SIX

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN LABOR MOVEMENT

THE DIVERGING FORTUNES OF BOGOTA’S ARTISANS IN THE LATTER years of the nineteenth century and the appearance of larger-scale manufacturing industries increased the complexity of the city’s labor structure. The often conflicting interaction among artisans, industrials, and workers shaped the labor movement and its relation to politics during the first score of years in this century. The labels artisan, industrial, or worker carry connotations that vary depending on the context. In this chapter, descriptive labels by which actors described themselves are used, except when otherwise noted. The obvious conflict of interest among these different laborers was one that organizations grappled with at length; it was a leading factor in the evolution of groups representing workers in the 1910s. In any event, it is safe to say that in Bogotá, as in other cities with a complex laboring population, artisans—either as independent or skilled workers—played a central role in the labor movement.¹

The Union of Industrials and Workers

Political stability heralded the renewed mobilization of bogotano artisans. A 1904 circular from craftsmen in Popayán to their counterparts throughout the country precipitated a petition drive to seek higher tariffs from the national congress. The circular claimed that only concerted action could stem the flood of imports that had followed the end of the fighting.² Owners of small shoemaking shops in the capital, who called themselves artisans, seconded these sentiments in a complaint against U.S. imports by Colombian merchants who, they claimed, worshipped the “corrupt dollar.” Juan Ignacio Gálvez observed that the proposed legislation would increase the tariff on manufactured items, reduce it to a minimum on raw materials used for internal production, and remove it altogether from machinery.³ In this context, Gálvez called for the formation of a non-partisan workers’ party to coordinate the petition drive.⁴

An estimated two-thousand people attended an organizational meeting of the Unión de Industriales y Obreros (Union of Industrials and Workers) to prepare Bogotá’s petition drive in June 1904. Emeterio Nates, a shoemaker, presided over the session, which was attended by General Rasprilla of the National Police—undoubtedly to avoid repetition of events of years past. Those present overwhelmingly supported the initiative begun by Popayán’s artisans. It was resolved that a newspaper directed by Gálvez should be the Union’s mouthpiece, an honor Gálvez accepted only when José Leocadio Camacho agreed to work with him so as to demonstrate the non-partisan nature of the organization.⁵ At the Union’s formal foundation on June 8, 1904, Camacho became president of the Union; Nates, vice-president; and Jesús González F., secretary.⁶ Spokesmen from twenty-five trades listened three days later to Camacho, now seventy-one years old, as he urged the unification of Bogotá’s workers for the betterment of all persons involved in industry.⁷

The Unión’s petition drive culminated in the presentation of signatures from Bogotá, Popayán, and Cali to the congress in early October. The Union undoubtedly thought that the proposal stood a good chance of being accepted, as President Rafael Reyes had included tariff reform as part of the fiscal package he presented to the congress when he took office. That stance, and his less partisan approach to politics, accounted for a march organized by the Union of some 2,500 workers past the president’s house late in October.⁸ However, despite the organized effort in favor of higher tariffs and the support of the president, congress adjourned without enacting the desired legislation. In his telegram to the caleño supporters of the bill, Camacho protested the insensitive attitude of the congress, while reaffirming the Union’s hope for tariff protection.⁹ President Reyes’s penchant for personal control and his support for state-directed development soon overrode congressional antipathy. Reyes issued an executive decree raising tariffs in January 1905 in order to “protect national industries,” a move Ospina Vázquez claims “put teeth in” the industrial protection begun some twenty-five years earlier by Núñez.¹⁰

There is no record of the Union of Industrials and Workers’ reaction to the new tariff, as the association appears to have lost momentum and organizational unity after the petition drive. The Unión represents a transitional workers’ group, evidencing both old and new characteristics. Clearly the Union drew upon past leadership (Camacho’s) and dealt with issues faced in earlier periods (e.g., tariffs), but, at the same time, its very title reflected the widening division of the working population. It also represents the first time that a bogotano group tried to form a popular mobilization consisting of workers from markedly different labor settings. Moreover, tentative moves to coordinate workers’ groups from other areas of the country presaged future developments. While some of its leaders were well known, many were new actors who would dominate labor organizations over the next fifteen years. The five years following the Union’s eclipse, however, were times of relative quiet, as the Reyes quinquenio (1905–9) did not provide the proper climate for politicized labor organizations.

Reyes had emerged from the war relatively unscathed by the bitter partisan struggle. Although a Conservative, he favored the cooperation exemplified by the National party over the antagonisms of traditional Liberal and Conservative politics. His absence from Colombia during the war years made him an attractive presidential candidate in 1904, favored by some old Nationalists and by most of those Liberals who enjoyed the opportunity to vote. Historical Conservatives and other Nationalists backed Joaquín F. Vélez, an equally, if not more, qualified candidate, but one who in the end lost a notoriously corrupt election. Reyes entered office ready to put into practice the “scientificism” he had observed in the Mexico of Porfirio Díaz and to take charge forcibly of the nation’s development, for which protective tariffs were only one aspect of his program. Others included the reorganization of the country’s beleaguered monetary system, improvement of its infrastructure, and promotion of export agriculture. Reyes also undertook substantial political reforms, most notably in bringing Liberals into his government to break the deadly partisan cycle of the nineteenth century. The president’s antipathy toward congress increased during the first months of 1905, leading him to dismiss that body, convene a National Assembly in its stead, and force a four-year extension of his term in office.¹¹

Conspiracies plagued the early quinquenio. Reyes’s bipartisan inclination, combined with lingering resentment concerning the fraud that gained him office, alienated some Conservatives to the point that they prepared to assassinate him on December 19, 1905. The conspiracy was discovered, however, and its planners were arrested and put on trial. Men of similar persuasion fired upon the president’s carriage on February 10, 1906. The assassination attempt inflamed Reyes and led him to complete the assumption of dictatorial powers begun the previous year.¹²

