ARTISAN MOBILIZATIONS IN THE ERA OF LIBERAL REFORMS
The country progresses, we are told, and in truth luxuries increase for certain classes, buildings multiply, merchandise are abundant, and exportation increases . . . and in all the principal streets we see an unaccustomed movement, but the pueblo suffers scarcities and privations; everything becomes dear to them, and their products or work do not cover expenses; and the pueblo has to say: we do not want progress nor English civilization, in so far as hundreds of people are dying of misery under . . . the marble porticoes.
—“El artesano de Bogotá”1
LIBERAL REFORMS IN THE MIDDLE YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH century transformed Colombia’s governmental structure, recast its economic infrastructure, and loosened its society from many colonial restrictions.2 Changes in economic policy during the presidential administration of Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera (1845–49) opened the reform period, which came to full flower under the regime of José Hilario López (1849–53), and culminated in the wake of the 1859–62 civil war. By the mid-1860s, Colombia had completed the most sweeping set of reforms in Latin America, provoking, as happened in other countries, oftimes heated reaction, especially from the capital’s artisan organizations.
The liberal ideology that sustained the reform era appealed to broad segments of the Colombian polity, although it was by no means universally accepted. In theory, advocates of liberalism believed that the efforts of individuals to satisfy their self interests, when unfettered by restrictive social, economic, or political policies, would best serve the interests of the public at large. The reformers therefore favored the individual over the group and laissez-faire over monopolistic economic programs. In social policy, this meant, for example, that few if any restrictions should limit speech, the press, assembly, or other areas of individual expression. Liberty of instruction was favored over church-sponsored educational facilities. The capacity of individuals to fulfill their potential, according to liberal theory, required that the temporal power of the church be curbed. In the political arena, direct expressions of the people’s will were deemed preferable to indirect, filtered political expressions. Fewer suffrage limitations would enable more individuals to voice their political sentiments, thereby blocking the inordinate power of the few over the many. Smaller units of government, bound up in a federalized system of government, were seen as superior to powerful, centralized state regimes. Economic liberalism demanded the elimination of monopolies, reduced levels of taxation, private ownership of land, and the free movement of products across national boundaries in keeping with a faith in comparative advantages in the international exchange of goods. Slavery, anathema to both autonomous individual economic and social expression, was incompatible with liberalism. Liberals promised that “progress” and “civilization” would follow the release of individual enterprise and the abandonment of policies favorable to privileged social groups.3
In the adherence to the ideology of liberalism, Colombian reformers marched in cadence with much of the Western world. Liberalism followed the logic of the Enlightenment and the material advances of capitalism. Liberalism served as the “ideology of choice” for many designers of the new republican governments that hoped to keep pace with the progress they saw in the United States and areas of Western Europe, particularly in economic terms. Contrary to its own rhetoric, the ideology of liberalism did not produce a neutral state. It instead directed Colombia’s political economy toward the economic structure of the North Atlantic, enhanced the development of export enterprises, and reduced the capacity of domestic manufactures, which were judged by many to be “non-competitive,” to sustain accustomed levels of activity. Liberalism not only satisfied the particular interests of social groups that aspired to full participation in the export-import economy but it also attracted broad segments of elite society, without direct correlation to socioeconomic function. Liberalism’s promised full participation in the social and political affairs of the nation appealed in particular to middle-level groups such as artisans, who envisioned that their abilities might be better served under that system of beliefs.4 At the same time, domestic craftsmen opposed economic liberalism, which threatened their productive positions.
National leaders supported most reforms that drew upon the principles of economic liberalism; these reforms were therefore most comprehensive. As discussed earlier, many of the reforms, notably those concerning fiscal policy, had been proposed in one form or another since the 1820s, but most had been forestalled by ideological opposition or by pragmatic hesitation on the part of early leaders such as Santander by fears of the loss of revenue for governmental operations, a pragmatism not shared by the reformers of mid-century. Mosquera’s economic reforms, which included tariff reduction, elimination of the tobacco monopoly, and a new coinage, elicited general bipartisan support, a consensus that continued after the Liberal victory of 1849, thereby reducing the significance of that election to the reform process.5
It is commonplace to attribute full responsibility for the reform impetus to the young Liberals. Indeed, the Generation of 1849, men trained under the educational system instituted by Santander and who became politically active in the full flower of youthful optimism, served as a primary catalyst for reform, yet they were simply the most visible advocates of reform. With the noted exceptions of the areas of reform dealing with the church, an essential consensus existed between politicians of both parties before 1852. The election of 1849 shaped Colombia’s political culture, not its reform process. From that year, the Conservative and Liberal parties have dominated Colombia’s politics, albeit not without significant third party challenges and considerable political strife. The election of 1849 also symbolized the liberalization of Colombia’s political culture, with the appearance of political organizations with significant popular input. Equally important, the defeat of the Melo revolt in 1854 closed that political culture to only these parties, as Conservatives and Liberals came together to defeat a third-party challenge, thereby establishing the precedent for the twentieth-century Frente Nacional (National Front). Significantly, the 1854 challenge involved an unprecedented degree of popular mobilization; its defeat also established a tradition central to the country’s political culture.
The Liberal regime of José Hilario López continued the economic liberalization of its predecessor, while attempting to redirect the nation’s social and political orientation as well. Importantly, Conservatives controlled the 1850 Senate, which sponsored reforms that decentralized the nation’s fiscal structure, abolished tariffs in Panama, reduced taxes on stamped legal documents (papel sellado), and allowed for the free export of gold. Subsequent congresses, dominated by Liberals in 1851, 1852, and 1853, opened rivers to foreign traffic, ended the death penalty for political crimes, declared absolute freedom of the press, finally eliminated slavery, hastened the elimination of corporate Indian landholdings (resquardos), abolished special religious rights (fueros), eliminated the church tithe on production (diezmo), and began political decentralization. The Constitution of 1853 culminated this first stage of reform by declaring the separation of church and state, allowing for civil marriage and divorce, extending the vote to all male citizens over the age of twenty-one, decreeing direct secret elections, allowing popular election of governors and many other officials, creating a more decentralized governmental structure, and weakening executive powers.6 Robert Gilmore reminds the observer who might argue for the innovative character of the Liberal government that precedent for “every measure tagged with the 7th of March label can be found [in petitions made] between 1809 and 1840.”7
This by no means suggests that Colombians gave 100 percent support to the reforms. Liberty of religious expression, if allowed, threatened the hegemonic position of the Catholic church, which was seen by many Conservatives to be the bedrock of morality, public virtue, and social stability. Separation of church and state, another liberal principle, ran counter to deeply imbedded traditions. Liberal anti-clericalism was thought by many to jeopardize religious leaders and imperil the very individuals who imparted the principles of harmonious social life. Significantly, many pro-church advocates warned that Colombian society was not sufficiently “civilized” to permit individuals free expression without the ominous threat of anarchism and disorder. Nor did all persons favor the elimination of slavery, which, in combination with the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1850 by presidential decree, incited the Conservative revolt in 1851. Moreover, the Liberal party splintered into a wing of younger, more radical reformers (gólgotas) and moderate reformers (draconianos). The latter group, men whose liberalism had been shaped as santanderista progressives, opposed the reduction of executive powers and the role of the military in government. Artisans of the Democratic Society in time joined with the draconianos in an attempt to curb the reforms, including tariff laws. Failure of that effort led to an artisan-military-draconiano revolt in April 1854 to halt the reform tide and return the country to previous constitutional norms. The movement was defeated by a Conservative/gólgota alliance in December 1854, thereby eliminating most organized opposition to the reform process.
