THE CHALLENGE OF EQUAL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

CONDITION OF THE BLACK WORKER

1. ECONOMIC STATUS OF NONWHITE WORKERS, 1955–62

By Matthew A. Kessler

The gradual movement of nonwhite workers (over 90 percent of whom are Negroes) into higher skilled and better paying jobs has continued since the mid-1950’s. However, despite these recent gains, large gaps continue to exist between white and nonwhite workers, as measured by most indicators of social and economic well-being.

Nonwhites continue to be concentrated in less-skilled jobs and are subject to more unemployment than whites. The jobless rates of nonwhites are still at least one and one-half times higher than for whites in every age-sex grouping, and for some age groupings are three times as high. Unemployment bears disproportionately on the nonwhite worker whatever his industry or occupation. Not only is he subject to more frequent spells of unemployment; once out of a job, he has tended to remain jobless for a longer period of time.

After achieving relatively substantial gains in money income during the early postwar period, nonwhite families have failed to keep pace with the rise in average income of white families since the mid-1950’s, despite the continued shift of nonwhite workers into higher paying jobs.

During the past two decades, nonwhites have narrowed the educational gap that had historically existed between themselves and white persons, a development which has helped to foster their steady ladder. Since the mid-1950’s, however, differences in the level of educational attainment between whites and nonwhites have remained essentially unchanged.

Industry and Occupation Changes

Throughout the postwar period, there has been a dramatic shift of nonwhites out of agriculture. In 1962, 12 out of every 100 employed nonwhite workers were employed in agriculture, compared with 16 out of 100 in 1955 and 21 out of 100 in 1948 (See Table 1). The precipitous fall in this proportion throughout the postwar period is a result of the exodus of nonwhites from sharecropping and marginal farms, particularly in the South, as well as the growth of alternative employment opportunities in other sectors of the economy.

In this quest for a higher money income, however, many nonwhites who shifted to nonfarm employment paid the price of greater job insecurity. As they often lack education and vocational training and are limited by discriminatory hiring and layoff practices, their employment opportunities are restricted to relatively unskilled and semi-skilled occupations. These are the very lines of work that are particularly sensitive to the business cycle and are vulnerable to large-scale reductions through automation. Although professional and clerical occupations have provided a major source of both white and nonwhite employment growth since the mid–1950’s, nonwhites continue to be overrepresented in such occupations as domestic servants, laborers, and semiskilled operatives.

White-Collar Occupations. Between 1955 and 1962, an increasing number and proportion of nonwhite workers entered the higher skilled and better paying white-collar occupations. In 1962, however, only 17 percent of all employed nonwhites were in white-collar occupations, compared with 47 percent of white workers (Table 2). White workers in this group outnumbered nonwhites 28 to 1, in marked contrast to their comparative representation in the civilian labor force (9 white for each nonwhite worker). The number of nonwhites in white-collar jobs has risen by 50 percent since 1955, about the same rate of increase as noted during the early postwar period and two and one-half times the increase for whites. However, unless there is a substantial acceleration of these trends, the percentage of nonwhite workers in white-collar employment will still be substantially below that of white workers for many years.

Nonwhite workers have been entering the professional, technical, and clerical fields faster than other white-collar occupations. These occupations have risen by 60 percent since the mid-1950’s, reflecting expanded job opportunities, particularly in public administration. The largest concentration of nonwhite workers in the white-collar group (almost 1 out of 2) is employed in such clerical occupations as office machine operators, book-keepers, typists, secretaries, stenographers, and filing and recording clerks.

The largest relative gains posted by nonwhites during 1955-62 were in professional services (such as hospital, medical, and other health services, welfare and religious institutions) and business and repair services—all of which grew nearly 70 percent in the 7-year span. This approximated advances noted in the earlier postwar period and compared with about a 35-percent increase for whites since 1955. Nonwhites also recorded relatively sharp gains in the growing field of educational services—up by 60 percent compared with a 50-percent rise among whites. Governmental policies assuring nondiscriminatory employment practices may account for the continued gains registered by nonwhites in the public administration since the mid-1950’s—up 40 percent compared with an 18-percent rise among whites.

Nonwhite employment in the professional and technical fields has increased at a somewhat faster rate than for whites since the mid-1950’s. Yet in 1962, only about 5 percent of all employed nonwhites were engaged in these occupations compared with 12-1/2 percent of all white workers. While teaching provides a major source of professional employment for both whites and nonwhites, a higher proportion of nonwhite than white professional workers (mainly women) were employed as elementary and secondary school teachers in 1962—nearly two-fifths and one-fifth, respectively. Indicating of nonwhites’ recent progress in the professional field is the fivefold increase in their employment in the growing engineering occupations during the 1950’s compared with a two-thirds rise for the occupational group as a whole. Nevertheless, nonwhites accounted for only 1-1/2 percent of all professional engineers by 1960.

Only 4 of every 100 nonwhites were employed as managers, officials, and proprietors and as sales workers in 1962, a somewhat higher proportion than in 1955 and 1948. The proportion of white workers in these occupations in 1962 was much higher (19 percent).

Blue-Collar Occupations. After registering small gains in the early postwar period, the proportion of nonwhites employed in blue-collar occupations fell slightly between 1955 and 1962, returning to levels prevailing in 1948. Blue-collar jobs have accounted for two-fifths of total nonwhite employment throughout most of the postwar period. During the more recent 7-year period, the proportion of white workers in these occupational categories also declined moderately.

More than 8 out of every 10 nonwhite workers in blue-collar jobs (compared with 6 out of 10 white workers) continued to be in either the semiskilled or unskilled occupations. These jobs tend to be concentrated in those goods-producing and related industries (such as transportation) which are quite sensitive to the business cycle. Moreover, the demand for this type of labor has diminished steadily during the postwar period as a result of automation and other technological developments.

Service Occupations. Nonwhites are still seven times as likely as white workers to be employed as private household workers (including maids, babysitters, housekeepers, chauffeurs, laundresses). During the earlier postwar period, the number of nonwhite private household workers remained virtually unchanged, while nonwhite employment in other service occupations, such as hospital attendant, barber, and cook, rose significantly (25 percent). During the 1955–62 period, this trend appears to have continued, with little change in nonwhite private household employment and a substantial gain (18 percent) in the number of nonwhites entering other service jobs. Among white workers also there was a steady rise in the proportion of service workers outside of private households throughout the postwar period—up between 20 and 25 percent in each of the two periods. In 1962, as in the earlier postwar period, proportionately twice as many nonwhite as white workers were in these rapidly expanding but still relatively low-paying and low-to-moderately skilled service occupations.

Manpower Utilization

Unemployment. Throughout the postwar period, unemployment has consistently fallen most heavily on the nonwhite worker. Comprising only a tenth of a civilian labor force in 1962, nonwhites accounted for two-tenths of the jobless total. This disparity was evident among both men and women.

The unemployment rate for nonwhites, at 11.0 percent in 1962, stood at its third highest level in the postwar period (Table 3) and was only slightly lower than rates recorded in the recession affected years of 1958 and 1961. Their 1962 unemployment rate was double the jobless rate of white workers. This relationship has persisted throughout the postwar period, and in fact tended to increase in the latter part of the postwar period. In the years 1947-49, the nonwhite unemployment rate averaged about 60 percent higher than for white workers, whereas in each year from 1954 through 1962, it was consistently twice as high.

Nonwhite boys and girls 14 to 19 years of age continued to have one of the highest jobless rates of any age-color group (See Table 4). In 1962, the unemployment rate of nonwhite teenagers remained near 25 percent, compared with about 12 percent for white youth of the same ages. Since 1955, the jobless rate of nonwhite teenagers has increased faster than for white youngsters—up about 60 percent among nonwhites compared with a 30-percent rise for white youth.

In 1962, nonwhite men in both the 25–34 and 35–44 age brackets (primarily family breadwinners) recorded unemployment rates about three times as high as for white men (about 9 and 3 percent, respectively). A differential of similar proportions was recorded in 1955.

Even within the same major occupation group large differences in unemployment rates persisted, with rates for nonwhites generally substantially exceeding those of white persons. Among both white and nonwhite workers at the lower end of the occupational hierarchy, both nonfarm laborers and operatives usually have relatively high unemployment rates; however, differences are not (and have not been) as great as in most other occupation groups (Table 5). This may reflect a high proportion of such workers in highly unionized mass-production industries, some of which provide for nondiscrimination clauses in their collective bargaining agreements.

Differences in overall unemployment rates by color are partially explained by the higher concentration of nonwhites at the lower rungs of the occupational skill ladder. Even assuming there were no differences in the occupational distribution of both groups, however, nonwhites still would have had a greater unemployment rate than whites in 1962. But assuming that the experienced nonwhite civilian labor force had the same occupational distribution as the experienced white civilian labor force, and applying actual jobless rates of nonwhites to this adjusted occupational distribution, the difference in the overall jobless rate between whites and nonwhites in 1962 would have been cut in half. Under these assumptions, the unemployment rate for nonwhites would have been 8.1 rather than 11.0 percent of their number in the labor force, compared with an actual rate of 4.9 percent for whites.

Nonwhite workers not only have higher rates; they are also subject to more frequent spells of unemployment. For persons experiencing any unemployment throughout the year, the chances are much greater that nonwhites rather than whites in 1962. But assuming that the experienced nonwhite civilian labor force had the same occupational distribution as the experienced white civilian labor force, and applying actual jobless rates of nonwhites to this adjusted occupational distribution, the difference in the overall jobless rate between whites and nonwhites in 1962 would have been cut in half. Under these assumptions, the unemployment rate for nonwhites would have been 8.1 rather than 11.0 percent of their number in the labor force, compared with an actual rate of 4.9 percent for whites.