Although it was not immediately apparent, a feared third attack on the president aborted another effort to organize Bogotá’s workers. Two newspapers sympathetic to workers’ issues had begun publication in late 1905. The more radical of the two, El Faro, printed by the Liberal artisan Alejandro Torres Amaya, praised artisans’ “natural goodness” and called for strong governmental action to improve their material conditions. The newspaper article spoke of an apocalyptic uprising of displaced individuals in assertion of their rights.¹³ The editors of El Yunque, the more moderate paper, had been active in the Union of Industrials and Workers and now forwarded its concerns, such as the need for tariff protection and educational reform favorable to workers. The paper insisted that industrials and workers should continue to close ranks politically, so that when elections were held in 1908 they could “break the bonds” of partisan politics by electing their own representatives.¹⁴

A third alleged conspiracy brought to an abrupt end the efforts of both El Yunque and El Faro. The conspiracy was said to involve a plan to cut electrical wires to the city and undertake a movement against the government. Military authorities subverted the supposed plan, arresting large numbers of artisans, workers, and others. El Faro became involved in the incident when it published a petition asking permission to hold a public rally in support of the government, which some in the administration considered a subterfuge. The government denied the request, termed the paper a danger to social order, and arrested its editors. The capital’s press in the following days offered conflicting accounts as to the degree of worker involvement in the alleged conspiracy, which the government in the end admitted did not exist. Nonetheless, since editors of both newspapers were arrested and sent to military colonies or to prisons in other areas of the country, the nascent effort ground to a halt.¹⁵ The incident brought on an era of close governmental supervision of politicized workers’ groups that ended only when Reyes was driven from power.

Although organizations with openly political ends could not operate during the remainder of the Reyes administration, numerous mutual aid societies, characteristic of earlier years, provided the basis for future political mobilizations. For example, the August 7, 1907, meeting of the Mutual Aid Society—Bogotá’s oldest—was attended by representatives from the Sociedad Filantrópica, the Sociedad de Amigos de Paz, the Sociedad de Caridad, the Sociedad de Impresores, the Sociedad de Carpinteros Unidos, and the Sociedad Unión.¹⁶ Four of the societies had been founded prior to the war, but the others, along with some not present, had been established after its conclusion. Most of these groups cooperated in the creation of the Unión Nacional de Industriales y Obreros in 1910.¹⁷

As might have been expected, mutual aid societies had struggled to survive the War of the 1000 Days. Typical, perhaps, was the experience of the Mutual Aid Society. Economic dislocations cost the body its office, furniture, archives, and much of its capital. Not until 1905 did it formally reorganize; within two years the Society had started a savings bank for its members and resumed its position as the largest organization of its kind in the capital.¹⁸ The 1889 merger between it and the Philanthropic Society seems not to have survived the war, as the latter group was reorganized as a separate entity in 1906.¹⁹ The Typesetters’ Society, which had been active politically before the war, also experienced much hardship. Nonetheless, it, too, was revived by 1905, but with a less partisan stance. According to a press report, abandonment of its partisan past drew most members of that trade into the Society. Typesetters recognized their obvious status among the city’s working population; the group noted in 1906 that “the typesetter is now, more than ever, conscious that he is in the workers’ vanguard” and therefore should be obliged to work for peace.²⁰ The Society was given juridical status in November 1906, even though it had been organized nine years earlier. (This underscores the shortcomings of employing juridical recognition as a conclusive measure of the numbers of labor organizations, a method used by Urrutia Montoya and others to identify workers’ groups, albeit with acknowledgment of its weaknesses.²¹)

The church appears to have been closely associated with many mutual aid societies founded after the war. The Sociedad de la Protectora, established in 1902, was probably the first such body. Its members were described as “industrials” and “artisans” who pledged to mutually protect one another and to pressure the government to control the high prices of foodstuffs.²² Two similar organizations, the Sociedad de Caridad and the Sociedad de la Cruz, were functioning by 1907.²³ A final church-supported mutual aid society, the Sociedad de Santa Orosía, began to operate in January 1907. It too appealed principally to workers and had certain connections to prewar groups, as Félix Valois Madero was its first secretary. By 1909 the Society had almost five-hundred members and substantial funds. The Santa Orosía Society, perhaps more than any church-affiliated society, cooperated actively with non-religious groups of the same nature.²⁴

While the preceding societies had clear mutual aid objectives, the elite Sociedad Unión (Union Society), founded in April 1907 by Eduardo Boada R., had a more openly political nature. The Union Society attempted to bring all social classes together under the theme “Amor al trabajo,” but loyalty to the “honor” of work was hardly its sole concern; many of its members were active in the fledgling Republican movement in opposition to Reyes.²⁵

The semi-authoritarian regime of Reyes quieted direct opposition for three years after the 1906 assassination attempts. In early 1909, however, the president was forced to reconvene the National Assembly in order to ratify the treaties his government had negotiated with Panama and the United States to settle the conflict resulting from the loss of the isthmanian department. The terms of the proposed treaties favored both the U.S. and the now-independent department, and they did not reflect the feelings of most of the assembly’s members or much of the nation. Opposition leader Nicolás Esguerra disavowed the assembly’s constitutional power to ratify the treaties, insisting that according to the constitution, only an elected legislature could approve international agreements. This bold rebuff of Reyes’s wishes helped to further discredit his regime. Faced with student-led demonstrations in the capital on March 13, 1909, Reyes delegated power to Jorge Holguín, who promptly declared a state of siege. Reyes reclaimed control the next day, but the opposition of the previous days had broken his political authority. Shortly thereafter the president called for congressional elections and set about preparing to “normalize” the political process.²⁶

Medófilo Medina has amplified the role of artisans and workers in the 13 de marzo by characterizing them as the “popular sector” at the front of the first great urban protest of the twentieth century.²⁷ Such a claim is exaggerated, as it seems most likely that the demonstrations on the 13 de marzo represented a popular seconding of the sentiments expressed in the assembly against the treaties, the closed political system, and unfavorable economic conditions. Industrials, artisans, and workers did take part in the drama of the 13 de marzo, as the Union, Mutual Aid, and Philanthropic Societies joined in some of the mobilizations of that day, although the Union Society later denied any involvement.²⁸