With the draconiano challenge repressed, gólgota Liberals and Conservatives returned to the reformation of the country’s political structure, an item not fully completed under the 1853 constitution. Although decentralization had ceded considerable autonomy to an expanded number of provinces (now thirty-six), the multiplicity of territorial divisions, coupled with uncertain governance structures, dictated the need for additional reform. Provinces were consolidated into “sovereign states,” beginning with that of Panama in 1855. Antioquia followed in 1856 and six more states were added in 1857.8 The Constitution of 1858 that created the Granadian Confederation ratified these territorial changes and established a starkly federalist system of government with eight sovereign states.9 Radical Liberals (the name assumed by gólgotas after 1854) and Conservatives worked closely to frame that document.
The Radical/Conservative alliance did not last. The civil war of 1859–62, the only successful rebellion in the nation’s history, ended in a Liberal victory and provided the opportunity for a final set of reforms, the most explosive dealing with church/state relations. Alleged clerical support for the Conservative rebellion led to the July 20, 1861, decree demanding governmental authorization of all church officials. Several days later, the Jesuits were once again expelled from the country. All corporate properties were disamortized and offered for public sale on September 9, leaving the church with physical domain over only its churches and chapels. Religious communities such as convents and monasteries were ordered abolished on November 5, at which time the government ordered the expulsion from the country of all those who resisted that decree, or those of July 20 or September 9. These edicts satisfied liberal anti-clericalism, the desire to eliminate corporate ownership of land, and the very real fiscal needs of the government, which reaped the profits from forced sale of church property. Archbishop Antonio Herrán’s opposition to the disamortization decree earned him exile.10
When the war had finally ended in late 1862, a constitutional convention met in Ríonegro to replace the Pact of Union that had united the country since 1861. Though plagued with disputes between pro-Mosquera and Radical Liberal delegates, the country’s fourth constitution in twenty years was promulgated on May 8. The Constitution of Ríonegro created a federal union of nine states,11 each of which held all powers not expressly given to the federal government. Liberal fears of Mosquera’s executive ambitions resulted in a two-year, non-repetitive presidential term, a limitation that burdened representatives as well. Differences on the extent of wartime religious reforms aggravated the Radical/Mosquera coalition during the meeting, but all of the latter’s decrees were incorporated into the constitution.12 Before the convention closed, its delegates selected Mosquera as president until April 1864, when the first popularly elected president of the United States of Colombia assumed office.13
Artisans and Liberal Reforms
Artisan mobilization against the liberalization of the economy began at an early date. Craftsmen from Bogotá and Cartagena requested the full prohibition of competitive foreign goods into the country in 1831, claiming that their economic misfortunes originated in foreign imports.14 Five years later, fifteen bogotano artisans, including Agustín Rodríguez, who later became the first president of the Sociedad de Artesanos, alleged that low tariff levels were undermining the social and economic welfare of the country and its craftsmen, suggesting that the government was obligated to provide for the best interests of its citizens by a system of protective tariffs. A congressional commission to hear the petition agreed, but took no action to increase rates.15
Governmental policies designed to draw immigrants to the country also evoked considerable criticism. The colonial guild system had produced few masters and suffered from technological stagnation. Many in the government hoped to rectify that situation by the introduction of foreign craft masters, who would bring with them the latest productive techniques. Unfortunately, immigrant masters failed to improve the situation, with most preferring to make short-term profits and then return to their native lands. “Some Native Artisans” wrote in an 1843 article that the formal status of aliens under the laws of the nation gave them various advantages over their domestic counterparts. While native tradesmen were obligated to fulfill military obligations in either the Army or the National Guard, foreigners were exempt from that civic responsibility. Thus they did not lose work to military service and enjoyed more time to pursue their crafts. Moreover, foreigners were exempt from the multiple taxes that burdened natives. In short, foreign craftsmen were seen as a privileged class not burdened with the responsibilities, taxes, and risks implicit in the citizenship enjoyed by native artisans.16 Moreover, most foreign craftsmen were said to have been unwilling to share knowledge of their trades with native artisans.17 Similar opposition was voiced publicly by tradesmen in 1867, 1875, and 1887. Native artisans, however, willingly acknowledged the contributions of some foreigners in advancing the general state of the arts, particularly those foreigners who shared their skills with natives.18
While accusations against foreign craftsmen inevitably claimed that Colombian artisans produced goods of equal quality, petitions for tariff protection frequently requested that masters be brought from abroad to teach native craftsmen.19 Such requests were common after the crisis of the 1860s, when they resulted in approval of a plan to bring foreigners to Colombia to teach mechanical arts.20 In the end, such aspirations were not realized, although several Colombians were sent abroad in the 1880s to study industrial trades.