Nonwhite workers not only have higher rates; they are also subject to more frequent spells of unemployment. For persons experiencing any unemployment throughout the year, the chances are much greater that nonwhites rather than whites will have repeated spells of unemployment during the year. About 3 of every 10 nonwhite men who had been unemployed sometime during the year were subject to 3 spells or more of unemployment in 1961, compared with 2 of every 10 white men who had some unemployment. Moreover, nonwhite workers spend considerably longer periods of time on layoff or looking for work between jobs. Since 1954 (earliest year for which these data are available), nonwhites have consistently accounted for 20 to 30 percent of both long-term unemployment of 15 weeks or more and very long-term unemployment of 27 weeks or more, as the following tabulation shows:

Since the peak of the 1957 cycle (on a seasonally adjusted basis), nonwhites have consistently had a higher proportion of their total unemployment concentrated in the group of work 15 weeks or more than have the white unemployed.

In the 1957-59 cycle, after seasonal adjustment, unemployment among both whites and nonwhites rose about 70 percent between the third quarter of 1957 (prerecession peak) and the second quarter of 1958 (recession trough). During the downturn phase of the most recent cycle (1960–62), the number of jobless white and nonwhite workers both increased by similar proportions from prerecession peak to the recession trough—up 30 and 25 percent, respectively. In the upturn of the 1957–59 cycle (four quarters after the trough had been reached), differences in the rate of decline in unemployment among whites and nonwhites were not significant. There was, however, a relatively sharper drop in the rates for whites in the 1961–62 recovery period. During this later period, whites recorded a 25-percent decline in joblessness, compared with only a 10-percent dip among nonwhites. By the subsequent quarter, however, the improvement from the trough was about the same for both groups.

Part-Time Employment. In every year since 1956, a higher proportion of nonwhite than white persons were working at part-time jobs. In 1962, 21 percent of all employed nonwhites, compared with 14 percent of all white workers, were working less than 35 hours a week; however, the rate of “economic part time” continued to be three times as high for nonwhites as for white workers—10 percent of total nonwhite employment (Table 6). In 1962, as in previous years, nonwhites accounted for about one-fourth of all nonfarm workers on part time for economic reasons while constituting only 10 percent of nonagricultural employment.

Nonwhite workers in 1962 accounted for 16 percent of those on reduced workweeks because of economic reasons (such as slack work and material shortages), while comprising 35 percent of those in part time because they were unable to find full-time jobs. This latter category is likely to have a high proportion of young workers and adult women, many of whom are employed in private household and other service occupations.

The proportion of nonwhite workers on part time for economic reasons has risen significantly over the past 6 years, while that of white workers has remained about the same. On the other hand, the entire rise in voluntary part-time employment was among white workers.

The difference in the proportion of white and nonwhite workers who work at year-round full-time jobs is appreciable. Only one-half of nonwhite men compared with two-thirds of white men with work experience were reported to have worked steadily at full-time jobs in 1961. This difference has persisted since the late 1940’s when such data first became available. During the postwar period, nonwhite women made sizable gains in full-time year-round jobholding, while the proportion of white women in this category remained relatively stable. This improvement among nonwhite women has resulted in part from their shift away from farm occupations—jobs where work schedules tend to be unstable. In 1961, there were proportionately almost as many nonwhite as white women in full-time year-round jobs (32 and 38 percent, respectively).

Labor Force Participation. A salient development in labor force activity of nonwhite workers in recent years has been the sharp decline in labor force participation rates of teenage boys and older men (Table 7). In 1962, rates for nonwhites in these groups were below those of white men in the same ages. The especially sharp decline for nonwhites continued a secular trend, including the long-term decline in agriculture, increased years of schooling, and liberalized retirement programs—developments which have also affected whites greatly in recent years.

During the 1950’s, at least 70 percent of the net migration from farms consisted of young people under 20 or who reached 20 during the decade. In general, farm youth, whether in or out of school, tend to be an integral part of the farm labor force. Their rates of labor force participation are usually higher than those of nonfarm youngsters of the same ages. In view of the continuing decline in the proportion of nonwhites employed in agriculture between 1955 and 1962, it is reasonable to assume that many of these young farm leavers were nonwhite. A sharp rise in the number of youngsters enrolled in school, as well as unusually high jobless rates which have prevailed in recent years among nonwhite teenagers, may have contributed to their drop in participation.

Participation rates of both white and nonwhite older men (65 and over) dropped very significantly between 1955 and 1962—down about 9 and 13 percentage points, respectively. Probably because of the trend toward earlier retirement, participation has also been declining (although to a much smaller extent) among men 55 to 64 years of age, with the nonwhites again showing sharper declines.

Among men in the central age group 25 to 64 years, where participation rates tend to be the highest, nonwhite men continued to have somewhat lower rates than whites. This may be due to a higher incidence of disabling illness and injury among nonwhite men, associated with their concentration in manual, more hazardous occupations.

Nonwhite women historically have participated in the labor force in greater proportions than white women. The postwar rise in labor force participation rates of adult women has occurred both among white and nonwhite women. Despite these changes, only about two-fifths of all white women 25 to 64 were in the labor force in 1962, compared with nearly three-fifths of nonwhite women of the same ages.

Income and Education

Income. Nonwhites tend to have a somewhat larger number of wage earners per family unit and higher rates of labor force participation than whites, which tend to reduce white-nonwhite income differentials. Partially offsetting this is the relatively high concentration of nonwhites in agriculture, where income received in kind is excluded. Family income is nevertheless a useful criterion of socioeconomic wellbeing since many expenditure patterns relate to the family unit as a separate entity.

The average (median) income of both white and nonwhite families has increased quite substantially in dollar amounts during the past two decades. Very notable income advances by nonwhites were made particularly during World War II and the early postwar period as a result of wartime induced shortages of unskilled workers and governmental action designed to raise the income level of lower paid workers. The family income of nonwhites climbed from less than 40 percent of white family income in 1939 to nearly 60 percent in the early 1950’s. Although since then nonwhites have continued to raise their money income, they have failed to bring about a further narrowing of income differentials between the two groups. In fact, on a relative basis, nonwhite family income as a percent of white family income has shown little change since 1952–1953 (Table 8). This phenomenon seems to be due to the fact that during the past decade, professional, technical, and managerial workers (where nonwhites are still very underrepresented) showed much larger relative income gains (up nearly 70 percent) than workers at the lower rung of the occupational skill ladder (where nonwhites are still disproportionately concentrated). The incomes of laborers and service workers rose by only 40 percent during this same period, compared with an increase of about 180 percent during the forties.

In 1948, nearly 8 of every 10 nonwhite families had money incomes of less than $3,000 (See Table 9). This proportion had dropped by 6 out of 10 by 1955 and 5 out of 10 by 1961, but it was about 2-1/2 times the proportion of white families in this relatively low income category. Since 1955, the proportion of nonwhite families in the $5,000 to $10,000 category had increased by approximately one-half (to 23 percent), but was still well below the comparable proportion of white families in that category (45 percent). At the upper end of the income scale—$10,000 or more—6 percent of nonwhite families were in this group in 1961, in sharp contrast to their negligible proportion in 1948 and 1955 (about 0.5 percent in both years). Despite recent employment gains made by nonwhites, which is reflected by their movement into higher money income groups, a substantial gap continues to exist, with proportionately three times as many white families in the $10,000 or more bracket.

Educational Attainment. Very large strides have been made during the past two decades in reducing the persistent educational gap between nonwhite and white persons. By 1962, the average white person 25 to 29 years of age had completed 12.5 years of schooling, compared with 11.2 years of schooling completed by the average nonwhite person in the same age bracket. For nonwhite men, this represented a gain of some 4-1/2 years of school since 1940; for whites, the average gain was 2 years. This narrowing of the educational gap during the postwar period can be largely attributed to the rising proportion of nonwhite youngsters who have been enrolled in school. At the elementary school level, the differential has been markedly reduced. But at the high school level, despite some narrowing differentials during this period, the percentage of nonwhites attending school falls appreciably below that of whites.

Since the mid-1950’s, however, the gap has essentially remained the same, with both groups showing a rise of about 1 full year in median school years completed, which departs from previous longrun trends. Recent income data by color and educational attainment of the head of the family also support conclusions found in other studies that the income gap between whites and nonwhites is not completely closed even when educational levels of both groups increase (Table 10). However, the differential is substantially reduced at the college level, with the family income of nonwhite college graduates in 1961 about 85 percent of that of white college graduates.

Monthly Labor Review, 86 (July, 1963):780–88.

2. STATEMENT OF WHITNEY M. YOUNG, Jr.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE TO THE SENATE LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT, MANPOWER, AND POVERTY CONCERNING S. 1308 TO PROMOTE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES MAY 4, 1967

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

My name is Whitney M. Young, Jr., and I am Executive Director of the National Urban League. We appreciate your invitation and the opportunity it provides the Urban League to support this vitally needed legislation. To be effective, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission needed enforcement power from its inception.¹

We also wish to take this opportunity to commend Senators Clark and Javits, who are responsible for introducing this important piece of legislation.²

The legislation to which we address ourselves would make an indispensable contribution toward the protection of the equal employment rights of individuals. The major division is that which grants EEOC the power to issue cease and desist orders.

We believe that President Johnson, in his message to Congress, emphasized the need for cease and desist order power when he stated:

Unlike most Federal regulatory agencies, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was not given enforcement powers. If efforts to conciliate or persuade are unsuccessful, the Commission, itself, is powerless. For the individual discriminated against, there remains only a time consuming and expensive lawsuit.³

It is increasingly apparent, from EEOC’s brief operation, that more effective machinery for enforcement authority must be given to the Commission to bring about conciliation.

We note that of thirty-five States with FEPC laws, twenty-eight provide for enforcement procedures. Of the remaining seven that had initially relied upon voluntary compliance, four have amended their laws to provide for enforcement procedures.

Federal enforcement toward Equal Employment Opportunity continues to be a major issue with minority citizens. While the employment status of Negro workers has improved considerably during the past two decades, there remain significant differentials between white and Negro workers. In spite of the Nation’s improved economic status, the employment opportunities of Negroes continues to lag behind their white counterparts.