If the exact participation of workers in the 13 de marzo remains nebulous, the behavior of the self-styled industrials and workers in the political events of the months and years that followed is much more evident. A significant number of the men who would emerge as labor activists in the coming years were connected to the Unión Republicana, a political conglomeration of moderate Liberals and Historical Conservatives that seized the opportunity made available by Reyes’s fall from power. The Republican Union was formally organized in April by Carlos E. Restrepo, Guillermo Quintero Calderón, Nicolás Esguerra, and others. Leading industrials were involved in the Union from its inception. Its principles included bipartisan politics, open elections, and religious tolerance.²⁹

Much to the country’s surprise, Reyes left for England in June after delegating power to Jorge Holguín. The newly elected congress then appointed General Ramón González Valencia as president until August 1910, at which time his successor would assume office. In November 1909, elections were held throughout the country for municipal councils, who in turn selected delegates to a National Assembly that met the following April. That assembly enacted major constitutional reforms, including the reduction of the presidential term of office to four years, the establishment of direct popular presidential elections, and guaranteed minority party representation (one-third of all seats in congress). The assembly also selected Carlos E. Restrepo as the country’s president for a four-year term.

The National Union of Industrials and Workers

Unprecedented steps to politically organize the working class of Bogotá were made while these events unfolded. In August 1909, Emilio Murillo proposed forming a Unión Obrera (Workers’ Union) to further the interests of that class.³⁰ The call was successful, and the Unión Industrial began publication on August 15 as the association’s mouthpiece. The paper, which was apparently published for only one month, announced that it was dedicated to protection of the nation’s industry.³¹ The Workers’ Union lent its backing to some Republican candidates in the November municipal council elections, a contest that returned a strong Republican victory. Support by Murillo’s group was seemingly an advantage, as the candidates with the largest vote totals were those backed by both Republicans and the Union.³²

The initiatives of the latter half of 1909 led to the formation of the Unión Nacional de Industriales y Obreros (National Union of Workers and Industrials—UNIO) in February 1910. The UNIO was, according to Alberto Navarro B., first and foremost an attempt to unify workers for their common well-being, for protection of their trades, and to help their families. Its intent was to avoid partisan political alignments, he continued, although temporary dealings with traditional parties were not to be dismissed. While the UNIO’s organizers recognized that its members were Catholics, and thus vowed not to attack their religion, they pledged not to abandon the group’s basic interests in conflicts with the official line of the church. Other objectives of the UNIO included free obligatory education, trade schools for industrial education, adult schools, and the formation of a savings bank. Finally, Navarro noted that “the group . . . will work in all elections by common accord, and its candidates will be those citizens who fulfill the indispensable conditions to be genuine representatives of the people who elect them.”³³

At first glance, the organizational efforts undertaken by workers in 1909 seem to have led directly to the establishment of the UNIO in 1910. This is true insofar as the fall of Reyes created the opportunity for such ventures, but as time revealed, two distinct political tendencies were present among workers. Members of the Workers’ Union of 1909 tended to align themselves with the Republican movement until it weakened later in the decade. By contrast, most of those associated with the UNIO were more clearly affiliated with the Liberalism of Rafael Uribe Uribe, a circumstance that would hamper efforts to unite non-Conservative workers’ groups until after his assassination in 1914. Nonetheless, in the early months of the UNIO’s existence, this polarization was not visible; workers of both tendencies took part in its formation.

The UNIO quietly pursued its goals of building a unified organization throughout 1910. Its newspaper, La Razón del Obrero, publicized the Union’s principles and addressed issues relating to workers, including education, tariff protection, living conditions, and the developing workers’ movement. UNIO’s April elections resulted in Domingo E. Alvarez’s becoming its president; Alejandro Torres Amaya, vice-president; Juan N. Paniagua, secretary; and Andrés Luna E., treasurer.³⁴ Although the National Assembly met from May until November 1910, the UNIO refrained from commenting on most of its deliberations. In its one direct observation, it expressed support for free and obligatory primary education. Other workers, however, reminded the assembly of their protectionist needs.³⁵ When the assembly deliberated on candidates for the country’s next president, the UNIO made no official endorsement, although many of its members signed statements backing Guillermo Quintero Calderón.³⁶ Since both he and Carlos E. Restrepo, the assembly’s choice, were active in the Republican Union, it is unlikely that many politically expressive workers were upset with the incoming president.

The UNIO represented itself as the Workers’ party in the elections of 1911 as the nation returned to normalized political activity.³⁷ The UNIO’s Central Workers Election Directory, which oversaw the effort of the Workers’ party, called upon shop owners, industrials, and workers to form committees in each barrio to work with the central body. The Directory also urged the formation of similar groups throughout the nation. By December, it had received favorable replies from Popayán, Cali, Ibagué, Zipaquirá, and numerous other towns. On November 26, the Proteccionista (the Directory’s mouthpiece) reported 1,500 subscribers in the capital alone, while the Directory included representatives from all of the city’s barrios.³⁸ The Directory’s political objectives focused upon tariff protection, which it coupled with reductions in duties on items for internal consumption and elimination of export duties on coffee, measures it felt would benefit the nation as a whole. Protection was hardly a new demand, but the Directory insisted that, to be effective, it had to come about as the result of political pressures by workers, not as a gift from the state.

The elections of 1911 offer dramatic insights into the power of workers’ political organizations throughout the decade. Four groups—Conservatives, Liberals, Republicans, and Workers—exerted significant electoral strength. Liberals and Workers joined forces for the February elections for positions in the departmental assembly, tallying 5,124 votes; the Conservatives received 3,593, and the Republicans, l,907.³⁹ Republicans joined the Worker/Liberal liga (alliance) for the May selection of national congressmen, out-polling the Conservative party 7,083 to 4,936 votes.⁴⁰ Two incidents of urban disorder involving the UNIO—one in May and the other in July—shattered the liga, especially when the UNIO demanded its own slate for the October elections.⁴¹ As a result, ten lists faced voters for the city council elections.⁴² The Conservative list finished first with 2,750 votes; the Liberal list received 2,050 votes; the Workers’ party was third with 1,850; Republicans tallied 1,350; and other groups shared 500 votes. The secretary of the Workers’ party, Rafael Reyes Daza, charged that at the last moment Liberals had usurped the names from the UNIO slate, causing numerous voters to erroneously think that a pact had indeed been arranged. Even so, he expressed a degree of satisfaction because those three candidates had received the most votes of any on the Liberal slate. Despite the loss by his own party, Reyes Daza concluded that the stance assumed by the organization would enhance the real power of the Workers’ party, and that the 1,850 votes it collected held promise of future victories.⁴³

In this frantic set of elections, only the Conservative party demonstrated the capacity to achieve electoral victory without alliances. Alliances or pacts between the other parties could achieve victory. As a consequence, the votes held by workers and their political societies were crucial to the Republican and Liberal parties, a point not ignored by either group. On the other hand, the UNIO was not strong enough to win elections by itself, and faced the dilemma of victory through cooperation and possible betrayal of its raison d’être.