The most vocal artisan response to liberal reform came in reaction to tariff reduction. Bogotano craftsmen who founded the Society of Artisans protested that tariff reductions on “ready-made clothing, shoes, tools, and other manufactures” would damage the country’s industry and disemploy thousands who “foment the national wealth” by manual trades.21 Although the political mobilization to repeal the Law of June 14 quickly embroiled the Society in the heated 1848 presidential campaign, upward revision of the tariff rates remained foremost on the artisan political agenda. When the 1849 congress did not raise tariff rates, Bogotá’s Society expressed confidence “that the wisdom of the Congress will weigh and meditate for the good of the country’s industry in the most assertive and convenient manner.”22
When artisans renewed their drive for tariff protection, the obstacles blocking their goals became clear. The Sociedad Democrática de Bogotá presented a petition in May 1850 to remind legislators of its faithful service to the ideas of the 7 de marzo, implying that tariff protection would be the just compensation for that support.23 The petition called for increased tariff protection for all the country, or at least for the provinces of Bogotá, Mariquita, Neiva, Tundama, Tunja, and Vélez, supposedly the areas most affected by manufactured imports. Against those who argued that tariff increases would aid only a small sector of society, the artisan petition calculated that if each shop in the capital had twenty journeymen, then four-thousand workers and their families would be hurt by low tariffs in Bogotá alone. They estimated the population of consumers of foreign products at two-thousand. To them, these statistics clearly demonstrated that low tariffs favored a minority of the population, not the reverse as proponents of free trade insisted. The petition made clear that artisans were suspicious of foreign ideas as well as foreign products. The notion that worship of foreign ideas might help the nation materially was called the “vanity of theoreticians and the greed of speculators.”24 After several days of heated exchange among legislators, a debate that was monitored closely by the craftsmen, the bill died in committee.25
Quite significantly, Lorenzo María Lleras and Juan José Nieto, leading members of the emerging draconiano wing of the Liberal party, supported the rationale for higher tariffs. Lleras noted that he had studied the ideas of such proponents of economic liberalism as Say and Bastiat, yet, as head of the commission that had studied the plight of the country’s artisans, he reported, “it makes me sick to see the conditions of the artisans.” Lleras thus abandoned his economic training, realizing that what might work in other countries was not necessarily applicable in Colombia. Lleras insisted that Colombia provide for the welfare of its citizens, pointing out that in theory no duties should be levied and that the consumer should pay only the cost of the item plus transportation. Yet, if this were the case, how could the government function? Already revenue shortages had forced the government to cut back projects, reduce expenditures, and fire employees. Theory, Lleras concluded, did not override the pragmatic need for revenue, nor the government’s obligations to its citizenry.26
Many of the same craftsmen repeated the request for tariff protection to the 1851 congress. Like previous requests, this petition focused upon the desperate economic situation facing artisans and their families. The artisan document argued that craftsmen cared more for social reality than economic theory, which dealt with nations as single entities, not as amalgamations of various classes and peoples. The authors of the petition pointed out that what might cause “advancement” for the whole nation did not necessarily help its separate parts. The artisans thus questioned the advice of those who felt they could remedy their plight by changing trades. According to the members of the Democratic Society, only agriculture and commerce provided real alternative employment and they lacked the necessary capital to become established in those fields. The artisans reminded legislators that their petition was not a party matter, but reflected the needs of a threatened social class.27
The inherent flaw in the artisan/student union supporting the national network of the Democratic Societies is revealed in the rejection of requests for higher tariffs. The Sociedad de Artesanos had been formed in reaction to liberal tariff reduction and, in keeping with the interests of its artisan membership, had made increased tariff rates its primary objective. Younger members of the Liberal party, invited into the group as a means of reaching that goal, had used the Artisan Society as an electoral force through which their own reform objectives and political ambitions could be met. The political liberalism espoused by the students and others appealed to members of the Society, as it promised the expansion of the polity to include the voices of previously excluded groups, such as artisans. After the 7 de marzo victory, the national extension of the Sociedad Democrática succeeded in mobilizing popular support for many reform measures and in bringing popular sectors into the polity. On the positive side, the students had influenced artisans to become more politically active, by which craftsmen had increased their self-consciousness. But artisans wished to negate the economic measures favored by the young Liberals and other politicians. Mobilization to win higher tariff rates vividly revealed the contradiction. Political liberalism enabled craftsmen to seek interests relative to their class, which included opposition to the tariff reductions demanded by economic liberalism. The flawed relationship did not last.
After the congressional rejection of the May 1850 petition, artisans in the Democratic Society became vocal opponents of the young Liberals in their organization.28 The ultimate indication of the division is seen in the Liberals’ accolades to Florentino González as a “man of progress” worthy of a cabinet post or of the vice-presidency.29 The blacksmith Emeterio Heredia roundly condemned the suggestion, claiming that González was not a good Liberal and that his attitude toward craftsmen had been demonstrated in the tariff of 1847.30 The conflict became so bitter that José María Samper was driven from the Democratic Society after he insisted that it support the tariff reductions undertaken by the government.31
Young Liberals, who were by now labeled gólgotas, established the Escuela Republicana (Republican School) on the 1850 anniversary of the attempted assassination of Bolivar, a move that symbolized their separation from the Democratic Society. The rector of the National University, Vicente Lombana, and the core of the gólgota activists founded the Republican School to provide reformers and intellectuals with a sounding board and base in which to examine their particular interests and ideas. Conservatives claimed that the objective of the Republican School was to defend the ideas of socialism, but this statement must be understood in the spirit of the times.32 José María Samper, after he moderated his political opinions, rightly observed the character of gólgotan socialism, noting that “We were all socialists in the School, but without having studied socialism nor understood it, enamored with the word, with its political novelty.”33
Artisans accelerated the lengthy process of making the Sociedad Democrática more representative of their interests in late 1850. This was in part made necessary by increased complaints about its direction.34 For at least Ambrosio López, these appeals for introspection had the desired affect. His critical analysis of the Society’s history, published in early 1851, concluded that leadership had been lost to imitators of the “red serpents” of the 1848 French Revolution. The embarrassed tailor recognized his own role in subverting artisan economic objectives (i.e., tariff legislation) in order to help the López campaign. The 1849 victory, he related, had not brought the true democratic institutions hoped for by the artisans, but an “oligarchy with the name of a democracy.”35 Worse perhaps than this for López had been the “red serpents’” attack on religion. He did not approve of the expulsion of the Jesuits nor of the attacks upon the Catholic church and its dogmas, which he saw as necessary for a just republic. The disillusioned López wrote that Conservatives were using their economic power to oppress artisans. Indeed, both Conservatives and Liberals offered the artisan only “worse misery.” To López, the future was bleak: “Fellow disillusioned, beloved friends, there exists a strong opposition that strengthens every day, and I believe that the day is not distant that our affiliation will force a civil war among ourselves.”36 Artisans, as López saw it, had to reassert their solidarity. Only some military men and moderate Liberals could be trusted in this process. It would then be possible to fulfill the artisans’ hopes “of protected arts . . . with our families living happily in the soul of a true Republic, where citizens are not denied their real rights.”37 For his slanderous publication, López was expelled from the Society.38