Nation-wide studies document that they are still confined largely to the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, when employed. They are employed fewer hours per week and their unemployment rates are twice as high as those of whites. Negro men continue to earn sixty per cent as much as white men, while Negro women earn a little more than half as much as white women. The lower earning power of Negro men makes it necessary for more Negro women to work than white women.

Even more striking data is available on employment and unemployment from a recent study, conducted by the Department of Labor, entitled “A Sharper Look at Unemployment in U.S. Cities and Slums.” Gathered from the twenty largest U.S. metropolitan areas, it reveals an unemployment rate that varies greatly from two point seven per cent in Washington, D.C. to five point two per cent in San Francisco and six per cent in Los Angeles. In ten of these areas, the rate is significantly above the national average of about three to four per cent. In five, it is about the same; in five others, it is significantly lower.

The non-white unemployment rate is about three times higher than the white unemployment rate in eight of these areas, two times higher in six more and fifty per cent higher in two others. This study partially corrects, for the first time, a fault which had been discovered in the 1960 Census - i.e. the missing completely of a large number of Negroes: one out of every six Negro men between the ages of twenty and thirty. This means that past nonwhite unemployment figures have understated the situation substantially.

The highest unemployment rates in the twelve larger areas, covered by the study of fourteen to nineteen year-old non-whites, range from eighteen point four per cent in Washington, D.C. to thirty-six per cent in Philadelphia. The rate is above thirty per cent in seven of these areas.

Many of the differentials in the employment status of Negroes are due to their inability to obtain jobs commensurate with their training. Likewise, discriminatory hiring practices adversely affect both the Negro individually and the total economy. They account for the disproportionate representation on the public welfare rolls. Discrimination in employment has a greater direct and indirect impact on the AFDC Program than any other single socioeconomic factor. It causes desertion, divorce and unwed parenthood with all of their concomitant personal, social and economic costs. It also has similar significant causal relationships to unemployment.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was established, engendered great hope that this mechanism would deal meaningfully with the problems surrounding discrimination in employment. The actual agency experience, which has demonstrated that the Commission cannot enforce compliance, has given rise to disillusionment and lack of confidence. These conditions have led the American Negro to suspect that legislation, supposedly guaranteed to provide equality of opportunity, is full of loopholes and political terminology. He is rapidly losing faith in the democratic process to achieve his goal of equality of opportunity.⁴

Within the next few months, the Federal Government will sponsor a Concentrated Employment Program in nineteen of our major cities throughout the country. The Government will spend from two and one-half to eight million dollars in each selected city. The ultimate objective of this program is to make it possible for the unemployed slum residents to obtain and hold regular jobs, primarily in the private sector of the economy. The immediate short range goal is to provide twenty-five thousand to forty thousand new jobs for previously unemployed slum residents. Many of the people participating in this crash effort will be Negroes, who, because of prior deprivation and discrimination, need all of the legislative tangibles to assist them in becoming productive and useful citizens. They cannot become discouraged, in their desires to attain full equality of opportunity, by additional “token legislation” to appease the wishes of a few, while ignoring the crying needs of the disadvantaged poor.

The Urban League’s fifty-seven years of existence have been dedicated to the cause of equality of opportunity. Through our Job Development Program, Skills Bank Program, and more recently, our On the Job Training Program, we have worked with thousands of business and industry personnel. In these efforts, we have been and are still being thwarted by subtle and overt discriminatory practices, that are perpetuated by biased employers who hide behind the legislative jargon, to deny compliance. At present, we have no leverage which requires violators to terminate their unlawful policies and practices.

We feel that the proposed legislation improves tremendously upon the present Act. Therefore, we are in general agreement with most of its provisions. However, we would like to submit some suggestions regarding the provisions listed below.

It seems appropriate that there should be a provision for the Commission to effect its own litigation. This should also include employers who hold government contracts and are under Executive Order 11246. This would serve as a dual control to insure maximum compliance under the law.⁵

We strongly recommend that greater consideration be given to the “charging party” involved. Under the proposed legislation, the charging party has little involvement with conciliation and agreements can be worked out between government representatives and management.

We also strongly feel that an aggrieved person should be able to institute a civil action against the respondent named in the charge in the appropriate United States district court, without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any state or local court of competent jurisdiction. This protects the rights of all citizens, regardless of the nature and size of the act.

The National Urban League’s experience demonstrates the need for the pending legislation.

I wish to thank you for inviting me to present this testimony, in behalf of the National Urban League. The problems we face in the coming months and years may well rest in your hands.

In addition to the moral implications, there is a dollar-and-cents logic to equal employment opportunity. There are some costs which taxpayers are shelling out, because of Jim Crow, that could easily be eliminated. There are the billions spent on public welfare; there is the cost of public housing, much of which would be unnecessary if more Negroes could buy their own homes; there is the cost of sending thousands of building inspectors into the field every day to ferret out violations of slum landlords; there is the cost of arresting, jailing, trying, and paroling teen-age colored boys for purse snatching because they can’t find work.

These items in America’s Bigotry Budget cost taxpayers more than twenty billion dollars a year. This twenty billion dollars, which we are virtually throwing away, is equivalent to all U.S. exports abroad with all the one hundred-thirty nations of the world.

In the opinion of W. W. Heller, former chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors, lifting the income of Negroes to that of whites would double their current rate of economic growth. If the non-white labor force earned as much as their white counterparts, Negroes would spend an additional three point six billion dollars on food; one point seven billion dollars on clothing; one point five billion dollars on housing; one point three billion on household operation; one point two billion dollars on cars and transportation; one point two billion dollars on recreation and amusement; five hundred million dollars more on utilities; and eight million dollars more on personal care and miscellaneous items.

You have an obligation, I believe, to give a ray of hope to the deprived - those who have been deprived, by circumstances, in the past. You must make sure that disadvantaged persons will have the full equality of opportunity, that our economy demands.

Thank you!

Testimony of Whitney Young before the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, May 4, 1967, Whitney Young Papers, Columbia University.

3. 35% BLACK JOBLESS SAYS TOP ECONOMIST

Content removed at rightsholder’s request.

New York Amsterdam News, June 10, 1972.

4. DISPLACED FARM WORKERS LOSE INDUSTRIAL JOBS IN RURAL SOUTH

By Roy Reed

Content removed at rightsholder’s request.

New York Times, January 22, 1975.

5. BLACK WORKERS: PROGRESS DERAILED

By Barbara Becnel

The economic progress of black Americans is determined by many factors, and as a result, the progress has been very uneven. What works for one sector of the black population doesn’t always work for another.

Blacks made tremendous economic strides between 1960 and 1969, but the income levels and living standards have been varied. Education, sex, age, family status, geographic location, union affiliation and numerous other characteristics have affected that progress.

Thus sharp income differentials prevail not only between black and white workers, but also among sectors of the black labor force.

Further, a sector of the black population remains outside the mainstream economy—the hardcore impoverished who never benefited from the advances of the 1960s.

Many blacks were able to benefit from the 1960s—a time of advancing national economy, a rising level of social awareness and such vital pieces of legislation as the 1964 Civil Rights Act and manpower and economic opportunity programs.

Unfortunately, the economic and social advances of the 1960s did not last long. The economic policies of a new administration began to slow down—in some instances halt or even reverse—the social and economic progress that had been occurring in America. In 1969–70, a recession took hold and Americans in general, but blacks in particular, were forced to tighten their belts. And even worse off was that sizable group of blacks who had never benefited from the economic gains of the 1960s.

The evidence is widespread that blacks have been sorely pressed by the economic climate since 1969:

• Unemployment rates for all Americans rose to 7.7 percent in 1976, but for blacks it rose to 13.8 percent.

• Unemployment rates for black teenagers have reached catastrophic levels. In 1976 they averaged 39.2 percent, and in July 1977 they reached an all-time recorded high of 45.5 percent.

• The median income of black families, as a percent of the median income of white families, fell back to 59.5 percent or $9,242 in 1976. In 1969 this figure had been 61 percent of the white median.

• During 1974–75, the number of persons living below the government-defined poverty level rose by 2.5 million—the largest single-year increase observed since poverty data was first kept in 1959. As in previous years, blacks continued to be disproportionately represented, a little more than 31 percent of all low-income persons.

• From 1975 to 1976 the median income for black families, after correction for inflation declined in all regions except the South. In the Northeast it declined by as much as 8 percent. This is in sharp contrast to the 31.4 percent growth in the median income of black families experienced during the period 1965 to 1970.

All of this contrasts with the 1960s, when Americans witnessed a steady decline in unemployment. The decade began with overall unemployment at 5.5 percent and black unemployment at 10.2 percent. Yet by 1969, expansionary economic policies reduced unemployment drastically—3.5 percent for all persons and 6.4 percent for blacks. It was in this period that blacks made their major advances in median income. In 1964, the median income of black families was $3,724, or 54 percent of the white median. By 1969, it had grown to the high point of 61 percent of the white median, or $5,999.

Moreover, by 1970, approximately 25 percent of all black families residing in the North and West were earning incomes of $15,000 or more annually. In contrast, the 1965 figure had been only 14 percent.

Increased educational opportunities, occupational upgrading, and vocational training played a key role in the economic advancement made by blacks during the 1960s. In fact, the gains in educational attainment were startling. Blacks age 20 to 24 completing four years of high school or more rose to 65 percent in 1970—up from 42 percent in 1960. The percentage of blacks completing four or more years of college also increased, from 4.1 percent to 6.1 percent over the 10-year period, 1960 to 1970.

Staying in school longer enabled blacks to begin improving the quality of jobs they held. While in 1964 the proportion of non-white males employed as white-collar workers was only 16 percent, by 1970 it was up to 22 percent. And for black women the increase was even more dramatic—from 22 percent to 36 percent of their ranks in white-collar jobs.

The evidence shows many blacks were able to secure major economic and educational gains during the 1960s—but not all blacks benefited. Millions of black Americans remained impoverished, and for those blacks left behind in the earlier progress, the economic upheavals of this decade have been particularly devastating.

