New Islamist Movements, Justice, and Democracy
It is said that Allah allows the just state to remain even if it is led by unbelievers, but Allah will not allow the oppressive state to remain even if it is led by Muslims. And it is said that the world will endure with justice and unbelief, but it will not endure with oppression and Islam.
—IBN TAYMIYYA (Daily Hadith Online)
As the sun was setting, several people rushed to lay down the newspapers and plastic covers on the street. Others were carrying the meals, plates, plastic cups, and utensils and stacking them next to the beverages on the sidewalk. The crowd included university students, volunteers, observers, residents, and refugees from Syria and Africa gathered in this narrow street of Istanbul’s poverty-stricken Tarlabaşı neighborhood1 to break their fast (iftar) during Ramadan. “We have been organizing these meals for several years now. It is our way of helping the poor, the immigrants, and anyone in need. Ramadan is about blessing, humility, and human dignity, not about wasteful meals and vanity,” said one of the organizers. He talked about what came to be known as earth meals (yeryüzü sofraları) organized by the new Islamist movements such as the Labor and Justice Platform and Anticapitalist Muslims since 2011 to protest the lavish lifestyle, corruption, and neoliberal policies of the ruling AKP in Turkey.
This iftar gathering in Tarlabaşı was an impressive scene of solidarity and benevolence. Its setting was a narrow and impoverished street next to Taksim, one of the most affluent areas and the center of Istanbul. The contrast between the communitarian and egalitarian spirit of this gathering was in stark contrast to another Ramadan dinner, the mayor’s iftar at the center of the Taksim Square, only a couple blocks away from the first scene in Tarlabaşı. The Taksim Square dinner was sponsored by prominent businessmen, presumably devout and close to AKP circles. The guests were separated from other people in the square who were waiting in line to receive a free boxed dinner. The latter group was not invited to the tables, nor were they engaging in conversations with the guests. A new generation of Islamist social activists representing an egalitarian religious outlook organized the Ramadan dinner in Tarlabaşı. The other gathering, the Taksim dinner, reflected the changing political Islamist vision that has increasingly become elitist and hierarchical and has dominated the Turkish social and political scene in the new millennium under the AKP rule. The contrast in these iftar gatherings represents two competing outlooks, both rooted in the same religion and prioritizing justice as Islam’s core value. The outlook associated with the Tarlabaşı gathering is representative of a new brand of Islamism, significantly different than the Islamism associated with the AKP.
The disillusionment of some Islamists with AKP’s policies after its rise to power in 2002 was perhaps one of the main catalysts for the social justice–oriented civic activism of the new genre of Islamic groups.2 Inspired by both leftist and Islamist ideologies, these groups represent a new brand of Islamic identity emphasizing egalitarian, pluralist, and social justice oriented views.3 They resemble the horizontally organized new social movements that form counterhegemonic discourses in the public sphere,4 especially using their Islamic identity.5 One common element uniting these new groups is their quest for justice and the resulting social activism to help the most disadvantaged groups. From homeless adults to children living in the streets, the immigrants to the unemployed, the new Islamic social activism was an everyday protest movement empowering those confined to marginal urban spaces and left out of the “hegemonic charity structures.”6 The glue that held these groups and their socially conscious small charity activities together was their profound belief in Islamic justice. Specifically, they used justice as a discourse and engaged in social justice activism in accordance with their alternative Islamic political vision.
What do social activists mean when they say justice? Does one’s conception of justice influence her political attitudes? Do perceptions of justice, for instance, shape one’s attitudes toward democracy? At first sight, the answers to these questions might seem too evident, especially given the central role of justice in Islam’s ethicopolitical system. However, a closer look reveals that the picture is much more complicated than it initially appears. There is no uniform path in the Islamist mindset leading from religion to justice and from justice to democratic orientations. While the quest for justice has been at the center of political debates concerning legitimacy, obedience, and rebellion against tyrants over many centuries, the mechanisms linking conceptions of justice to political attitudes and behaviors, particularly those related to democracy, are not always clear.
Previous chapters examined the historical and ideological underpinnings of Islamic conceptions of justice and their relation to political preferences. They examined the mechanisms linking Islamic conceptions of justice to perceptions of legitimacy, political obedience, and social welfare. This chapter builds on this analysis to explain the cognitive pathways linking perceptions of justice to support for democracy and authoritarianism. It aims to explore how religious individuals problematize justice to inform their political preferences. The analysis provides a fine-grained assessment of attitudes about justice and democracy using two dozen in-depth interviews conducted with the members of new Islamist movements in Turkey in 2017 and 2019. The subsequent chapters further explore the insights from this analysis by conducting statistical tests of public opinion surveys.
New Islamist Movements in Turkey
Turkey’s new Islamist movements, ironically, teamed up with the opposition groups in the Gezi protests against a political party with Islamist credentials. Against the realist pursuit of power by the ruling Islamists at the expense of ethical principles, “seeking justice” has been the central notion motivating these movements before and after these protests.7 These protests were the most significant demonstrations against the AKP government unfolding in a small park in Taksim Square in 2013. The demonstrators were from different civil organizations and they represented a broad ideological spectrum. Protesters came together to oppose an urban development plan involving one of the few parks in central Istanbul.
The Islamist Labor and Justice Platform was one of the first groups to come forward by signing a declaration supporting these protests. In this declaration, the group frequently referenced Islamic justice as a panacea against the unjust and corrupt government.8 Arguably, this oppositional stance is the new incarnation of the everlasting cleavage in Islamic history9 between ethically minded pious individuals and those who seek power at the expense of religious principles. The group’s manifesto and the Gezi declaration highlight justice, morality, and human dignity, making them the centerpiece of their criticism of the AKP government. Islamist writers raised a similar criticism about the consequences of neoliberal economic policies in the post-2000 period, as discussed before.