The blacksmith Emeterio Heredia, then president of the Society, refuted López’s charges in his own publication. Did not Ambrosio like freedom of the press? And, he asked, what of Zaldúa’s proposal in the Senate to create industrial workshops? As for the struggle to increase tariffs, Heredia reminded López of the support the artisan petition had received in the Chamber the year earlier. Surely this provided evidence of a republican government that was responsive to the needs of artisans. Heredia felt that a man of López’s nature, who allegedly had reaped personal benefit from public appointments, a “conservative without principles,” had no right to censure the Sociedad Democrática and the Liberal government without first censuring himself.39 López responded that his charges had gone unanswered and that his expulsion was contrary to free liberal expression, proof of the influence of “red” Liberals in the Society.40
The López/Heredia exchange reveals the extension of publicly stated artisan concerns from an almost exhaustive attention to tariff rates to a variety of issues raised during the reform process. The Jesuit question, for example, drew artisan societies into one of the most polemic disputes of the era.41 As reformers had focused their attention upon the order, José María Samper twice convinced the Democrats to petition for their expulsion.42 President López resisted the strong anti-Jesuit pressures until May 18, 1850, when, citing the April 2, 1767, decree of Charles III that had previously expelled the priests, he ordered the Society of Jesus once again to leave Colombian soil. Two days later, some two-hundred artisans of the Popular Society guarded their exit from the capital.43
Liberal party divisions and the fractured artisan/Liberal relationship became more apparent after the Conservative insurrection of 1851. The carpenter Cruz Ballesteros renewed López’s polemic in December of that year when he charged that craftsmen had been deceived by Liberal theory. Indicative of the insolent and unappreciative attitude of Liberals toward artisans, in Ballesteros’s opinion, was their seeming disregard for the lives of artisans who served in the National Guard: the latter had been poorly clothed and fed and had been used as cannon fodder in the field. And, when they had returned to Bogotá, their compensation consisted of little more than Liberal speeches. Liberal theory and Liberal reality were two different things for Ballesteros.44 The powerful blacksmith orator Miguel León followed with a similar attack in January 1852 against Manuel Murillo Toro, perhaps the most outspoken gólgota ideologue.45
The Sociedad Democrática in Revolt
Artisans in the Democratic Society became increasingly alienated by the reforms after the defeat of the 1851 Conservative insurrection. Their antipathy paralleled that of the draconiano wing of the Liberal party, with whom they forged a durable alliance. Democrats formally adopted José María Obando as their presidential candidate on February 22, 1851. Obando, an enormously popular candidate with a lengthy Liberal vita, had strong support among both the lower classes and the military; and he lived in Las Nieves, where he frequently attended Society meetings. Obando opposed the gólgota reform platform, especially their plans for reduction of the military, although his campaign statements avoided serious discussion of the reforms.46 For their part, gólgotas favored General Tomás Herrera of Panama who, while not as radical as most of his supporters, did favor some of their proposals, particularly those that offered Panama more regional autonomy and economic opportunity. Conservatives, subdued after the 1851 fiasco, presented no candidate, although they undoubtedly opposed the Obando candidacy.47
The conflict in the ranks of the Liberal party, which came at the apparent pinnacle of its power, is clearly understandable in that the rival factions no longer needed to maintain unity in opposition to the Conservative threat, which allowed ideological and programmatic divisions to become more apparent. In general, draconianos did not favor the more radical reforms that had been adopted in the last few years, especially questions of civil liberties, the death penalty, federalism, and the church.48 Draconianos had supported the artisans’ tariff petition, had not been in a hurry to expel the Jesuits, and did not fully support the anti-clerical legislation of the gólgotas; but they had not made a concerted effort on these issues. Additionally, draconianos, a substantial number of whom had military backgrounds, shared common class backgrounds with craftsmen. Significant percentages of the Colombian military hierarchy were men of lower-status groups socially and ideologically opposed by gólgotas.49
The status of the permanent army within the Colombian state reversed draconiano acquiescence to gólgota plans. To most gólgotas, a permanent army that consumed an excessive share of limited treasury funds was incompatible with republican principles that envisioned the spontaneous support of the people for the defense of a threatened government. Accordingly, gólgotas desired the permanent army’s elimination, or at least its reduction in size.50 This was absolutely unacceptable to the draconianos, many of whom were military men. Draconiano writers argued that the army-less utopia envisioned by the gólgotas would lead to anarchy or dictatorship, similar to what had occurred in France.51 When the congress reconvened in March 1853, Florentino González failed in his attempts to curb the institution; the proposal to eliminate the permanent army was defeated 55 to 14.52
Obando defined the draconiano cause as he took office on April 1, 1853.53 The president stressed the need for order, suggesting that radical reformers had destabilized Colombian institutions and society; he therefore pledged to halt the trend toward “anarchy.” Draconianos presented a largely reactionary program against suppression of import duties, reduction of the power of the executive, moves to make education independent of the state, the proposed reduction in the power of the military, and the agrarian laws. They further claimed that special loans were needed to support social institutions such as hospitals, charity houses, national colleges, and public schools—all items of special concern to the popular classes.54 Draconianos declared that their reaction was “for the good of the country: a reaction that assures the priesthood of its independence and rights; the laborer of the fruits of his work; the artisan the price of his industry; to all peace, order, and liberty . . . rights and social guarantees.”55
Artisans took advantage of perceived executive support to press for reestablishment of a protective tariff. On May 17, they presented a petition to the Chamber of Representatives, allegedly pledging a caraqueñada if the request were not granted. After a brief discussion in the chamber, the petition was referred to the Senate, which, since it was controlled by González and the gólgotas, meant sure death for the proposal.56 A violent fracas developed on May 19 outside the legislative chambers between artisans and gólgota youths in attendance, which caused many injuries to both sides, and the death of a black mason, Bruno Rodríguez.57
The May 19 incident divided the city along class lines. The combatants of May 19 were distinguished by their dress: the artisans wore their “official” red-and-blue ruanas and the gólgotas wore frockcoats.58 The very names given to the two sides, guaches (a derisive label given to the artisans which implied coarse, vulgar people) and cachacos (fops), indicate class labeling. Artisan participants in the protests came from both political societies, evidence that class unity now overshadowed party affiliations—or perhaps that political alignments were now being determined on the basis of class origins. Gólgotas—mostly upper-class youths—and many Conservatives took the lead in berating the artisans, while the latter were increasingly linked with the draconianos, which included many military men of humble origin.