The nation’s economy was not given time to recuperate from the 1969–70 recession when in 1973 an alarming rate of inflation set in. And by December 1974, the preceding 28-month period saw a drop in workers’ real purchasing power, after taxes, of more than 10 percent. The economy continued into a precipitious decline and by 1975 approximately one-third of the nation’s industrial plant and equipment was left idle, with unemployment reaching levels not seen since before World War II. Thus, the nation was left to recover two serious back-to-back recessions—in 1969–70 and again in 1973–75.

Unemployment declined during 1976, but the levels were still very high, averaging 7.7 percent for all Americans and 13.8 percent for blacks. The duration of unemployment also increased, averaging 15.7 weeks for all unemployed person and 16.7 weeks for non-whites in 1976, up from 14.1 and 14.8 weeks, respectively, in 1975.

During the first half of 1977 the overall unemployment rate dropped to a still very high 7.2 percent. Nearly all of the decrease in unemployment, however, was among white workers. Black adult males witnessed some improvement but black teenagers continued to experience the highest joblessness.

All Americans have been dealt a severe blow by the contracting economy of this decade. But for blacks the economic upheaval has wreaked havoc with many of the gains made during the 1960s—in fact, some gains have begun to vanish.

In this dismal economic climate it is not surprising there has been a decrease in labor force participation—the proportion of the civilian non-institutional officially counted as part of the labor force. For non-white adult males, participation rates have dropped in almost all age categories.

Between 1954 and 1966 the labor force participation rate for adult white males stayed almost the same, dropping only two-tenths of 1 percent for that entire 12-year period. Since 1966, however, their rate has declined more sharply—dropping 2.4 percentage points by 1976, from 97.3 down to 94.9. But for black men of prime working age, the decline has been continuous since 1958, dropping by 7.5 percentage points, from 96 to 88.5. For white men most of the decline in rates took place among those age 45 to 54. However, black men have shown significant drops in the 35 to 44 years age group, and since 1964, among those age 25 to 34.

Proportionally, black men are twice as likely to be outside of the labor force as are white men, even though the age distributions of black nonparticipants and the black population are essentially the same as for whites. Yet in 1976, blacks accounted for 22.2 percentage of all non-participant men of prime working age, although they made up only 11 percent of the population.

However, the reverse proved true among non-white adult women. In nearly all age categories, non-white participation in the labor force was higher than that of their white counterparts. This points up a fact now widely recognized about women in the workplace: they work for the same reasons men do, because they have to; and black women have to work more often. Consequently, overall labor force participation rates for black women 16 years and older has changed only slightly over the past 12 years, registering 50.5 percent in 1976.

During the 1960s black adult men made tremendous strides in the number of jobholders, recording employment rates that rose to twice the rate of the total labor force growth. During the same period white adult males, while experiencing comparable growth in the number of people eligible for the labor force, did not experience the same growth in employment. However, from 1970 to 1974, employment increased at about the same rate for both races, approximately 8 percent.

But during 1974, the employment of blacks did not grow at all, and by the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975, the number of employed blacks declined substantially. In contrast, white employment grew moderately throughout most of 1974. Nonetheless, as the year drew to a close, whites too began experiencing a rapid decline in employment.

Employment growth resumed in 1975, accelerated at the onset of 1976, but slowed down considerably by the end of the year. The average annual gain in 1976—2.7 million—was primarily a result of the increases occurring during the first six months. The employment patterns of white and non-white workers were roughly the same during 1976, marked by gains that were strong at the beginning of the year, while tapering off in the final two quarters.

Total employment increased rapidly during the first half of 1977. However, almost half of the rise occurred among adult women. Both white and black workers shared in the growth, but job gains among whites were proportionately greater. And for black teenagers, employment did not rise at all.

The lackluster performance of the economy during the bicentennial decade has brought frustration and despair to many American workers. Thousands have been out of work and unable to support their families for weeks, months, or even years. In fact, about 64 percent of men in the prime working age who were not in the labor force reported in 1976 that they had been unemployed for more than a year. And more than 25 percent of this group had worked at some point during the previous year.

For blacks, however, the problem is even more acute. Non-participation is of longer duration for non-white men age 25 to 34 years than for their white counterparts. In 1976, 20.4 percent of the non-white men not in the labor force reported that they had been outside the labor force for more than five years. That same age category of non-white men reported that 17.9 percent of them had in fact never worked. The corresponding white figures are 15.6 percent and 14.7 percent, respectively. Also, a substantially smaller proportion of the younger blacks than whites had worked within the preceding year.

Many workers have given up the search for a job. Older blacks and black teenagers have faced an impossible situation in securing employment. Thus, many blacks have joined the ranks of “discouraged workers”—workers who after trying for many months and sometimes years to obtain employment, finally give up because they know no jobs are available.

The downturn in the economy has also brought an increase in the number of “involuntary” part-time workers—those who want full-time employment, but because of workweek cutbacks and the inability to locate full-time work in a declining economy, have been forced to accept part-time work. Involuntary part-time work can be found disproportionately among the less educated, unskilled and the young—thus making the problem particularly serious for blacks.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not count discouraged and involuntary part-time workers in the jobless rates, and thus it seriously understates the nation’s real unemployment rate.

For the first 11 months of 1977, an average of 1.4 million non-white workers were without jobs, or 14 percent of the 9.7 million non-whites in the civilian labor force. Adding to the average 303,000 non-white discouraged workers and one-half of the 610,000 non-whites working part-time involuntarily—and one-half of them should be counted as unemployed—brings the non-white jobless total in the first 11 months of 1977 to 1.8 million, or 19.7 percent of the adjusted non-white civilian labor force of 10 million. That is decidedly more than the “official” non-white unemployment rate of 14 percent.

To a degree, blacks have been able to hold onto the higher occupational status obtained during the 1960s. In 1964, 48 percent of non-white men were employed in low-income, unskilled occupations like non-farm laborer, service worker and farm worker, as compared to 19 percent of white men. This proportion had dropped dramatically by 1970, to 37 percent of all non-white men, whereas the white male proportion remained about the same. The proportion of non-white men holding more skilled jobs as craftsmen increased slightly in the same period, from 12 percent to 14 percent. Again, the comparable percentage among whites barely changed, remaining at approximately 20 percent.

Black women made remarkable progress on the occupational ladder during the period 1964 to 1970. A large number of black women moved out of low-income unskilled jobs in private households and farm work into higher paying jobs as clerical workers and professional and technical workers. In 1964, 62 percent of all non-white women were employed as private household employees, other types of service workers and farm workers.

By 1970, the proportion of non-white women employed in these occupations had dropped to 45 percent. At the other end of the occupational scale, the proportion of non-white women employed as white-collar workers moved up from 22 percent to 36 percent over the same period. However, at least half of the women employed as white-collar workers are in clerical occupations—the lower paying end of the white-collar occupations. Thus the move into “white collar” is not as distinctive for them as it is for black men, who are more concentrated in the professional, technical, managerial, and administrative (except farm) positions. In fact, at least two-thirds of all male white-collar workers are in the higher paying white-collar occupations.

Since 1969 the favorable change in the occupational status of black workers has slowed down considerably. By 1976, the proportion of non-white men employed as white-collar workers had risen to only 25.4 percent, up from 22 percent in 1970, and registering an actual decrease since the 1975 figure of 26 percent. There was a dramatic improvement in the proportion of nonwhite males who make up the nation’s non-farm laborers, service workers and farm workers between 1964 and 1970, decreasing from 48 to 37 percent. But between 1970 and 1976, the improvement was only marginal—from 37 percent to 34.7 percent. And in between, there was a period between 1974 and 1966 when the figures went the other way, moving from 34 percent to 34.7 percent.

For black women the occupational gains continued, but were not nearly as great as in the preceding period. Thus despite major improvements during the 1960s, blacks are still over-represented in the low-paying, unskilled jobs and under-represented in the higher-paying professional, technical, and managerial jobs.

Black teenagers, black women, and the black elderly are the three major groups for whom much remains to be done in improving job prospects and economic status. The position of black teenagers in the U.S. economy has worsened during the past 15 years, and has been relatively unaffected by both the progress of black people in general and by conditions among other young people. In spite of an increase in the number of years spent in school, unemployment rates for young blacks are still at castastrophic levels.

By 1960, the jobless rate for young non-whites was approximately 45 percent. In 1970, it was down to 29.1 percent, but by 1976 the unemployment rate for black teenagers had jumped back to 39.2 percent and in July 1977 it registered 45.5 percent—an all-time recorded high. The black teenage unemployment problem has become so chronic as to prompt a commonly accepted rule of thumb measure: the black teenage unemployment rate will be generally twice the white teenage rate and a little more than four times the unemployment rate of the total civilian labor force.

These high rates of unemployment have been coupled with a downward trend in the labor force participation rate of black youth. An increasing number of black teenagers are giving up and dropping out of the labor force. By 1976, their participation rates had reached the point where only two of every five even made an effort to obtain a job. Even though some of this lack of participation can be attributed to school attendance, black teenagers still consistently maintain lower participation rates than their white counterparts.

Traditionally, young blacks have held jobs that were in urban centers and were related to the service and retail trade industries. In recent years, however, those employers have been migrating toward the suburbs, leaving black youths behind—unemployed and isolated in the central cities. The impact has been devastating.

To the extent that a job can keep young people in high school and college, high unemployment rates seriously affect black schooling and education.

To the extent that a job can keep young people off the streets, earning an income while learning job skills and good work habits, high unemployment and low labor force participation rates can lead to high crime rates—increased incidents of burglary, drug addiction and rape.

Across the country, inner city youths are between 10 and 20 times more likely than other young people to be arrested for violent criminal offenses—inevitable by-products of long periods of idleness coupled with feelings of little self-worth. Discouragement and despair, resulting from one job turndown after another, can cause a permanent undermining of self-confidence of black youths.