After the hectic pace of 1911, the various political parties used the subsequent non-election year as a time of reassessment and reorganization. Church officials began their own efforts to counter political initiatives undertaken by workers, moves that the Conservatives undoubtedly supported. Conservative Laureano Gómez, for example, rightly observed that industrial members of the UNIO had won representation in the year’s elections, but that they hardly represented workers whose interests were quite distinct from their own. Workers’ needs, he continued, were largely social in nature and could be best met by the church, not by political action.⁴⁴ Spokesmen for the UNIO objected to Gómez’s allegations, noting that while no dogmatic differences separated the UNIO and the Catholic church, political disagreements did exist, and for that reason the UNIO could not support the Conservative party (as did the church hierarchy). Juan N. Paniagua alleged that the Union was being denounced from the pulpits of the city as a consequence of that political decision.⁴⁵

As early as 1908, during the first formal conference of the nation’s bishops, the church had spoken in favor of actions to benefit Colombia’s workers. The bishops followed the directives of Pope Leo XIII, whose 1891 papal encyclical, Rerum Novarum, had urged the faithful to prevent the spread of socialist doctrines by addressing the needs of Europe’s laboring classes.⁴⁶ Father José María Campoamor established a Círculo de Obreros (Workers’ Circle) in early 1911 to defuse “nontraditional” (leftist) workers’ activities by raising living standards and inspiring workers’ commitment to church principles. The Workers’ Circle created a savings bank, restaurant, school, and various other social services for its members. The church’s endeavors met with government approval, receiving four-thousand pesos annually from 1913 until 1927.⁴⁷ These limited activities, as might be expected, did little to defuse workers’ partisan political activities even though they undoubtedly provided real material assistance. Not until 1946 did the church-sponsored Union of Colombian Workers compete with secular union efforts.

Rafael Uribe Uribe began his effort to bring workers into the Liberal camp in 1911. In a speech to the UNIO, he claimed a long identification with workers’ issues, dating, he said, to his 1904 speech in favor of state socialism. At that time Uribe Uribe had proclaimed his belief in “socialism from above,” not below; a socialism that would expand the role of the state in economic development, the protection of workers, the establishment of savings banks, and the protection of national industries.⁴⁸ Now, the Liberal chieftain forwarded four ideas to improve the condition of the country’s workers: electoral reform, better public education, improved public hygiene, and “rational protection” of the nation’s industries.⁴⁹ Officials of the UNIO protested the press coverage of the meeting, which they claimed was worded to convey the impression that the UNIO and Uribe Uribe were cooperating politically. That, they insisted, was not true.⁵⁰ Other Liberals also courted workers and the UNIO in an attempt to convince them that the Liberal party was the appropriate forum for expression of workers’ needs.⁵¹

Republicans, too, moved to retain the relationship they had developed with workers after the fall of Reyes. In a May 1912 reorganization of the party, several new planks seem to have been shaped to achieve that result. These included declarations in favor of expanded public education, development of the nation’s industry with moderate protectionist barriers, and unspecified measures to develop workers “morally and economically.”⁵² These “pro-worker” planks were, of course, practically the same as those of Uribe Uribe.

The UNIO faced the task of continuing its momentum toward becoming an economic, political, and social force independent from Liberals and Republicans. Conflicting opinions existed within the UNIO as to the priority of political versus “social” and economic considerations, a dispute obviously won by the pro-political members in 1911. The choice of this strategy suggests that some of the UNIO’s membership envisioned it as a primarily political force even while others stressed social issues. The inactivity and disorganization of the UNIO in 1912—a non-election year—further indicates that, without the political struggle, much of the catalyst for the group was lost, in spite of pressing social concerns.

The UNIO appeared incapable of representing workers’ needs outside the political arena.⁵³ Members of the shoemaker’s trade, many of whom were also part of the UNIO, bypassed that organization by directly petitioning the Chamber of Representatives to double the existing duty on imported shoes. This, they felt, was necessary to maintain the competitiveness of national shoes.⁵⁴ In September 1912, typesetters, also prominent members of the UNIO, were faced with a concerted effort by printing shop owners to drive down their wages. The Typesetters’ Society organized in favor of the workers, while the UNIO seemingly ignored the problem.⁵⁵

As part of its initial preparations for the 1913 electoral season, the directory of the UNIO met in October 1912 to determine its political objectives. It agreed to a list of nine goals: to ask departmental authorities to foster industries so as to make importation of foreign goods unnecessary, to make the judicial process more equitable in its treatment of all classes, to request the same of police officials, to lower taxes on articles of primary necessity and to eliminate them altogether on real estate valued at less than five-hundred pesos, to control rents, to sponsor savings banks, to improve expenditures of public service funds, to improve transportation routes in order to bring more foodstuffs into the city, and to increase salaries paid by the department.⁵⁶ At the same time, Uribe Uribe met with the UNIO, as did several other Liberal leaders.⁵⁷ The results of the Liberal recruitment became clear in December when their forces completely dominated selection of the UNIO’s electoral directory, allegedly because the meeting was packed with illiterate street cleaners obligated by patronage ties to Liberal officials. Marco T. Amorocho, who would play an important role as a political activist in the coming years, claimed that the electoral committee did not represent the “artisans and workers who constitute the nerves and strengths of Bogotá.” Amorocho insisted that if the “unrepresentativeness” were not corrected, he would pursue a path independent of the UNIO.⁵⁸