Publication of the liberal Constitution on May 21 did little to calm the political situation. To the dismay of many observers, Obando signed the document without protest. Artisans saw the Constitution of May 21 as a further indication of the erosion of order under gólgotan influence. Artisans had become increasingly alienated from the new order, as it ran counter to many of their own interests. In addition to their concern over the tariff question, they were uneasy over the weakening of both the church and state, and they were particularly distrustful of the groups responsible for the changes. For some, social divisions had become enmeshed with the reform controversy. One pamphlet supporting the artisans asked: “Who are the people? In the majority they are religious, Catholic, Apostolic, Roman, republican; who live by the work of their hands in order to earn the bread for their children and lazy masters; who are the people? The honorable veteran, the obedient and suffering soldier, the farmer, the poor merchant, the persecuted priest, all men, all citizens who work a trade; they are the people and not Gólgota.”59
Tension gripped the city as the June celebrations of Corpus Christi neared. The barrio of Las Nieves was said to have become closed to cachacos.60 Realizing the potential for conflict, Governor Nicolás Escobar Zerda ordered the jefe político of Las Nieves, Plácido Morales, to cancel the traditional bull run through the city, an edict Morales ignored.61 On June 8, artisans and gólgotas engaged in a rock-throwing melee near the city’s center. General José María Melo watched the conflict from his balcony, laughing as the guaches bested the cachacos. But when armed cachaco reinforcements arrived, he ordered out the guards. In their successful effort to clear the streets, a soldier, Isidoro Ladino, was killed. Later that day, Florentino González was attacked by a group of men in ruanas in front of the Peruvian embassy and beaten severely. Inevitably, gólgota sympathizers lambasted the authorities for their failure to curb the “government of Las Nieves.”
A heated leaflet debate continued the exchange, though with less deadly results.62 The most telling comment came from a “friend of the artisans” who accused artisans of running too readily from the fight against “aristocratic offenders.” Its author concluded: “In this land democracy is an illusion, we are republicans in theory and slaves in practice. . . . We are called the sovereign people, but the day that we speak, a rain of stones falls upon our august sovereignty; what can we do to install a positive Democracy? Make our own valiant efforts, and not flee at the sight of the oligarchs.”63 The newly appointed governor of Bogotá, José María Plata, made overtures for civic restraint, a move that proved only a temporary respite.64 The board of directors of the Democratic Society called upon its supporters to unite to end the chaos and restore the good name of the artisan, even while it promised the government Democratic support against “delinquents.”65
Despite pleas for calm, cachaco Antonio París Santamaría was killed on June 18 by a group of men in ruanas. Nepomuceno Palacios was arrested and charged with the murder, as were Eusebio Robayo (a blacksmith), Cenón Samudio, and E. Amézquita (a small trader). Palacios was sentenced to death for the murder and his accomplices were sentenced to jail. Palacios was garroted on Friday, August 5, in the Plaza de Santander, much to the dismay of artisan leader Miguel León.66 Why, he asked, was Palacios killed so quickly when Bruno Rodríguez’s cachaco murderer had not met the same fate? “Because he did not have the title of Doctor or gólgota!”67
Obando’s standing among the artisans rose in July when he reorganized the National Guard, strengthening the positions of craftsmen within it.68 This encouraged Democrats to seek cooperation with draconianos in the October elections, the first in Colombia under universal male suffrage as established by the new constitution. Emeterio Heredia and other artisans who would play active roles in the 17 de abril coup of the coming year participated in the elections on the side of the draconianos. Heredia stressed that recent reforms, based solely upon theory and backed by the “youths” (gólgotas), were the cause of the nation’s current crisis, suggesting as well that a conspiracy between gólgotas and Conservatives existed to drive Liberals (draconianos) out of office. The expansion of the electorate, he related, offered artisans the opportunity to dominate the legislature and secure passage of legislation in their own best interests, but only if they remembered the “crimes” of May 19 and June 8 and voted as a unit.69
Conservative victories throughout the country underscored the deep Liberal divisions.70 Although draconianos gained control of several provincial governments, the broadened electorate created by the new constitution benefited mainly the Conservatives. The elections gave seventeen senate seats to Conservatives, eleven to gólgotas, and only five to draconianos, while in the lower chamber twenty-five gólgotas, twenty-four Conservatives, and nine draconianos were selected by the voters.71 In some instances, Conservatives and gólgotas cooperated (Florentino González won the position of procurador general with Conservative support).