A study commissioned by the congressional Joint Economic Committee shows that all Americans pay social costs when national economic policy permits high levels of unemployment to persist for long periods of time. For example, a sustained 1 percent rise in unemployment will be followed by an increase in the homicide rate over that year and the subsequent five years. Thus the effect is cumulative. Moreover, the increase in homicide is comparable to 5.7 percent of the homicides which occur in the fifth year following the sustained rise in unemployment. This conclusion is based on 34-year data from 1940 to 1973.

That same 1 percent rise in unemployment was also found to be followed by state prison admissions. That increase was comparable to 4 percent of all state prison admissions occurring in the fifth year following the rise in unemployment. The analogous rate for suicides was 4.1 percent.

This study reveals the potent impact that unemployment has on society. Since black youth have consistently maintained higher levels of unemployment and longer periods of unemployment than most of the nation, the results of this study underscore the urgency of the need to provide jobs for all Americans in general, and black teenagers in particular.

For black women, the expanding economy of the 1960s coupled with a changing social attitude in favor of career-oriented women, combined to encourage them to seek employment and establish careers. In large part, however, women came to the job market generally unskilled and lacking experience. Consequently, they have a disproportionate share of low-level, low paying occupations, and a high susceptibility to layoffs and involuntary part-time employment.

The economic status of black women is an important factor in the overall progress attained by blacks. In the past, proportionally more black wives than white wives worked to maintain family income. Recent figures show that this trend has not changed. In 1975, 60 percent of black wives with preschool children and 70 percent of those whose youngest child was 6 or older worked at some time during the year. The respective proportions of whites were 46 and 59 percent. Moreover, 46 percent of black mothers who worked at some time in 1975 held full-time jobs all year, compared with 32 percent of the whites.

Additionally, black wives contribute a greater proportion to family income than white wives do. In 1975, black wives’ earnings averaged 32 percent of family income—42 percent if they worked year-round, fulltime—compared with 26 percent for white wives. The difference is explained in part by the greater likelihood of black wives working year-round, full time. Also black husbands had much lower earnings than white husbands—a median income of $7,800 for black husbands vs. $11,600 for whites.

Families headed by women with no husband present represent a growing proportion of all American families, increasing by one-third since 1970—black female heads increased by 45 percent and white female heads increased by 29 percent. The proportion of black female-headed families has grown from 28 percent of all black families in 1967, to 36 percent in 1976. During that period, however, the comparable white female proportion was only 9 percent in 1967 and 11 percent in 1976.

What is more, the percentage of low-income, female-headed black families is on the increase. In 1967, 46 percent of all poor black families were female-headed, compared to 26 percent of all poor white families.

Yet by 1976 the proportion of low-income, female-headed black families had increased to 69.4 percent, while the comparable white figure had increased to 38.7 percent.

Black families with a female-head had a median income of $5,069 in 1976—$7,804 below that of male-headed black families. This represents an increasing gap since in 1974 the median income of female-headed black families was only $5,900 below the black male counterpart. Among whites, female-headed families also trail badly. Their median income was $8,226 in 1976, or $8,192 below that of male-headed white families. Still, white female-headed families maintained a median income that was $3,157 greater than that of their black-female headed counterparts. Furthermore, from 1975 to 1976, after correction for inflation, the median income of black female-headed families registered a decrease of 2.2 percent while the corresponding white figure increased by 1.7 percent.

Since 1970, a downward trend has developed with respect to the number of black families with both husband and wife present as a percent of all black families. Although the percentage of white husband-wife families barely changed between 1970 and 1976, black husband-wife families have registered a considerable decrease, dropping from 68.1 to 60 percent. And since husband-wife families commonly have a higher median income than most other types of families—because more frequently both husband and wife are employed—the percentage decrease in black husband-wife families could have a downward effect on black family income.

Thus the importance of the role played by black women in the overall advancement of the black population cannot be overstated. The data prove that how black women fare in the labor force has a major influence on how black families fare.

The South—where the majority of blacks reside—is still the primary location of black poverty. Approximately 53.7 percent of all blacks maintained residence in the South by 1976, as compared to 17.1 percent residing in the Northeast and 8.7 percent residing the West. Although the 1976 figure of 53.7 percent is well below the 60 percent of the black population that lived in the South in 1960, it represents an increase over the 1974 figure of 53 percent.

During the 1960s, 1.4 million blacks migrated to the North. However, from March 1970 to March 1974, according to the Bureau of the Census, only 184,000 blacks migrated to the North while 276,000 blacks migrated to the South. And by the end of this period, the South was left with a net increase in black population of 35,000, while the North had a net decrease of 158,000.

One explanation for the reverse migration is that many of the traditional types of employment found in the northern industrial centers were eliminated during the 1960s by technological change, and by the move of factories from urban centers to the suburbs. Since many of the blacks migrating from the southern farmlands were unskilled, their occupational mobility was severely limited, and they were left abandoned in the central cities. Yet, 57.1 percent of all blacks existing on incomes below the poverty-line still resided in the South in 1976, vs. 35.7 percent residing in the Northeast and North Central part of the United States. However, there appears to be a change occurring in the location of black poverty. The percent of poor blacks residing in the South has declined from the 1974 figure of 60.5 percent; and the percent of poor blacks residing in the Northeast and North Central part of the United States has increased from the 1974 figure of 33.3 percent.

The median income of black families residing in the South is lower than that of black families residing in the Northeast, but is growing at a much faster rate than that of northern black families. Over the period 1970 to 1974, the median income of southern black families increased by 28.8 percent, in contrast to only a 13 percent increast in the Northeast. And from 1975 to 1976, the median income of black families, after correction for inflation, declined in all regions except the South. In fact, black families residing in the South saw a growth in median income over that period of 4.7 percent, while declines were 8 percent in the Northeast and 4.3 percent in the West.

Still, in 1970, the median income of southern black families was $5,226, or 57 percent of southern white median income. But in the Northeast, the median black family income was $7,774, or 71 percent of the comparable white figure. However, the declining economy of recent years has resulted, for some regions, in a dramatic decrease in the ratio of black to white median incomes, and by 1976, black families residing in the Northeast recorded a median income of $9,727, only 61.5 percent of white median income.

The South, however, has been able not only to hold on to its gain, but what is more, the ratio of black to white median income actually increased slightly—moving to 59.2 percent of white median income, or $8,526, in 1976 vs. 57 percent, or $5,226 in 1970.

Increased educational attainment has played a major role in the economic advances obtained by young black families, and is perhaps the most impressive black gain of the 1960s. In 1966, the median years of school completed by blacks was 10.5 years, as compared to 12.3 years for whites. By 1976, however, that gap had almost closed—with 12.3 years of school completed by blacks vs. 12.6 years for whites.

Blacks have also made tremendous progress in college enrollment. Indeed, college enrollment has increased more rapidly for blacks than for whites. Between 1970 and 1976, black college enrollment increased 27.9 percent. By 1976, blacks accounted for 11 percent of all college enrollment, up from 7 percent in 1970.

College completion has also continued to increase among blacks, but the gap in the proportion of young blacks completing college and young whites completing college was larger in 1976 than in 1960. An approximate eight-point gap in 1960 had expanded to a 12.2 point gap in 1976. The percentage of blacks between the ages of 25 and 34 who completed 4 years of college or more was 4.1 percent in 1960, 6.1 percent in 1970, and 11.3 in 1976—far behind the white proportions of 11.9, 16.6 percent and 23.5 percent. Still, a great deal of the gain in young black family income can be attributed to the educational advances made by blacks.

Older blacks, however, have not been able to avail themselves of the educational opportunities made available to younger blacks. By 1969, 30.5 percent of all non-whites 65 years old and over were still illiterate. This represented more than twice the proportion of illiterate whites of the same age.

Thus, not surprisingly, many older blacks had extremely low incomes. In 1975, 35.5 percent of blacks age 55 to 64 years old had incomes below $2,500. This was true of 18.9 percent among whites the same age. The median income of blacks age 55 to 64 was $3,800, or 52.3 percent of the comparable white income. With blacks age 65 years old and over, 56.7 percent received incomes of less than $2,500. Their median income was $2,359, or 64.6 percent of whites with the same characteristics.

In 1976, nearly 35 percent of all blacks age 65 years and over were existing below the poverty threshold. Thus, whatever the gains of other age groups, poverty is rampant in the older black community.

Black union members fare considerably better than non-union blacks. Not only are their incomes much higher, but within the ranks of union members, the income gap between black and white is less than among non-union workers. Additionally, a research paper prepared for the Industrial Relations Research Association shows that blacks in the unionized, middle-aged blue-collar category are less likely to experience unemployment than their non-union counterparts.

In May 1974, the median earnings for all full-time black union workers were $169 a week, 82 percent of the median for full-time white union workers. For non-union black workers, the median weekly earnings were $124, or 76.5 percent of the comparable white income. Among black women union members, the gap was even smaller, with their median weekly earnings of $141 representing 96.6 percent of white female union income. And their median weekly earnings were 28.2 percent higher than the $110 median for non-union black females.

Black men are part of a similar phenomenon. Black males who were full-time workers and union members had median weekly earnings of $183, or 83.6 percent of the comparable white figure. Non-union black male workers had a median of $141, or 70.2 percent of the median of their non-union white counterparts. For black male union members, their earnings were 29.8 percent greater than their non-union counterparts.

During the 1960s, progress was made toward eliminating overt job discrimination, but the rights alone could not take care of the entire task. A black person gains little in the right to a job if jobs do not exist. Further, the right to a job also needs to be backed up with the training and skills to perform the duties.

An expanding and healthy economy that was providing jobs, training and educational opportunities gave meaning to the social legislation of the 1960s. The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 provide examples of the types of programs that were initiated during the 1960s.

Only full employment can make it possible for blacks to attain work—experience and seniority in better jobs, and thus begin to participate fully in the mainstream of the American economy.

Since blacks have suffered the most from the mismanagement and social neglect that has characterized the nation’s economic policies since 1969, they also have the biggest stake in programs that will transform the present weak and ailing economy into a healthy, full employment economy. Only then will blacks be afforded the opportunity of achieving their full potential.