The striking fact in these developments is that the pledge of an independent Workers’ party was forsaken, almost without comment, in the wake of intense partisan appeals to working-class voters. The February 1913 election saw Republicans emerge victorious with 4,147 votes, closely followed by the Conservative tally of 4,118, while Liberals trailed with 3,128 votes. Republican analysts felt that the returns demonstrated the futility of a Workers’/Liberal union and the advantage of the Workers’ association with themselves.⁵⁹ A more accurate assessment of the entire electoral process would note the enormous difficulties facing individuals wishing to forge an independent workers’ party and the lack of influence on the part of those workers dedicated to socioeconomic issues. It was evident that the Republican and Liberal parties were more concerned with defeating the Conservatives than with making workers an integral part of their operations. Once again they formed an alliance for the congressional elections in May and soundly defeated the Conservative opposition. Not surprisingly, no workers were included on any electoral slate.⁶⁰

The Unión Obrera Colombiana

The Unión Obrera Colombiana (UOC—Colombian Workers’ Union), founded in May 1913, represented a marked departure from the policies of the UNIO. The founders of the UOC proposed a social, economic, and political agenda that would satisfy the needs of workers, not the industrials that they viewed as dominant within the UNIO. The group announced that it was dedicated to the establishment of an independent union of workers that would pursue an end to illiteracy, a program of public education, an increase in salaries and protection of national industries, protection of workers of both sexes against exploitation by capitalists, savings banks, mutual aid, and political autonomy. The new organization stressed the need for workers’ unity in support of a “militant” program, the first such agenda in Bogotá to be couched in terms of socialist analysis. The UOC adopted the organizational principles and many of the same socioeconomic objectives of the UNIO.⁶¹ In order to insure a more homogenous membership, only those who practiced a trade or who worked for a salary could join the UOC. Groups of thirty or more workers constituted the primary organizational unit of the UOC, with each group supplying two representatives to a board of directors. By August 1913, some fifteen groups were said to be in existence, with a membership claimed to be almost three-thousand.⁶²

The UOC’s public statements were in keeping with its avowed support of socioeconomic concerns. It proposed and established an Oficina del Trabajo (Work Office) to act as a clearinghouse where workers could solicit employment and owners could find employees. The Work Office was not limited to members of the UOC, and by August it was claimed that the office was functioning smoothly with over four-thousand people registered. In another instance, the UOC praised the efforts of a few representatives who had spoken in favor of workers’ legislation in the new congress. The Union used the pages of its newspaper to put pressure upon local authorities to improve basic services to areas of the city inhabited by workers and urged groups in other towns to do the same.⁶³

The UOC called attention to the economic and social needs of workers from a socialist perspective. The Union denied that it wished to “juxtapose” capital and labor, but few of its public analyses avoided doing just that. In an article entitled “The Vampires of the Pueblo,” one of the group’s members commented on the traditional inability of workers to resist exploitation by capitalists. As a result, workers rented “miserable hovels” at exorbitant prices they could ill afford at their low wages. Given the opposing interests of industrials and workers, the UOC accentuated its departure from stances taken by the UNIO.⁶⁴

The appearance of the Workers’ Union did not go unnoticed by the UNIO. The two groups made frequent overtures to each other that culminated in a joint session on June 22, 1913, which a thousand people reportedly attended. The Workers’ Union on that occasion refused, however, to recognize the legitimacy of the earlier organization’s claim to represent workers; it assumed that right for itself.⁶⁵ Thereafter, there seems to have been little official interaction between the two organizations.

As increased numbers of industrial wage laborers entered the city’s labor force, governments at both local and national levels grappled with innovative legislative measures. A worker’s compensation law (ley de accidentes del trabajo), patterned after Spanish legislation, was introduced within the chamber in August 1911 by a representative from Cundinamarca, Gustavo Gaitán Otálora. The proposed legislation would have reimbursed a worker injured on the job from funds collected for that purpose from owners of industries with over five employees. Even though Gaitán’s bill won some support, it died in the second debate, amid accusations that it was socialistic. Attempts to get the legislation through the 1912, 1913, and 1914 congresses also failed. Finally, the 1915 congress approved legislation providing six forms of accident compensation; the maximum award was one year’s salary to the family of a worker killed on the job.⁶⁶ Critics voiced complaints regarding the shortcomings of the legislation, emphasizing the low levels of compensation and the lack of clauses that would force owners to take preventive measures to protect workers from accidents. These defects were supposed to be resolved by the Council of State, but as late as August 1918, repeated petitions from the UOC had failed to get that body to take any action.⁶⁷

Bogotá’s workers also faced a shortage of adequate, inexpensive housing. Calls for some form of government-sponsored housing for workers, first heard in the 1890s, finally elicited a favorable response from the municipal council of Bogotá in 1912. In that year, the González Ponce brothers donated an eighteen-block area in San Victorino to the city to be used as a barrio obrero—sufficient land for 597 lots, which could be purchased by workers at reduced prices. The city in turn agreed to provide water, city services, educational assistance, and a monthly stipend of one-hundred pesos (gold) for its management.⁶⁸ The neighborhood was officially dedicated on February 22, 1914, and renamed “Antonio Ricaurte.” Some seventy houses were then under construction and ten had been completed. The city declared that plans were underway for extension of water lines to the barrio and noted that several “fine” artesian wells kept it fully supplied until pipes were laid. (Two years later, water lines were still not in place.) The barrio’s meeting hall quickly became a focal point of worker activity, most notably at celebrations such as May Day.⁶⁹

The assassination of Rafael Uribe Uribe in October 1914 recast the shape of the workers’ movement for the remainder of the decade. Without him, the Liberal party lost its dominance over the UNIO, which it had enjoyed since 1911. Numerous workers’ groups moved to fill the political opening left by Uribe Uribe’s death.⁷⁰ Republicans were especially active in trying to mobilize workers for the February 1915 departmental elections; they included Marco T. Amorocho as one of their principal candidates, only to lose to the Conservatives.⁷¹ In the May congressional elections, however, the Conservative party was divided, and a Liberal Union/Republican slate polled the most votes.⁷² A reunited Conservative party faced an alliance of Republicans, Liberals, and Workers in the October municipal council election. Amorocho, José Joaquín Munévar, and Antonio Aguirre, who won seats on the body, expected to express themselves autonomously as workers; but according to Amorocho, Liberals and Conservatives had secretly worked out an arrangement so that they could dominate the appointment process to the exclusion of the workers. While workers’ representatives on the council disrupted its operations with their complaints for a while, they could not overcome the Liberal/Conservative collusion.⁷³ This confrontation further undermined the faith of workers’ leaders in conventional political activity, and, in so doing, set the stage for the founding of the second Workers’ party.