Speaking for the draconianos, Lorenzo María Lleras observed that the October election revealed the existence of three political parties: Conservatives, gólgotas, and Liberals. Conservatives had failed to obtain power through revolt, Lleras wrote, so they appealed to “fanatics” and the superstitious masses in the name of religion. Gólgotas supposedly promised the masses a classless socialist utopia as their appeal, which, in his opinion, ignored social distinctions based upon merit. True Liberals, who were in control of the executive, recognized the social reality created by work and sought to guarantee the rights of individuals according to law. However, Lleras concluded, collusion between Conservatives and gólgotas now threatened the country’s Liberals.72
The tri-part political division became increasingly violent after passage of the 1853 constitution. Tumults occurred in Popayán, Barranquilla, Sutatenza, and other towns.73 Armories in Barranquilla and Cali were raided by Democrats and some six-hundred weapons were stolen in early December. Despite governmental condemnation of this action, reports claimed that the raids were officially sanctioned. A similar theft of arms took place in Chocontá, and public disturbances by supporters of the Democratic Society occurred in Santa Marta, Neiva, Sabanilla, Tunja, and Zipaquirá.74 Obando’s scheduled military parade on January 1, 1854, was anticipated by many to be the announcement of a coup. Rather, he took the occasion to praise and declare loyalty to the Constitution of May 21.75 However, the mortal wounding of Corporal Pedro Ramón Quirós that night sparked a chain of events that many believe led directly to the Melo revolt four months later.76
The historical interpretations of the Quirós affair have been extremely contradictory.77 Melo was charged with murder, with his trial eventually scheduled for April 17, 1854. In the meantime, Melo’s alleged responsibility for Quirós’s death was used by anti-military elements in the congress to generate hostility against Melo and support for the proposed reduction in the size of the military. Obando requested funds for an army of 1,240 men from the congress that had convened in early February, a slight reduction from the previous 1,300–man force. Congress, however, offered to fund only an army of 800, including a reduced officer corps with no generals. This last clause was specifically directed at Melo. Debate on the topic dragged on for weeks, with neither side willing to compromise.78
The disarray of the Liberal party provided the incentive for a reorganization of the Sociedad Democrática on January 6, 1854. The meeting was held at Lorenzo María Lleras’s Colegio del Espíritu Santo, where Lleras was chosen director over his objections that an artisan should head the organization. The Society formed a central board of directors to work for reorganization of the Liberal party as a whole. The board, which consisted of twenty-one persons, drawn from leading draconianos and artisans, directed letters to provincial capitals urging the formation of provincial boards of directors, which would in turn coordinate smaller district units. Each of the provincial bodies was to organize Democratic Societies in as many towns as possible; all of these groups were to follow the directives of the central body.79 The reorganized Democratic Society was no more purely artisan in nature than it had been in 1850. Non-artisan draconiano Liberals held most of the important positions and were quite influential in its direction. Artisan political objectives were more closely in tune with draconiano than gólgotan goals, however. No division of interests could be seen in the draconiano/artisan organization in 1854 paralleling those of the gólgota/artisan relationship of 1850.80
The Democratic Society’s March 20 petition to the congress demonstrated its expanded range of interests. The Sociedad requested abolition of imprisonment for debts as contrary to the principle of personal liberty. In a similar vein, it was proposed that a debtor should be liable for criminal punishment in the case of fraud, but if an “innocent impossibility” prevented repayment of the debt, he would be free to work after cession of his available goods. This proposal would prevent forced labor for non-payment of debts. Monetary reform was called for, including minting smaller coins for day-to-day use. The Sociedad wanted congress to approve a national road from Bogotá to the Magdalena. It also requested establishment of an industrial workshop for children of the poor and working classes so that they could learn new arts. Reforms were requested in military recruitment, making military service voluntary, with higher remuneration. The Society also proposed that service in the Guard be limited to national emergencies, and not include peacetime chores such as escorting prisoners. Such changes would prevent disruption of the members’ occupations. Lastly, the Society wanted an end to compulsory free labor services demanded by municipal governments and the reconsideration of municipal taxes upon the poor.81
The fifth anniversary of the 7 de marzo82 came amid rumors of an impending coup by the Conservatives, by the military, or by the military with the Democrats—or even by gólgotas and the military.83 A circular of March 5, 1854, signed by Democrat Francisco Antonio Obregón, contributed to the general alarm as he called upon Sociedades Democráticas nationwide to arm themselves, so that they could meet force with force. Notices of a seditious nature were also posted on city walls: Democrats paraded through the city.84 Under these circumstances, the Senate presented a request for one-thousand weapons to the governor of Bogotá so that “respectable” citizens could arm themselves. President Obando overruled the request, stating that he knew of no threat to order and that, if one did exist, the National Guard would maintain order.85 Since Democrats dominated the Guard, this response did little to calm the senators’ fears. Congress then passed a law on March 24 allowing the right to free commerce in all types of weapons, and the right to train with them and carry them. Obando vetoed the proposed law, saying that individuals already had extremely liberal access to weapons under the constitution—more liberal, in fact, than he favored. He reminded congressmen that under the proposed law even criminals would have the right to bear arms and denounced the proposal as a threat to the stability of the national government and public order. The bill was passed over his objections and became law on April 3, although congress did limit the privilege to those who possessed their personal liberty.86 On March 28, the congress passed the project for reducing the size of the army and of the officer corps. Obando also vetoed this law.87 Debate on the presidential veto was scheduled for April 17.
The movement toward civil disorder quickened in early April as leaders of the Democratic Society met in secret.88 The first day of Holy Week, April 10, witnessed a brick-throwing melee between parading Democrats and guardsmen versus gólgotan youths. A more serious clash pitted guardsmen and artisans against gólgotas on April 14. Two days later, on Easter Sunday, April 16, after news of an uprising in Popayán reached the capital,89 the Guard and armed artisans marched through the streets with signs that proclaimed “Long live the army and Democrats; down with monopolists!” Some four-hundred artisans gathered in the central plaza at noon in a noisy demonstration. Early the next morning, Melo initiated his coup d’état. He led his troops to the plaza, where some seven-hundred artisans waited. With a cry of “Down with the gólgotas,” the coup against the Constitution of May 21 began.90
The 17 de abril coup had an inauspicious start. Melo, General Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Lino García, Francisco Antonio Obregón, Pedro Mártir Consuegra, and Miguel León urged Obando to accept direction of the movement, but he declined leadership. Obando’s refusal to take command came as a shock to the leaders of the coup. Their first proclamation had confidently cited Obando as the supreme chief,91 but his refusal to direct the coup spurred a rash of defections. Obando, Lleras, and José de Obaldía had made up the draconian political hierarchy, while Obando, José Hilario López, and Melo were its military leaders. Lleras issued a statement late on April 17 that “he had not made, nor did he accept the revolution.”92 Obaldía, who many thought was instrumental in persuading Obando not to lead the coup, sought refuge in the United States consulate. Melo announced that López, who had left Bogotá on April 4 for alleged reasons of health, favored the coup, but on May 2 news to the contrary reached the capital.93 All major draconian political and military leaders save Melo thus rejected the attempt to sustain what was commonly seen as their cause.
