associations.101 The popular base for such associations would be the artisans of the nation. The connections between the Popular Society and the Conservative party were never hidden to the extent that they were between the Democratic Society and the Liberals. Although Simón José Cárdenas, the Popular Society’s first president, was an artist, officers of the group included the Conservative leaders José Eusebio Caro, José María Torres Caicedo, José Manuel Groot, Urbano Pradilla, and Mariano Ospina Rodríguez.102
The programs and ideology of the Popular Society are indistinguishable from those of the Conservative party. The Sociedad Popular announced that it hoped to pursue the perfection of public institutions, promote the country’s progress, work for the triumph of principles based upon evangelical morality, and put into political power men of honor, patriotism, and morality. The first three objectives could only be attained upon the success of the fourth, so political efforts were to be the primary focus of the group’s energies.103 It planned industrial assistance by the creation of a monetary pool from which artisans could draw to purchase tools and books necessary to their trades. Such funds would also be used to assist poor artisans in the case of sickness and to reward members for virtuous actions. Educational objectives included teaching reading, writing, grammar, arithmetic, and geometry, as well as lessons on the government’s structure, the constitution, and the rights and obligations of citizens. In order to strengthen the marital institution, a fund was to be created so that poor artisans could pay parochial costs and other necessary marriage expenses. Together these methods would serve to enhance the “principal bases of civilization”—the family, property, and instruction. Diffusion of these principles through membership in the Popular Society would insure the “legal triumph” of the Conservative party.104
The Liberal government immediately began a campaign against the Sociedad Popular, and eventually even used the Democratic Society as one of its tools of repression. As early as December 31, 1849, Governor José María Mantilla cautioned two members of the Popular Society, Francisco Cristando and Florentino V. Posse, that the government would use measures to repress the group if rumors about their collection of weapons proved true. Mantilla warned the Society’s vice-president, Simón Espejo, on January 2, 1850, of potential reprisals if he continued to verbally assault the government. Espejo claimed that he would use his rights as a citizen to speak his mind. Mantilla then allegedly threatened him with exile.105
The political rivalry between the partisan organizations erupted into violence on January 15, 1850. A Popular Society meeting of that evening, said to have been attended by more than one-thousand persons (including Maríano Ospina Rodríguez, José Eusebio Caro, and José María Baraya, jefe político of the city), was interrupted by the shouts of some thirty to forty Democrats in the crowd. According to Conservative accounts, Democrats soon left the assembly, shouting that a Conservative revolt had begun.106 Liberals related that when the Popular meeting became disorderly, a Democrat in the crowd went to a concurrent regular meeting of the Democratic organization and informed them of the occurrence. That session broke up, whereupon some of its members requested arms from the governor to restore order. Others went to the Popular meeting. Finding calm amid their rivals, Democrats reconvened their own session to consider steps to counter the opposition movement. José María Samper proposed that the Democratic Society should petition the president for the expulsion of Jesuits and the dismissal of all Conservatives from public office. Martín Plata proposed that the National Guard be called out to prevent disruption of the public order. Both resolutions carried.107
Announcements covered the city walls on January 16, 1850, calling upon all “good Liberals” to meet at noon to present the petitions to the president.108 López promised to review the petitions, but indicated no course of action.109 The petitions were nevertheless a partial success. Three Conservative judges were removed from the Supreme Court, and General José María Ortega, Conservative director of the Military College, was dismissed along with several of his subordinates. The questionable legality of the firings so infuriated Lino de Pombo that he resigned his position as head of the Supreme Court.110
Two days later Vice-President Rufino Cuervo urged leaders of both groups to remain calm. He suggested that both Sociedades consider a ban on meetings until after the opening of congress in March so as to avoid further violence.111 Public gatherings do, in fact, appear to have been curtailed in February, due to the cholera epidemic ravaging the city. In March, after the Democrats had resumed their meetings, the Sociedad Popular asked for permission to do the same. Police representative Plácido Morales gave permission for the group to meet, but only in the open air or in the Democratic meeting hall, not in their accustomed location. Simón José Cárdenas, the Popular’s president, protested, stating that the Society need not ask permission to meet in the open and that restriction of its meeting place was unwarranted, as cholera was gone from the city. Morales stood by his decision and reprimanded the Popular leader for his arrogant attitude.112
Cárdenas himself came under attack in what became one of the more publicized personal controversies of the period. His February 16, 1850, visit to jailed Popular member Ignacio Rodríguez provoked a heated argument and Cárdenas’s arrest. Cárdenas protested that he had been singled out for arrest simply because of his political activity for the Conservative party. The Conservative artisan leader harshly criticized jailer Camilo Rodríguez, alleging that he was unfit for public office because of a 1839 criminal conviction, whereupon Rodríguez promptly accused both Cárdenas and Popular member Juan Malo of libel. Cárdenas was found guilty and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. To Conservatives, the trial was not concerned with libel, because Rodríguez did have a criminal record; rather, it was political persecution, which to them was characteristic of the 7 de marzo regime.113 If so, it appears to have been effective, for by June 1850 the Popular Society had grown quiet under the press restrictions imposed by President López after the expulsion of the Jesuits in May of that year.114 Governmental repression had effectively silenced the popular mobilization of the Conservative party, establishing a dangerous precedent that came to be characteristic of Colombia’s political culture.