The Partido Obrero

The Partido Obrero (Workers’ party) built upon the experience and activities of other labor organizations that had operated during the 1910s. The eight-hundred workers who issued its organizational manifesto on January 1, 1916, included members from various mutual aid societies, as well as many participants in the UOC. Its leaders rejected partisan politics in favor of social and economic measures that would more directly benefit the Colombian worker. El Partido Obrero, the group’s newspaper, indicated that the party would seek workers’ unity and socioeconomic justice.⁷⁴

The first of these focal points, the rejection of partisan politics, had slowly gained force throughout the decade. Although the UNIO was supposedly interested in social and economic concerns, it became deeply embroiled in the political process and fell under the control of uribista Liberals. The UOC, by contrast, had dedicated itself to the socioeconomic concerns of workers and claimed to be their “legitimate” representative. The organizers of the Workers’ party saw cooperation with Liberals to be a political quagmire and announced that it was best to abstain from political participation as long as the traditional parties were abusive and the workers unorganized. This attitude did not prevent “legitimate” accords with the established parties on occasion, nor did the party deny that Liberals had helped workers in a limited fashion over the years.⁷⁵ Still, the failure of traditional parties to pass compulsory education, give protection to small industries, or establish savings banks allegedly warranted the need for an independent workers’ political organization according to the group. Moreover, in the opinion of the party’s newspaper editors, private property had spawned the problems that the workers faced, a concept rejected by both Conservatives and Liberals.⁷⁶

The organizational structure of the Workers’ party drew upon earlier patterns. Neither the Partido Obrero nor the UOC used the barrio as its unit of organization, a move that ignored the potential political strengths of that subdivision of city politics. The UOC had employed affiliated groups of workers to form a central directory, while the Workers’ party proposed organizing each trade in a body that would select two delegates to a Workers’ Directory, which in turn would assume control of the party on May 1, 1916. Its leaders thought that such an organizational format would allow the sometimes diverse interests of the various trades to be heard with no single trade’s concerns dominating the others.⁷⁷

Clearly, the Workers’ party understood the issues of the day from a more socialist perspective than had its predecessors. The editors of El Partido Obrero described a society in which class inequities denied the worker equal enjoyment of material possessions or social rewards, suggesting that labor, and not capital, should control production and the distribution of its benefits. Fundamental social changes would be necessary to reach such a goal, they realized, but in the short run, workers’ education, improvements in social services, wage increases, and increased cooperation between the trades could be achieved. These demands had all been heard before, but the Workers’ party also expressed concern for the particular problems of women laborers, regarded strikes as legitimate tools for the rectification of injustices, and called for a national workers’ convention.⁷⁸

The Partido Obrero encountered public opposition as it sought to define its ideology and organizational character. Its spokesmen stressed that the party did not favor an anarchistic socialism that desired elimination of all property, but rather “protectionist socialism,” by which the state in cooperation with workers would carry out the task of restructuring society. The party’s rationale in determining its label, the editors of El Partido Obrero wrote, took account of socialism’s negative public image and the fact that the title “Workers’ party” conveyed the desired sentiment; a union of “workers that asks for social guarantees, education, work, and just remunerations.”⁷⁹ More radical socialists criticized the use of the name “Workers’ party,” suggesting that it implied that the group was dedicated to political action, which was obviously not the case. Moreover, the critics continued, the exclusivism of the workers cut off the group from many of its real allies, who were not manual laborers. Nonetheless, the editors of the socialist newspaper La Libertad declared that they would cooperate fully with the party.⁸⁰

Liberals associated with the UNIO and loyal to Uribe Uribe expressed more pointed opposition to the new organization. Ramón Rosales, who would become minister of labor under President Alfonso López Pumarejo in the 1930s, claimed that the group represented a Republican device to confront the Liberal party. If one favored workers’ issues, Rosales insisted, then the Liberal party was the only place to find support. Leaders of the UNIO made similar comments.⁸¹ In response, members of the Workers’ party charged that Rosales was a political boss whose sole concern was to use the votes of workers and that his allegations were hardly cause for them to cease their labor.⁸²

Rosales’s comments that Republicans were intimately involved in the foundation of the Workers’ party were at least partially accurate. Republicans had been losing cohesion as a party for some time, with some of their adherents returning to the Liberal fold and others striking out in new directions. La Gaceta Republicana, the party’s mouthpiece since 1909, had changed hands in late 1915, when Juan Ignacio Gálvez become its director. Gálvez, it will be recalled, was active in the 1904 Union of Industrials and Workers; that he promptly invited workers’ groups to use the paper for their announcements indicates that Rosales’s point had a degree of validity.⁸³ Nonetheless, antecedents such as the UOC suggest that the Workers’ party was less a product of desperate Republicans than part of the emerging working-class labor movement.