Melistas cited the “pandemonium of anarchy” and the introduction of “foreign ideas” contained within the Constitution of May 21 as the reasons for the 17 de abril. Melo abrogated that document on April 27 and replaced it with the 1843 constitution until a national convention could meet to frame a new law of the land. Specific features of the 1853 constitution to be altered included: universal manhood suffrage, popular election of provincial governors, the reduction of executive powers, and various articles affecting the church.94
Membership in the National Guard brought craftsmen into the military affairs of the movement; “the artisans were organized in militias in order to sustain the army [which] constituted the firmest prop of the provisional government.”95 Artisans made up the majority of the Guard’s common soldiers and many of its officers, including blacksmith Miguel León, tailor José María Vega, carpenter Cruz Ballesteros, cobbler José Antonio Saavedra, and Francisco Torres Hinestrosa.96 León worked to help procure supplies for Bogotá in the months following the coup. Emeterio Heredia served as jefe político in Fusagasuga. Moreover, craftsmen produced much of the equipment, clothing, and weapons used by the melistas. Felipe Roa, for example, supplied two-thousand uniforms to the Regeneration Army.97
Yet, artisan participation in the 17 de abril coup has been overstated. Bogotano artisans were less active in the early military defense of the Melo regime than they were in its final stages. Melistas won two battles against constitutionalist forces in May that served to protect northern access to the city and to permit the Melistas to advance in that direction. By July, most of the eastern highlands were in their hands. Melo chose not to move out of that stronghold, despite major support in the Cauca valley, which revolted at about the same time as did Bogotá. Cali resisted occupation by constitutionalists for most of June, when some eight-hundred Democrats surrendered to José Hilario López. The north coast offered weak verbal support for Melo and practically no military aid. Only in Cartagena did serious mobilization take place, but it was promptly suppressed by General Mosquera.98
The constitutionalists’ response to the Melo coup, while slow in developing, brought a rapid conclusion to the rebellion. Mosquera, General Antonio París, and General José Hilario López led the military effort which, by November 1854, had surrounded the capital. A constitutionalist congress had opened in Ibagué on September 22 under the leadership of Obaldía. Its first action was to denounce the 17 de abril regime and to name a commission to investigate the conduct of those involved in it, including Obando. On October 28, the congress closed its sessions and vowed that it would reconvene in the capital.99 The battle for Bogotá was joined on December 4. By 1:30 P.M. of that day only the barracks of San Francisco and San Agustín resisted the constitutionalist attack. In Mosquera’s final assault on San Francisco, Miguel León was killed, and José María Vega, along with Joaquín Posada, the editor of El Alacrán, were critically wounded. By 4:00 P.M. the fighting had ceased, when Generals López, Mosquera, and Herrán met in a fraternal embrace at the foot of Bolivar’s statue in the central plaza. The attempt of the 17 de abril to wrest governmental control from the so-called anarchists had failed.100
The defeat of the coup was felt by the capital’s artisans for years to come. As acting president, Obaldía extended a pardon—in principle—to common soldiers, but not to officers of the National Guard.101 Governor Pedro Gutiérrez Lee’s commission to identify those guilty of seditious or criminal activity was, according to one account, completely arbitrary.102 Obaldía’s “pardons” allowed prisoners to accept the pardon and serve four years of duty in the army in Panama, or be subjected to trial—in the circuit court of Panama, so as to relieve the burden on Bogotá’s courts.103 Exact numbers of those sent to the notoriously unhealthy lowland province from Bogotá either as “recruits” or for trial are impossible to determine, but it seems reasonable to conclude that the number totaled from three- to four-hundred.104 Not all of these men went alone. Lorenzo María Lleras told of receiving a letter in May, which reported the deaths of twenty of the twenty-five women who had accompanied their husbands into exile. (The same letter reported the deaths of forty men in exile.)105
The judgment of melista leaders was not concluded until June 6, when Melo and several members of his cabinet were expelled from the country for eight years. Other major melistas were exiled for periods of four or more years. Numerous artisans had already been “pardoned,” the terms of which varied from three years’ exile for Agustín Rodríguez to one year’s exile from certain provinces for others.106 Despite Melo’s claim of total responsibility for the rebellion, much of the blame for the coup was shifted to Obando, who underwent a grueling trial for his behavior during the coup. It was not until December 20, 1855, that the Supreme Court reached its verdict: not guilty of crime or treason, but, because he did not fight the rebellion, guilty of having failed to fulfill the responsibilities of his office.107
The terms of the pardons drew pointed criticisms from artisans. One leaflet proclaimed that “to exile a man for three years is not a pardon, nor is it forgiveness for his crimes.” Moreover, the alleged pardons were said to have been unconstitutional, “because the Constitution does not give the Executive the faculty to impose penalties, nor to judge the degree of guilt of a criminal, nor to determine who are leaders or agents and who is not.”108 Gólgotas, in an obvious fence-mending exercise, noted that pardons were within the executive privilege, but that Obaldía’s decrees had contained penalties, for which only judicial authorities had responsibility.109
The results of the 1853 elections, the first under a system of universal male suffrage, had demonstrated the strength of Conservative patronage throughout the country. Liberals—of both the draconiano and gólgotan wing of the party—had no choice but to reunite as quickly as possible if they were to have any realistic expectation of electoral victories. In Bogotá, Lorenzo María Lleras, among the many citizens arrested in December 1854, served as a central figure in the effort to recruit former melistas to the party. From jail Lleras joined those proclaiming the illegality of the pardons.110 Upon his release, Lleras served as lawyer for the jailed artisan José María Vega’s defense against charges of having participated in the “invasion” of the U.S. consulate in November 1854.111 Lleras met with Manuel Murillo Toro and Rafael Mendoza in June 1855 to plan the party’s political agenda, a meeting that attracted artisan support to Mendoza’s August bid for the governorship of Cundinamarca. Murillo, in September, posted an eight-thousand peso deposit to guarantee Melo’s prompt departure from Colombian soil.112
The presidential elections of 1856 signalled the partial reentry of bogotano craftsmen into the political arena. Conservatives presented Mariano Ospina Rodríguez as their candidate in that contest. Most Liberals united behind Murillo, while Mosquera launched himself as the candidate of the “National” party. Murillo opened his campaign with a statement of support signed by twenty-five notable melistas, including several artisans.113 In addition, Lleras and the blacksmith Emeterio Heredia used the pages of El Artesano to appeal to the Liberal political tradition of artisans, claiming that tradesmen had had more independence under Liberals, an obvious pitch to artisan pride. Lleras reminded artisans of the attitudes shown by gólgota Liberals after December 4, contrasting it with the stances of Mosquera and the Conservatives. Mosquera, whom El Artesano labeled a “wild card,” was portrayed as single-mindedly driving for personal power as a representative of the aristocracy of Popayán.114 Mosquera, however, reminded artisans of the abuses craftsmen had suffered in their relationship with Liberals, drawing special attention to the question of tariffs. Mosquera’s platform of restricted public intervention in religious matters, public works, and expanded educational opportunities and industrial training for the poor attracted public support of some craftsmen, notably Narciso Garai and Ambrosio López.115 Both Mosquera papers, El Ciudadano and El Nacional, harped on gólgotan betrayals of artisans in May and June 1853, and in April 1854.116