AFL-CIO American Federationist (January, 1978):1–8.

6. LAST HIRED, AND USUALLY THE FIRST LET GO

By Charlayne Hunter

Content removed at rightsholder’s request.

The New York Times, January 29, 1975.

7. BLACK MANPOWER PRIORITIES: PLANNING NEW DIRECTIONS

By Walter W. Stafford and Lewis J. Carter, III

Content removed at rightsholder’s request.

The Crisis, 85 (December, 1978).

8. BLACK WORKERS EXPOSE KAISER RACISM

By Mike Giocondo

Content removed at rightsholder’s request.

Daily World, June 2, 1979.

9. WEBER CASE HITS UNIONS, MINORITIES

GRAMERCY, La.—This community is a part of the most industrialized area of the “New South.” About 30 miles up river from the port of New Orleans (second only to New York City in this country), is part of the complex of grain and oil docking facilities, light industry, and commerce that abutt the Mississippi River.

This is the area chosen to launch the “Weber Case,” a major attack against the labor and civil rights movements. It is the site of a Kaiser Aluminum Company plant where Brian Weber, a white worker, filed the “reverse discrimination” case which has now reached the Supreme Court. If Weber wins affirmative action in industry will be set back by about 30 years.

The Weber-Kaiser case began back in 1974 when an apprentice training program was negotiated between the company and the United Steel Workers of America. Prior to that time Kaiser refused to upgrade its employees, Black or white, but hired skilled workers at the gate.

When the new training program was instituted it followed the example of the Basic Steel Consent Decree in that it set up procedures to guarantee that minority workers would at last have a chance to enter the skilled trades on a one-to-one ratio to make up for past exclusion.

Program Stopped

Weber filed suit when he was passed over in the first selections (he would have been next in line and would now have finished his training). As a result of his suit the apprenticeship program was halted and Kaiser went back to the old system of hiring outsiders.

“This case is holding back a whole lot of people, both Black and white,” says Charles Pittman, a leader of rank and file workers in the plant. “We can lose all the gains we have won over the years since I started working here.”

Lionel Turner expressed surprise that Weber had sued the union as well as the company. “It isn’t right to be an officer of the union and then sue it like that,” he felt.

Kernell Goudia, a Black worker in a skilled job who credits the affirmative action program with getting him a better deal, defended the union program. “A lot of people saw the need to have minorities in the crafts. None of us had experience, so how could we get into the training program otherwise? It would have been 10 to 15 years before we got in. We didn’t have the damn seniority.”

Women were part of the agreement too, but it didn’t last long enough to get to them.

The Brian Weber case has become a rallying point for the anti-labor and racist forces throughout the country. A batch of “friend of the court” briefs have been entered by right-wing foundations. The traditional enemies of the labor and civil rights movements – the press and radio, big industry, and of course, the right wing organizations – have either distorted or buried the stories about it.

But the labor movement is becoming more and more aware of the inherent dangers of the Weber position. The AFL-CIO recently filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court and other unions are in the process of doing so. Rank and file groups, including National Steelworkers Rank and File Committee, plan to do so.

Our own union, USWA, has had a mixed reaction to the suit. As a defendant along with Kaiser the union opposed Weber. But it did not bring in testimony necessary to the case - that there had been prior discrimination at Kaiser, fearing that it would throw itself open to suit. It thereby let Weber win.

It is astonishing to note that up to this point no Black worker or organization has had any testimony in this case!

Lynch Lending Fight

Since the acceptance of the case by the Supreme Court USWA has taken a better stance. Vice President Leon Lynch has been going around the country (where he can be invited by the district directors) rallying the members of the union to express opposition to the appeals court decision in favor of Weber. He was the featured speaker at a civil rights conference called by District 31.

The rank and file must continue to press for more support of the USWA fight. We need more district meetings. We need resolutions and motions in the local unions. We need invitations extended to Brother Lynch. We need to create a climate of rejection of “reverse discrimination.”

Labor Today, the rank and file paper, is sponsoring a conference in March to rally support (write Labor Today Associates, 343 S. Dearborn, Room 600, Chicago, IL 60604 for more information).

This is an important fight against the attack on the right of all unions to bargain collectively.

The resolution below was adopted unanimously by USWA Local 65, an 8,000 member local at U.S. Steel in Chicago. Similar resolutions have been passed by other major locals; such as 1010 (18,000 members), 1014 (14,000 members) and 1104 (7,500 members).

We strongly urge that you help such a resolution adopted in your local. Let us know if you do so we can help get the word out.

WHEREAS; The recent 19th Constitutional Convention of the USWA adopted a Civil Rights Resolution which states: “Employer sponsored right-wing ‘Legal Foundations’ and others have challenged our Union’s right to negotiate fair and even handed affirmative action programs such as The Steel Industry Consent Decree and comparable programs in other industries, and our Union has vigorously resisted these challenges;” And

WHEREAS; The court suit of Brian Weber in challenging the Affirmative Action Program of our Union at the Kaiser Aluminum Plant in Gramercy, La., strikes at the heart of our unity of our Union as well as undermining all agreements reached between the USWA and the steel companies; And

WHEREAS; Affirmative action programs such as the one at Kaiser are a small step towards correcting the many years of discriminatory hiring and promotional practices of the steel industry;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED; That Local reaffirms its support of Affirmative Action Programs with quotas to Guarantee Job Equality for minorities and women;

AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED; That we support our International Union in its action to alert our Union Membership and the Labor Movement to the threat to all working people posed by the Weber case now before the U.S. Supreme Court;

AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED; That copies of this resolution be sent to the press, the U.S. Supreme Court, and to our International Officers in Pittsburgh.

(Willie Hill, Recording Secretary & John Chico, President of Local 65).

National Steelworkers Rank and File Committee Report (1979?). Mimeograph flier in possession of editors.

10. HIGH COURT DECISION BACKS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON JOBS

By David L. Perlman

Labor Hails Ruling As ‘Total Victory’

The Supreme Court upheld a voluntary affirmative action agreement negotiated by the Steelworkers and agreed with the AFL-CIO that a union and an employer can set up a plan to overcome racial imbalance even if neither party has been guilty of past discrimination.

“We are delighted with the decision,” AFL-CIO President George Meany said. It allows unions and employers to use the collective bargaining process to speed up “elimination of the vestiges of centuries of racial injustice.”

The 5-2 decision, rejecting a “reverse discrimination” charge brought by a white worker at a Kaiser Aluminum plant in Louisiana, was hailed as “a total victory” by the Steelworkers.

It validates similar affirmative action training agreements with other aluminum producers and the major steel and container companies, the union said, and will encourage voluntary action elsewhere.

The national agreement with Kaiser that was tested in the Supreme Court sought to remedy a virtual absence of blacks in skilled craft jobs at a number of plants. The imbalance reflected the lack of opportunities for minorities in the communities and not illegal discrimination at the hiring gate, which could have been corrected by a court order.

At the bargaining table, the union and the company agreed to set up in-plant training programs that would give both black and white production workers an opportunity to acquire higher-paid skills.

The agreement set aside 50 percent of the training slots for underrepresented minority workers until their ratio in skilled jobs matched their proportion in the community.

Once in the program, all trainees had to meet the same rigorous standards that require an average of three years of on-the-job training, supplemented by classroom instruction and home study.

A divided federal appellate court agreed with the reverse discrimination charge of a white worker, Brian F. Weber, who didn’t have the seniority for one of the training slots open to white workers but had longer service than several black workers accepted for the program.

The Steelworkers and the AFL-CIO contended in a joint brief to the Supreme Court and in oral argument that the imbalance in skilled jobs was undesirable and voluntary efforts to remedy it should not be blocked by a narrow reading of the Civil Rights Act that distorts the law’s intent.

While the path it took may not have been required by law, the union said, it was certainly not prohibited by law. And the fact remains that the affirmative action program “created opportunities for both black and white USWA members which neither would have enjoyed otherwise.”

Justice William Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court majority, found as the AFL-CIO had urged that Congress had “left employers and unions in the private sector free to take . . . race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.”¹⁰

Since the agreement does not involve state action and was adopted voluntarily, he said, the only issue before the court was whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act—the fair employment provision—forbids such a plan.

It does not, the court majority concluded, and “it would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a nation’s concern over centuries of racial injustice” were used to prevent voluntary, private measures to overcome inequities.

Brennan cautioned against an assumption that all affirmative action plans would be upheld by the court, and his decision declined to “define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans.”

But he did give a strong indication of the criteria the Supreme Court would apply by noting that the purpose of the Kaiser plan “mirrors” the intent of the Civil Rights Act, “to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”

Furthermore, the program “does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees” and “does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hires.”

It provides an opportunity for whites as well as blacks, and its racial quota is a temporary measure to be dropped after the racial imbalance has been eliminated.

Dissenting from the opinion were Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist, who contended that the court majority was substituting its own views of desirable social conduct for the specific language of the law. Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who has been ill, and John Paul Stevens did not participate in the case.¹¹

Meany said the reasoning of the Supreme Court majority exactly paralleled the AFL-CIO understanding of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.¹²

He found the decision “a victory for all who, like the AFL-CIO, believe in racial justice and who are committed to private voluntary action to end discrimination.”

Leon Lynch, Steelworkers vice president for human affairs, expressed appreciation to all of the organizations that backed the union’s position in the case and said the decision will enable unions and employers to adopt similar programs “without having to worry about reverse discrimination suits.”

The Supreme Court decision makes a clear distinction between the Weber case, involving a voluntary affirmative action agreement in the private sector, and the earlier Bakke case in which the court overturned a governmental quota system involving admission to a state medical school.¹³

While the AFL-CIO did not take a position on the Bakke case, an Executive Council statement following the Supreme Court decision stressed the federation’s continuing commitment to affirmative action.

That council statement, which set the stage for the AFL-CIO to join the Steelworkers in defending the negotiated job training program, urged “aggressive, positive efforts to integrate, instead of mere passive agreement not to discriminate.”