The non-partisan stance of the Partido Obrero was evident in the 1917 departmental elections. Liberals and Republicans, who united in a “Liberal Union” for the contest, cautioned workers that their plan to steer free of politics might be well-intended, but that partisan politics remained the only legitimate route to fundamental change.⁸⁴ The Liberal Union defeated the two slates presented by Conservatives, but it proved unable to draw the Workers’ party into the alliance. Most observers commented that large numbers of workers refused to take part in the election, which, as a consequence, drew the smallest number of voters for any departmental election in the decade.⁸⁵ Both Liberal and Republican editorialists condemned this new variant of workers’ politics, insisting that they could satisfactorily address workers’ needs.⁸⁶ Officials of the Workers’ party in turn condemned “los dirigentes de la política” (political bosses) who had consistently denied that workers could shape their own future by their own hands. They noted that changing socioeconomic conditions had produced a more aware working class, one that was, through the Workers’ party, planting the seeds for its own future.⁸⁷

The movement away from political activities to those more directly concerned with social and economic conditions was visible in the Workers’ party’s inclusion of strikes as legitimate weapons in the struggle to improve working conditions and wages. Strikes were not unknown in nineteenth-century Bogotá but, given the predominance of artisan production, they were few. As wage labor became more common, the frequency, although not necessarily the duration, of strikes increased. Early strikes in transportation industries, especially on the Railroad of the Sabana by non-unionized workers, often opposed wage reductions or favored wage increases to offset inflation.⁸⁸ In the first days of 1918, a wave of strikes, spawned by these grievances, swept the major cities of the northern Colombian coast, stimulating railroad workers in Bogotá also to demand higher wages.⁸⁹ When the Cartagena strike turned violent, the government issued a decree that acknowledged the right of native-born workers to strike, but prohibited permanent strike committees or the use of violence by workers. The same decree imposed a state of siege until the situation was brought under governmental control.⁹⁰

The outbreak of strikes in 1918 most likely resulted from the economic pressures created by the First World War; a “modern” response to modern phenomena. At the same time, workers in Bogota were using modern methods to counter an old problem, that of international competition. The tariff of 1905 had lessened, though not stilled, clamors for protective legislation, but in the 1910s governmental solicitation of bids from foreign producers caused a flurry of protests. In October 1916, for example, cabinetmakers expressed outrage that the Railroad of the Sabana had ordered windows and doors from the United States, calling the move typical of the foreignism (extranjerismo) that denied the competence of native producers.⁹¹ Three years later, the government’s announced intention to purchase military uniforms abroad spurred workers to stage a massive demonstration on March 16, 1919. During the course of the protest, confrontations broke out between demonstrators and police; armed authorities opened fire, killing at least seven people and wounding an unknown number. In order to understand the size and tenor of the demonstration, and the reaction it precipitated by the government, it must be placed in the context of the meeting of the Asemblea Obrera (Workers’ Assembly).

The Asemblea Obrera

The workers’ mobilizations of the 1910s culminated in an assembly of organizations in early 1919. The Sindicato Central de Obreros (Central Workers’ Syndicate) and the Confederación de Acción Social (Social Action Confederation) met in late 1918 to determine possible alternatives for the future, the result being a call for the Asemblea Obrera (Workers’ Assembly). The latter group, presided by Dr. Eduardo Carvajal, had been formed to help bogotanos cope with the 1918 outbreaks of typhoid and influenza. Members of the Confederation were a varied lot, united only by the fact that they had shown concern for social issues throughout the 1910s. They included labor activists such as Pablo Amaya and Luis Ezpeleta; Liberals such as Alberto Sicard and Bernardino Rangel; and the dissident Conservative Laureano Gómez. The origins of the Central Workers’ Syndicate are somewhat more obscure, although it was rooted in the tradition of the UOC and the 1916 Workers’ party. Pablo E. Mancera, one of the founders of both the Syndicate and the UOC, related that it was created in 1917 as a group of five people to study the city’s socioeconomic misery.⁹² In any case, the January 19 opening of the Assembly attracted a broad spectrum of individuals and groups that had been connected with organized workers over the previous fifteen years. Delegates from the Mutual Aid Society, the UOC, the Society of Death Insurance, the Barbers’ Society, and at least five other groups were among the estimated five-hundred people in attendance. The delegates announced their commitment to social, moral, and economic unity and their inclusion in the international workers’ movement.⁹³ As the Asemblea continued its deliberations, it invited other groups to organize and become affiliates. That call resulted in the establishment and affiliation of various organizations, ranging from those of tailors and cobblers to cabinetmakers and railroad workers. Within two weeks after its opening, the number of affiliates had doubled from the initial ten. By the time the Assembly declared its work completed in June, it claimed over one-hundred affiliates.⁹⁴

The Assembly’s first pronouncement declared itself to be the Socialist party. The Asemblea called for an activist state program to be directed by workers, to combat social injustices such as poor housing, illiteracy, and unequal material conditions. The Assembly included in its platform a clause calling for nationalization of the police, the telegraph, and the teaching trades, which, it presumed, would improve their social conditions. Various components of the platform directly addressed the needs of workers: an eight-hour workday, maternity benefits, protective tariffs, the right to strike, wages determined by workers’ committees, a strengthened workers’ compensation law, paid May Day holidays, and state-managed retirement funds. The platform did not envision the state to be the primary catalyst for workers’ betterment; that improvement, it insisted, would come from education and material progress, which, in turn, would enable the Socialist party to place reformist pressure upon the state. In regard to political action, the Assembly declared itself to be independent, supportive only of those who favored the socioeconomic advancement of the proletariat. The group declared that it would practice abstention when no clear pro-worker candidates were available.⁹⁵ The Assembly released plans for the creation of the Central Workers’ Syndicate to serve as the basis for future action. Local syndicates would have responsibility for organizing laborers and other pro-socialist sympathizers for the development of programs such as savings banks, mutual aid societies, consumers’ cooperatives, and workers’ housing. Representatives of local groups would then form the Central Syndicate, which would be charged with direction of political plans, coordination of agencies for improvement of socioeconomic conditions, and communication with international groups. A national workers’ congress, scheduled to meet on August 7, 1919, was to formalize the Central Syndicate.⁹⁶