It is doubtful that the electioneering had much impact upon the artisans of Bogotá. Ospina earned the victory with 844 electoral votes; Murillo trailed closely with 673 votes; and Mosquera finished a distant third with 380 votes.117 In any case, melistas were again part of the capital’s political scene. Leading melistas, including Ramón Mercado, Francisco Antonio Obregón, and Ramón Beriña met in late 1857 to reestablish themselves as a cohesive political voice.118 A memorial service in honor of melista dead drew some 250 to 300 Democrats to a mass at the San Francisco church on November 30, after which a silent candlelight march with the portraits of Diego Castro and Miguel León wound its way to the city’s cemetery. Outraged Conservatives insisted that the event constituted a threat to public order, a charge refuted by artisans. José María Vega charged that the government had harassed artisans and other melistas, citing several examples of alleged public abuses.119
Conservative fears increased when Lleras and Manuel María Madiedo founded El Núcleo in January 1858 as a draconiano mouthpiece.120 While calling themselves Liberals, the editors described their Liberalism as “practically based,” in contrast to the Radicals’ theoretical Liberalism.121 Draconianos presented a slate to the November 1858 town council election that included artisans Cruz Ballesteros and Emeterio Heredia.122 Heredia was also nominated to the state assembly, a race that he lost, but one in which Conservative painter Simón José Cárdenas, the slandered former leader of the Popular Society, earned a seat.123 Cárdenas’s victory was marred by accusations of fraud from irate Liberals.124
The increased strength of the Conservative party under the system of universal suffrage had prevented the Liberals from regaining control of the national government. Liberals throughout the country were outraged by passage of two laws that challenged their control of state governments in 1858.125 A series of rebellions, first in Santander in March 1859, and then in the Cauca under Mosquera, plunged the nation into civil war as Liberals abandoned the vote for the sword.126 The eventual Liberal victory resulted in several safeguards against the Conservative majority in the Constitution of 1863. Suffrage laws reverted to state control, where increasingly powerful machines of both political hues limited voter eligibility. State governments in Cundinamarca and Santander became powerful Liberal strongholds, the foundation of the so-called Radical Olympus. The way was paved for a final wave of reforms.
The religious reforms of the early 1860s inspired deep antipathy among many craftsmen, beliefs that surfaced after the promulgation of the 1863 constitution. The pamphlet Los derechos del pueblo, for example, questioned both the religious reforms and Liberal political conduct. Liberal bosses, the author claimed, had long enticed the people with promises of rights, but he had come to question the value of those rights. Formerly free Catholic schools were now closed; disamortization had raised the rents of shops and stores; and social services once provided by the church were lacking. Moreover, suffrage had been restricted under the political machine created by Ramón Gómez in Cundinamarca, thereby precluding democratic participation. Conservatives were said to have been persecuted both economically and politically in spite of the alleged freedom of political expression. In short, the pursuit of rights had devastated the people, leading him to conclude that artisans had been deceived by Liberals so that the party might satisfy its own interests.127
Artisan supporters of the government countered these sentiments. One leaflet observed that as part of the people, the clergy, like laborers, artisans, and merchants, were subject to the same laws.128 Cruz Ballesteros, who purchased a house and shop formally owned by the church from the government, claimed that disamortization had been necessary to strip the church of funds used to conduct war.129 Yet the anti-clerical measures enacted during the civil war proved to be crucial for the final alienation of certain leading craftsmen from the Liberal party. “An artisan,” who claimed to have been present in 1863 when General Santos Gutiérrez, recently appointed governor of Cundinamarca, entered the capital, noted that “the people now have liberty of the press, but do not know how to read or write.” They had liberty of education, but free education had ended with the closure of church schools. Liberties existed, the craftsman claimed, but with churches closed, the people had no place to baptize their children, marry, or bury their dead: “In short, the people have all the liberties they do not need, and are deprived of the one indispensable freedom . . . that of worshiping the God of their fathers and to receive religion’s sweet consolation.”130
Conclusion
Artisan political reactions to changes in the economic, political, and social policies of Colombia do not support the tendency to see the acceptance and promulgation of socialist ideas by artisans of the Sociedad Democrática. Both Conservative contemporaries and leftist writers of the present perceived socialist influences in the Society, albeit from different points of view. In either case, the socialism of the Societies has been misstated. Contemporaries applied socialist labels to their foes to undermine the group’s appeal, or used socialist rhetoric symbolically to express their own romanticism. Modern writers have pointed to the socialist content of the era’s speeches and proclamations, as exemplified by José María Samper, Manuel Murillo Toro, or Francisco Javier Zaldúa. While socialist rhetoric is found in their writings, laissez-faire individualism guided their reform projects.131 An examination of the words of Ambrosio López, Cruz Ballesteros, or Emeterio Heredia, representatives of the artisan movement, reveals a starkly different message. Their words and deeds were directed against “socialists” such as Murillo or Samper. Artisan leaders countered gólgotan economic liberalism and judged their belief in political liberalism to be rhetorical.
It is also a mistake to focus exclusive attention upon the reactive nature of artisan political mobilization during the era of liberal reform. Artisan political activity challenged the direction of elite parties in a way that threatened their control of and aspirations for the country. To that extent, artisans challenged the existing socio-political order. Craftsmen in the Democratic Society apparently took the rhetoric of the 7 de marzo seriously, as had artisans in the Popular Society, the Catholic Society, and the Democratic-Republican Society. Political liberalism offered artisans a voice within the polity. When faced with items that affected their interests, artisans mobilized, and sought to influence government policy. In the face of such threats to their control, elites of both parties tended to lay aside their differences, which were minor, and repress the threats, as seen in the aftermath of the 17 de abril coup. The constitutionalist union of Liberals and Conservatives illustrates that while parties did differ on the issue of the church’s role in state and society, they had far fewer differences on other issues, and none concerning which social sector should direct the state.
If similarities are to be seen between the socialist reaction of Parisian workers in 1848 and that of bogotano artisans in 1854, it is because both responded to similar threats to their traditional social positions and economic well-being; and they met a similar fate. Capitalization and industrialization of production threatened Parisian workers directly and bogotano artisans indirectly. While the reaction of tradesmen in these two countries took very different paths, both sprang from similar circumstances. The eventual violent response of bogotano artisans to the reforms challenged elite control of the Colombian state, but it must properly be labeled as reactionary radicalism.132 Whatever the label, artisan political participation in this stage of the reform movement was significant; the same would be true of such activity in the following years, although the results would be quite different.