AFL-CIO News, June 30, 1979.

11. A KIND OF ‘TOLERANCE’

By Tom Wicker

Content removed at rightsholder’s request.

New York Times, July 2, 1979.

12. COURT OVERSTEPS BOUNDS

By George F. Will

Content removed at rightsholder’s request.

The New York Times, July 2, 1979.

13. VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION MEETS GOALS OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

The following is excerpted from the majority opinion by U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan in the Weber case upholding a voluntary affirmative action agreement negotiated by the Steelworkers and Kaiser Aluminum.

Congress’s primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with “the plight of the Negro in our economy.” (Remarks-of Sen. Humphrey). Before 1964, blacks were largely relegated to “unskilled and semiskilled jobs.” Because of automation the number of such jobs was rapidly decreasing. As a consequence “the relative position of the Negro worker (was) steadily worsening. In 1947 the nonwhite unemployment rate was only 64 percent higher than the white rate; in 1962 it was 124 percent higher.” Congress considered this a serious social problem.

Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act—the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society—could not be achieved unless this trend were reversed. And Congress recognized that that would not be possible unless blacks were able to secure jobs “which have a future.”

Accordingly, it was clear to Congress that “the crux of the problem (was) to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them,” and it was to this problem that Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination in employment was primarily addressed.

It plainly appears from the House Report accompanying the Civil Rights Act that Congress did not intend wholly to prohibit private and voluntary affirmative action efforts as one method of solving this problem.

Given this legislative history, we cannot agree with the respondent that Congress intended to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve.

The very statutory words intended as a spur or catalyst to cause “employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country’s history,” Albemarle v. Moody, cannot be interpreted as an absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action efforts to hasten the elimination of such vestiges.

It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a nation’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had “been excluded from the American dream for so long,” constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.

We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans. It suffices to hold that the challenged Kaiser-USWA affirmative action plan falls on the permissible side of the line. The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute. Both were designed to break down the patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. Both were structured to “open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them.”

At the same time the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees. The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hires. Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees; half of those trained in the program will be white.

Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Preferential selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled craft workers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.

We conclude, therefore, that the adoption of the Kaiser-USWA plan for the Gramercy plant falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.

AFL-CIO News, July 7, 1979.

14. THE WEBER DECISION

By James Johnson

The recent decision of the Supreme Court to turn back the challenge of Brian Weber to affirmative action represented a major victory for Black people, the labor movement and indeed all progressive-minded individuals in this land.

Brian Weber, a white factory worker, contended in his suit that the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation and the United Steelworkers of American illegally discriminated against whites when they set up an on-the-job craft-training program at a Gramercy, La., plant that reversed half of its slots for minority workers. The program was initiated to correct an imbalance that saw only 1.8% of skilled jobs going to Afro-Americans in a city whose population is 40% Black.

Justice William Brennan, writing for the 5 to 2 majority, stated:

“It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a nation’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had been excluded from the American dream for so long constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”

The court’s decision dealt a major blow to racism, those who profit from it, and the main ideological weapon used against affirmative action programs, the myth of reverse discrimination.

The ruling provided clear affirmation of the immense power of public opinion, for the decision was not arrived at in the court’s chambers alone. The court was forced to rule against Weber because hundreds of thousands of Americans, recognizing Weber’s challenge as a threat to the working class as a whole, marched, rallied, lobbied and wrote thousands of letters in support of affirmative action.

Weber’s racist challenge evoked a united response and fightback from the Black community, which spearheaded the struggle. There were other forces though which helped to make victory possible. Trade unionists throughout the land forced their leadership to take a forthright position against the Weber challenge. Consequently, the mighty power of labor which includes a disproportionately large percentage of Black workers in the basic industries, united with the Black liberation movement into a coalition which recalled the glorious days of the CIO and the civil rights movement when other major victories were won.

The women’s role, especially in the trade union movement, contributed significantly to the victory. This unity of forces foreshadows the type of coalition that must be built if affirmative action and other people’s victories are to be extended.

The victory, however, is not complete. The decision should be viewed as a door opener for more vigorous action. The court’s decision leaves open the possibility that other affirmative action plans may be impermissible. It also failed to define what constitutes “traditional patterns of segregation.”

The victory will not be complete until affirmative action moves from the voluntary to compulsory stage. Compulsory affirmative action must begin with all public sector jobs. Nor should the federal government be permitted to provide contracts to any employer who does not have the enforceable affirmative action program.

In 1952, Charles E. Wilson, the president of General Motors, expressed the sentiments of all monopolists and other reactionaries when he stated, “What’s good for General Motors is good for the country.” We must untiringly explain the relation of Black freedom to progress and democracy by proclaiming loud and clear, “What’s good for Black folks is good for all the exploited and oppressed in this country!”

Black Liberation Journal, 3 (Summer, 1979):6–7.

15. APPEAL OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES RINGS HOLLOW TO WORKERS, POOR

By Norman Hill

In mid-December, newspapers devoted front-page coverage to a conference of blacks in San Francisco. However, what made the conference noteworthy was not its size—there were about 100 participants—nor the range of the organizations which were represented—few of the participants could be said to represent significant black constituencies. What was special about the meeting, what made it news, was the fact that it was a gathering of black conservatives.

Of equal importance was the fact that the conference was sponsored by a conservative foundation which Ronald Reagan helped found in the early 1970s. In 1980 Ronald Reagan failed to attract a significant portion of the black vote. The overwhelming majority of black community and political leaders endorsed President Carter in his unsuccessful bid for re-election. Yet despite little black enthusiasm for Ronald Reagan, a number of black intellectuals and professionals have begun to embrace Reagan’s conservative economic positions.

To some extent there is evidence to suggest that there is a small constituency for conservative political ideas in the black community. However, despite the growth of a black upper-middle class of professionals and businessmen who might be drawn to the conservative siren song of tax cuts, the overwhelming majority of blacks are workers and the poor. For them the appeal of black conservatism will right hollow, and for this reason one can confidently predict that blacks will continue to be a solid voting block which backs pro-labor candidates who support policies dedicated to a more equitable distribution of wealth.

Nonetheless, the two-day conference in San Francisco indicates that a debate will have to begin for the first time within the black community on political options. This debate, in my view, will be a healthy one insofar as it helps sharpen the arguments of black liberals and moderates.

Who, then, are the black conservatives and who do they stand for? The two leading prononents of black conservatism are Prof. Thomas Sowell, an economist from the Hoover Institution, and Prof. Walter Williams of Temple University in Philadelphia. Both are strong opponents of organized labor, which they claim limits opportunities for blacks. Their view, however, flies in the face of the evidence that organized labor, more than any other institution in American life, has opened its doors to increased black participation. Indeed, today, over 30 percent of black workers are union members. Rather than adopting a policy of exclusion, the labor movement has sought better working conditions for all its workers, irrespective of race. And, most importantly, unions effectively represent their members, who on the average receive $2,000 a year more than non-union workers and have better health and retirement benefits.

A second favorite target of Sowell and Williams is the minimum wage. They argue that the minimum wage is responsible for the inordinately high rate of black teenage unemployment and propose that it be eliminated entirely. At the least, they feel, a sub-minimum wage should be established for teenagers. Their prescription for black teenage unemployment would be worse than the disease it is meant to cure. For a teenage sub-minimum wage would displace unskilled adult workers, a large proportion of whom are blacks with family obligations.

Under conditions of full employment, where every adult is guaranteed a job, the implementation of the youth sub-minimum wage would be of less serious consequence. Under conditions where unemployment stands at nearly 8 percent nation-wide and with figures several percentage points higher among blacks, the implementation of a youth sub-minimum wage would produce disastrous consequences for adult black unskilled workers.

Yet despite the fact that the views of Sowell and Williams are not in the interests of most blacks, the black conservatives cannot be dismissed as mere oddities. They are reflective of the sense of frustration with the state of the economy most blacks have felt in the last decade. In this way they mirror the dissatisfaction which moved many Americans to vote for Ronald Reagan.

If the conservative policies which Walter Williams and Thomas Sowell espouse are implemented by the new Administration, blacks and all working Americans will be able to judge the merits of the conservative approach. If history is to serve as any guide, these policies will be found wanting and will be repudiated in future elections.

And within the black community, those who have consistently favored progressive social programs and who have actively participated in the labor movement should welcome the opportunity to challenge the views of the black conservatives. Complacency can hardly be characterized as indicative of leadership. And the coming Reagan years give little reason for us to be complacent.

AFL-CIO News, February 7, 1981.

16. ADMINISTRATION POLICIES FAIL TO ADDRESS NEEDS OF BLACKS

By Norman Hill

In the six months he has been President, Ronald Reagan has failed to articulate anything approaching a coherent policy on matters of racial inequality and poverty. Aside from generalities concerning the need to combat discrimination and to bolster productivity, the Administration shows no sign of having given serious thought to the plight of what has come to be called the black underclass.¹⁸

This underclass has been a persistent fact in the life of American society for many decades, and its ranks continue to swell.

The typical Reagan Administration response to the problem of black poverty and unemployment has been to assert that only the private sector can resolve the problems faced by blacks and others who are poor. Help business and industry, the Reagan argument goes, and you will help poor blacks and all poor Americans improve their lot. However, a glance at the recent history of black unemployment and impoverishment gives little indication that the Reagan approach will work.

Since World War II, the rate of black unemployment has stood at roughly twice that of white unemployment. This ratio has remained constant in times of economic prosperity and through periods of economic decline, through periods of inflation and periods of price stability. No matter how the economy has been doing, blacks seem disproportionately to shoulder the burdens of unemployment.

What improvement has been made by blacks in the last 35 years can be attributed to increased education. Blacks who have received adequate training and education have made tremendous strides economically. Black women college graduates, for example, today earn slighly more than their white counterparts. But the Reagan Administration has implemented massive cuts in federal aid to education and has drastically cut funding for a number of training and employment programs which seek to prepare minorities and the poor for meaningful private sector employment—precisely the initiatives one would expect the President to support.