The increasingly dynamic organization called for a public show of strength on March 16, 1919. It is unclear whether the plan and demonstration was prompted by President Marco Fidel Súarez’s decision to purchase the Army’s uniforms abroad, or whether it was simply coincident—both seem to have been announced on the same day.⁹⁷ There is no doubt, however, that the Assembly promptly linked the two, declaring the demonstration to be in protest of the decree, proclaiming, “Workers, the hour of our justice begins!”⁹⁸ An estimated five- to ten-thousand people gathered in the Plaza de Bolívar on Sunday, March 16, to protest the government’s decision. The crowd peacefully listened to the Assembly’s president, Marco T. Amorocho, and others criticize the plan. Súarez himself stepped forward to address the multitude, only to be met with disorder and stones. Isolated shots rang out, then barrages of machine-gun fire, which forced the demonstrators to flee for safety. Gunfire and other disturbances lasted until nightfall, leaving at least seven persons dead and unknown numbers wounded. Numerous leaders of the protest were arrested, including Amorocho, Eduardo Carvajal, and Alberto Manrique Páramo (director of La Gaceta Republicana), and the government imposed a state of siege.”⁹⁹

Somewhat unexpectedly, the government did not suspend the Assembly and quickly released those arrested. The Assembly in late April 1919 announced the creation of an Executive Socialist Directory, which was then elected on May Day. The Assembly’s final document, approved on May 20, formally renamed the organization the Socialist party. It declared itself both free of established parties and religious groups and exclusively dedicated to measures that would favor the cause of the proletariat. With its work accomplished, the Assembly moved to adjourn, but not before a National Executive Socialist Directory was elected and declarations of solidarity signed by the groups that had been included in the Assembly’s deliberations.¹⁰⁰

The May congressional elections offered the movement an opportunity to display its organizational strength. It had earlier urged its members not to vote in the February departmental elections, which produced the lowest vote total in the decade (4,219), less than half of the turnout for the 1915 elections (9,200), and considerably less than the 5,684 votes two years later—an election also characterized by workers’ abstention.¹⁰¹ The Assembly initially announced that it would support only those individuals with socialist goals in the May contest and that in no case would it assume an active role. It nonetheless gave a list of possible workers’ candidates to the committee of Liberals, Republicans, and dissident Conservatives—men with very questionable socialist credentials. Negotiations among the three groups failed to concur on a common slate, so Liberals presented a list separate from the unified slate presented by dissident Conservatives and Republicans; the latter slate included Amorocho as a principal candidate. True to its pledge, the Assembly abstained from active electioneering. The election was won by the Nationalist Conservative slate.¹⁰²

It seemed that the Assembly had resolved the nagging problem faced by all workers’ groups in Bogotá during the 1910s—how to balance political and socioeconomic action and not to become a tool for the interests of non-workers. The route to that end was to be the Socialist party, “adapted to the needs and aspirations of the Colombian people,” which, by assumption, were those of the workers.¹⁰³ In fact, however, the conflict of interests continued. May consultations among members of the Socialist Directory and representatives of the Workers’ Directory of Girardot, who were grappling with the same problem, failed to produce an accord. Members of the Bogotá group who were not workers urged the Girardot association to consider the broader implications of the workers’ needs, which, in their view, made it necessary to emphasize the political cause before more purely worker issues. Even Amorocho seemed to agree with this, although he cautioned that workers’ trade organizations had to serve as the base for any such movement. When the same non-worker members of the Bogotá directory commented on the May election, they insisted that the apathetic attitude displayed by workers in that contest needed to be changed if they were to progress, seemingly suggesting the priority of political action. Finally, it is noteworthy that none of the workers’ delegates who signed the closing manifesto of the Asemblea Obrera were selected as members of the National Executive Socialist Directory; workers and non-workers seemed to be following two distinct orientations.¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

The first two decades of the twentieth century constituted a transitional era for Bogotá’s labor movement, from one that had been dominated by artisans to one that reflected the particular interests of wage laborers. Certain issues were common to both types of workers, foremost among these the demand for effective political participation. However, fundamentally contrasting social and economic realities produced more points of departure than convergence in the platforms expressed by the two classes of laborers. Whereas tariff protection had been central to artisan political statements, this issue was seldom raised after the War of the 1000 Days, and even then more often by industrials than by workers. For the Colombian Workers’ Union, the tariff question, which originated from the artisans’ desire to protect established professions, took a backseat to socioeconomic priorities such as increased educational opportunities and higher wages. While tradesmen certainly had raised their voices in favor of the former, the question of wages was less relevant to the independent craftsmen than the more general issue of income. Similarly, demands for accident compensation and the right to strike were only pertinent to modern wage laborers.

Both types of laborers issued calls for effective political participation, albeit with different goals. During most of the nineteenth century, men claiming to speak for craftsmen had espoused the virtues of republicanism, an ideology that they felt would properly reward their social and economic contributions with political influence—if it were not subverted by partisan egoism. Artisans, as a middle-sector group, did not desire to rewrite the political rules, only to reform them, which, presumably, they could accomplish. By contrast, the 1910s saw a gradual evolution by certain bogotano workers toward a socialism that would alter the basic economic, social, and political fabric of the Colombian state. The point of departure for workers was the same as it had been for artisans; a bipartisan system seemingly run by and for the elite. Groups such as the UNIO posited that if a united industrial/worker political front could be formed, then it could bring about the reforms necessary to make the system more responsive to their will and needs. Ideally, the UNIO hoped, such a movement would be independent of the established parties, but reality dictated relations with Republicans and Liberals, compromises not dissimilar to those made earlier by artisans. However, the groups of the 1910s did not fall back to earlier positions when their exploitation became obvious. Rather, they came to believe that abstention from traditional parties in favor of socialist politics might be the appropriate way to achieve effective workers’ participation. It is not surprising that politically conscious workers, aware of their seeming inability to alter their subordinate position within society, would seek a solution that would create a new system, as opposed to reforming the old one.

It was nonetheless the case that while the needs of Bogotá’s workers were articulately expressed, and a socialist solution for the basic problems elaborated, the ever-present question of cooperation with or independence from traditional political parties persisted. At no point during the 1910s did the capital’s workers, to say nothing of workers from other areas of the country, obtain sufficient power or unity to impose their wishes upon local, departmental, or national politics. The labor movement entering into the 1920s was more conscious, politically mature, and better organized, yet it had to confront the decision of cooperation (and possible co-optation) with other groups, or an independent route and probable impotence.