In 1851, there was a revival of the clashes between the Democratic and Popular Societies. The Popular meeting of March 11 resulted in the worst violence to date among these two groups. As Democrats tried to break up the assembly, gunfire was exchanged, killing one member of the Popular Society and seriously injuring several policemen. This incident served to revive demands for the suppression of the Sociedad Popular, which was forced to curtail meetings until May.115 The Popular Society resumed its meetings with reorganizational sessions in every quarter of the city. Several disgruntled Democrats attended one session and suggested the formation of a sociedad de la unión de artesanos (union society of artisans) that would be dedicated exclusively to artisan interests and would not serve as a tool for the parties.116 Nothing came of the proposal, as the Conservative rebellion of 1851 soon overshadowed events in the capital.117
The rebellion of 1851 stemmed from a complicated mix of economic, political, and social factors. Democrats in the Cauca valley initiated a series of attacks upon hacendados (many of whom claimed Conservative allegiance), claiming that landowner encroachment upon town lands (ejidos) justified the behavior. The early months of 1851 were so dominated by these actions that the period was given the name El Zurriago (The Whipping) to characterize the brutal nature of the attacks. Violent assaults upon landowners were especially virulent around Palmira, where attacks were made in broad daylight.118 Conservatives claimed that the government sanctioned these actions, as force was seldom used to quell them—seemingly a valid complaint. The jefe político of Cali dismissed one case of the burning of a hacienda, saying that, after all, its owner was a “dangerous conservative.”119 This violence helped provoke the unsuccessful revolt, which quickly spread throughout the Cauca valley and into Antioquia. General Obando was named Chief of the South, while Colonel Tomás Herrera was given charge of the fighting in Antioquia. By mid-July, Obando had quieted the Cauca, but Herrera needed until September to suppress the Antioqueño revolt. The Democratic Society of Bogotá saw service in Antioquia as part of the National Guard and returned to Bogotá on December 9.120
Conclusion
The years before the 1849 presidential selection stand as the formative period of Colombian political culture. Significantly, the Conservative and Liberal parties developed in response to regional loyalties, generational experiences, and questions of control of the reigns of government, not to essential class interests. Each party found it necessary to recruit non-elites to secure electoral allegiances, a process that in time engendered rigid popular identification with one or the other party. Partisan violence and manipulation of the electoral process almost immediately warped any sense of genuine representative government, even while appearances suggest a republican façade. At its extreme, partisan competition could lead to civil war; in normal times it festered social tensions. Although it is clear that the Conservative and Liberal antagonisms at the root of the twentieth-century La Violencia are to be found in the political scene of the 1930s and 1940s, the character of partisan contention was established in the repression, rancor, and popular recruitment associated with the 7 de marzo regime. Yet, partisan mobilizations allowed non-elites in some instances to express their class interests, making an alternative character for Colombia’s political culture possible. In the mid-century liberal reform era, the policy contours of that polity—both actual and potential—would be determined.