Of equal importance is the Reagan approach of “states’ rights.” The Administration is a vocal proponent of block grants and of giving increased power to the states. Yet it is precisely at the regional and state level that, for historical reasons, discrimination remains a significant problem. For example, due to a variety of complex factors, black workers in the South earn 78 percent of the income of white Southerners. Throughout the rest of the country, however, the earnings of black and white workers are nearly identical.

An approach that puts emphasis on “states’ rights” will prove unable to diminish the discrepancy between the earnings of Southern whites and blacks. Federal action must be a component in diminishing these differences. And it is precisely such federal intervention that President Reagan appears to oppose.

Recently, the Gallup Organization conducted a poll of the views of the black population. The results are both interesting and ominous, for they indicate a deepening division between blacks and whites, in some measure as a direct consequence of the policies of the Reagan Administration.

The Gallup study found that while 55 percent of whites were optimistic about what 1981 would bring to them personally, only 18 percent of blacks expected a better year and 48 percent expected things would be worse.

Similarly, in February a Newsweek magazine poll found that 52 percent of blacks expected things would get worse for them during Reagan’s presidency and only 8 percent felt things would improve. In April, while President Reagan enjoyed a 74 percent approval rating among whites, only 25 percent of blacks approved of the President’s performance.

In the late ’60s and early ’70s, when blacks were experiencing some social advancement, polls registered a significant sense of progress. In 1969, for example, 70 percent of blacks felt that the situation of blacks had improved during the previous five years. In 1981 only 30 percent felt this is true.

The Gallup survey reveals one very dangerous trend. Only the barest majority of blacks (51 percent) rejects violent protest as a means of accomplishing goals, and two-thirds of blacks agree that the only time the federal government really pays attention to blacks is when they resort to violence. This sense of frustration and rage must be confronted. Yet in the context of the Reagan Administration’s retreat from necessary social programs and in the Administration’s failure to confront the reality of racial inequality, there are the seeds of disaster.

Black Americans have viewed the Administration with skepticism since Ronald Reagan took his oath of office. Yet the President has made no serious effort to diminish this skepticism by developing a policy which addresses the specific needs and problems faced by blacks. Glib generalizations and assertions that the private sector will resolve the plight of the black poor do not constitute a coherent policy on black inequality. They constitute a serious failure of leadership.

In defending his economic policies, Ronald Reagan frequently asserts that “a rising tide lifts all boats.” He, however, appears to have forgotten that those who are without boats may very well drown.

AFL-CIO News, August 22, 1981.

17. PROGRESS OF BLACK AMERICANS REVERSED UNDER GOP POLICIES

By Gus Tyler

In Source, the official publication of the Republican National Committee, there appears an intriguing short piece under the title: “The Reagan Economic Program: An Agenda for All Americans.” The brief item makes it clear that “all Americans” very specifically includes “black Americans.”

Here is a word-for-word repetition of this most unusual story:

“Black unemployment declined from 10.7 percent to 6.4 percent during the ’60s, but increased from 6.4 percent to 11.3 percent during the ’70s.

“Black unemployment declined faster than white unemployment during the ’60s, but rose faster during the ’70s.

“Between 1959-59, a decade of growth and private prosperity, median black family income, in constant dollars, rose 6.4 percent—from $7,200 to more than $11,800.

“Yet, between 1969–79, the decade of public sector prosperity, real black median income declined by 3 percent.”

That’s the full account. It makes two points: first, that blacks did much better in the 1960s than in the 1970s; second, that jobs and income fell in the 1970s because of “public sector prosperity,” whatever that means.

Now let’s tap our memory banks. Who were the Presidents of the United States in the 1960s, when things were going better—jobs and income—for the blacks? For eight of the ten years, the Presidents were Democrats John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson.¹⁹

In the 1970s, Republican Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford were in the White House for seven of the 10 years. That decade of the ’70s included the deep recession year of 1974-75.²⁰

If any conclusion is to be drawn from the GOP figures, Democrats do better than Republicans for black America.

Putting parties aside, the ’60s were characterized by expansionist policies, a desire to grow. The ’70s were marked by restrictionist policies, a decision to create unemployment on the theory that, if people were out of work and could not buy, prices would not climb so rapidly.

As to that statement about “public sector prosperity,” the implication that government was spending too much in the ’70s seems strange since those years were dominated by Republican Presidents who were busy impounding funds and pinching pennies.

Actually, the government was tigtening up on spending in that decade. Federal employment was 4.19 percent of all wage and salaried people in 1960, but at the end of the ’70s was down to 3.16 percent. Government spending (purchases) fell from 10.60 percent of the gross national product in 1960 to 8.77 percent by the end of the 1970s.

This should not come as a surprise, of course, since all three Presidents in the ’70s—Nixon, Ford and Carter—believed that “cooling the economy,” including the public sector, was the way to check inflation. As we know, these painful policies did not hold the price line, but they did do much damage to America, including its minorities as Source, the voice of the GOP, so succinctly proves.²¹

AFL-CIO News, February 27, 1982.

18. WHERE REAGANOMICS HITS HARDEST: MINORITIES & WOMEN

You don’t have to be a statistician to figure it out. Just visit the unemployment lines in any racially mixed neighborhood and you’ll see a disproportionate number of blacks, Latinos, other minorities, and women. The last hired, they’re often the first fired during a recession or forced to hustle from one marginal job to another with long stretches in between.

While Reaganomics aids Big Business and the banks, working and middle-class Americans continue to suffer. What makes matters worse is that the American minorities are suffering even more. This country’s lopsided distribution of wealth has a flip side: the lopsided distribution of joblessness and poverty when hard times hit.

The statistics merely confirm what you can see with your own eyes. Reagan has wrung inflation out of the economy by pursuing a deliberate policy of industrial slowdown, disinvestment, and layoffs. Record post-World War II unemployment has thrown a devastating number of white males out of work in the last two years—but the impact on minorities has been doubly devastating. In February, when white joblessness stood at 9.2%, the unemployment rate for blacks and Latinos was 19.7% and 15.8%, respectively.

The greater job losses of blacks and Latinos stem from many causes—the “last-hired, first-fired” syndrome, racism (including lack of educational opportunity), and the disproportionate numbers of minority workers in marginal shops and hard-hit industries.

The auto industry demonstrates some of these factors. Of the 30 largest auto plant shutdowns since 1980, all but a handful have occurred in the frostbelt or on the two coasts where Latinos and blacks have paid heavily. Minorities constituted about 11.2% of all U.S. workers in 1978–79 but held exactly twice that percentage of auto jobs; the 1979–83 auto slump has hit them especially hard. Of 270,000 indefinite layoffs in auto, 100,000 are minorities and women.

Did Reagan, David Stockman, and other White House “supply-siders” deliberately set out to make minorities pay for their trickle-down experiment? Some of them may have done exactly that. The perpetuation of a distinct, highly visible underclass of unemployed and marginally employed minorities not only tends to undercut the solidarity of all American workers, but it forces down the real wages of white workers as well. These facts are not lost on Big Business strategists.²²

But there are other supply-siders—and Reagan is probably one of them—who honestly believe their massive cutbacks have been even-handed. “The Administration has reaffirmed the original vision which lies at the heart of our national commitment: an America that is color-blind,” declares a recent White House defense of the Fiscal 1984 budget. Yet this belief is a good part of the problem, for the truth is that America is still more color-bound than color-blind. Blacks, Latinos, women and other minorities were never in as good a position to survive the budget cuts.

Take housing. Nearly a quarter of all black households are so poor that they have relied, until now, on some degree of federal aid for shelter. Latinos have increasingly found themselves in the same predicament. Thus, when Reagan slashed federal housing subsidies by $20.4 billion and upped the rent that poor tenants pay, he destroyed far more minority households, proportionately, than white ones.

What about Reagan’s 1981 tax cuts for homeowners? Not only did they continue the old mortgage interest deduction, but they created new tax subsidies for “gentrification” (well-to-do people moving into once-poor neighborhoods), the sale of homes by people 55 or older, and real estate speculators, while ignoring the real housing needs of minorities.

Blacks, Latinos, and other minorities were simply not as well-positioned as whites to pluck these plums. About 40% of all black families and 33% of all Latino families can be found in the bottom-fifth of all U.S. population when the measure is income; the top 50%, however, is 95% white. It is no surprise that while two-thirds of all white households own their own homes, only about two-fifths of all blacks and Latinos do.

The same inequalities mark the Administration’s attack on nutrition, child welfare, job training, and health programs. When Reagan chopped $3.3 billion from the food stamp program in 1981–82, he drove a million people off the rolls. Another six million—in particular the working poor—had their food stamp allotments cut. Since 3 out of every 10 black families depended on food stamps for an adequate diet at the time of the cuts, blacks suffered disproportionately. So did Latinos.

Last year a million children from low-income families dropped out of the federal school lunch program; they couldn’t pay the higher prices schools charged after Reagan cut back the federal contribution. We have already seen how blacks, Latinos, and other minorities are clustered in the low-income brackets. More of their children had to stop eating lunches, proportinately, than children from white families.

Black families represented 10% of the U.S. population but make up 30% of all the families living in poverty. Twice as many blacks and Latinos are unemployed, proportionately, as whites. Two-fifths of the families receiving Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits in 1981 were blacks.

Thus, when Reagan cut $1.5 billion from AFDC in Fiscal 1982–83, $1.7 billion from Medicaid, and $4.4 billion from job retraining programs, his budget axe was not “color-blind” but fell hardest, and proportionately most often, on black and brown necks.

The attack which Reaganomics has launched on the American working class has been so prolonged and severe that it has hurt the white majority more than any economic program since President Hoover’s (1928–32). If proportionately the greatest impact has been on blacks, Latinos, and other minorities, numerically the greatest impact has been on whites. The basis for a multiracial, multi-ethnic alliance of working people against Reaganomics is firmly in place.²³

UAW Solidarity, 26, (April, 1983):16–17.