The Labor and Justice Platform was not the only group to come forward during the protests. The Anticapitalist Muslims movement (Antikapitalist Müslümanlar) was another religious group participating in demonstrations. Inspired by the writings of influential Islamist intellectual İhsan Eliaçık, who has written extensively about social justice and the political role of justice in an Islamic government,10 the members of the Anticapitalist Muslims strongly opposed the AKP government. Gezi provided an opportunity for the group members to voice their concerns about such issues as justice, oppression, and workers’ rights. The group’s ideology is reminiscent of a leftist critique of the AKP government, viewed as corrupt and authoritarian. Just like the Labor and Justice Platform, Anticapitalist Muslims strongly emphasized justice as a core value of Islam and viewed its implementation as a panacea against the “unjust rule” of the “conservative Islamists.” The doyen of the group, Eliaçık stated that the protesters’ real fight is for social justice and that “the young people who were with us on the square were rebelling against authoritarianism, totalitarianism and the patriarchy.”11
These new Islamist movements represent one side of a split between Islamism and Muslimism, as defined by prominent Islamist intellectual Akif Emre.12 According to Emre, Islamism is a movement, an ideology claiming to provide new solutions and projects, whereas Muslimism is a pragmatist political view. Muslimists aim to win power and use religion as an element of political strategy. Islamists, on the other hand, focus on apolitical vision grounded in Islamic ethics. Yenigun finds a family resemblance between Emre’s classification and the historical cleavage between ethicalists (i.e., Islamists) seeking justice and realists (Muslimists) striving to maintain political power.13 This cleavage is a contemporary manifestation of rival ideologies of legitimacy going back to the distinction between the piety-minded opposition and proponents of benevolent absolutism in early Islamic empires, as described by Hodgson.14 One can argue that AKP’s renunciation of Islamism to consolidate its power and the party’s turn to the so-called conservative democracy as a model are the most visible manifestations of this cleavage. Yenigun succinctly summarizes this trend by arguing that “a new generation of Islamist youth, who was already disgruntled over the victims of the AKP’s neoliberal development model as well as rampant corruption and nepotism within its ranks, had emerged. Banding together under new youth organizations with a particular focus on social justice issues, they began speaking up against the AKP.”15
As discussed above, these groups included the Labor and Justice Platform, the Anticapitalist Muslims, some branches of the Islamist human rights organization such as the Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (Mazlumder), Islamic feminist group “Muslims’ Initiative against the Violence toward Women,” and some other smaller groups. Gezi protests served as a catalyst that increased the activities and awareness of these groups. They reached out to secular, liberal, and leftist groups to convey their support for the protests. Labor and Justice Platform’s declaration proved to be highly controversial from the perspective of the AKP leaders and traditional religious elites. Groups like “Muslims’ Initiative against the Violence toward Women” resolutely challenged AKP’s attempts to label Gezi as an anti-Islamic protest.16
Some of these groups were active long before Gezi. Social justice has been the main motto of these groups who criticized the developmental model of AKP for creating new inequalities and exploiting the working class. For example, Mazlumder organized an activity in Istanbul’s Fatih Mosque to demand justice for Uludere victims.17 The Labor and Justice Platform organized Ramadan dinners in front of five-star hotels to protest the lavish lifestyle among the AKP rank-and-file members since 2002.18 Later, Anticapitalist Muslims organized street iftars calling for social justice policies. They criticized the ruling party’s corrupt policies and exploitation of Islam. Another group, an intellectual brand of the new Islamist youth, gathered around the Istanbul Think House (İstanbul Düşünce Evi-İDE) voicing similar ideas. Members of these groups were interconnected. They engaged in social justice activism by helping homeless children, women, the poor, and immigrants.
Overall, the new Islamist movements opposed the religious conservative AKP government. They are critical of AKP policies, which they view as unjust, corrupt, and authoritarian. They have a socially conscious agenda resulting in charity activities geared toward bringing justice to the most marginalized segments of Turkish society. Members of these groups actively engage in labor unions, workers’ mobilization campaigns, and anticapitalism protests. Given their social justice focus, how do members of these groups view democracy? This chapter provides an analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with the members of these groups to answer this question.
The Interviews
In-depth interviews with the members of new Islamist groups and other religious youth were conducted in Istanbul during the summers of 2017 and 2019.19 I made the initial contacts before my travel and looked for opportunities for additional interviews during my stay. The interviews were semistructured and lasted between thirty-five minutes and one hour. I recorded the conversations when permitted to by participants and also took notes during the interviews.20 These interviews provide a unique opportunity for understanding the cognitive mechanisms linking justice to support for democracy among the devout individuals. Most interviewees were members of new Islamist movements, including Labor and Justice Platform, Anticapitalist Muslims, and Islamic feminist groups. Other interviewees (students, part-time workers, professionals) were highly devout, but they were not affiliated with any of these groups. I also participated in several street iftars in Tarlabaşı and closely observed the interactions at these events.
A preliminary look at these interviews reveals that members of these groups define justice in broader terms and link these conceptions to their political preferences. The interviews also show that religion plays a significant role in the development of different conceptions of justice. Most interviews point to a healthy dose of skepticism about the existing political system. The chapter continues by presenting the deeper insights from these interviews in two sections. First, the analysis discusses interviewees’ perceptions and interpretations of Islamic justice conception. Second, the discussion elaborates on attitudes to explain the synergies between justice values and support for different regime types (e.g., Islamic state, Muslim democracy, and authoritarian systems). This analysis helps us understand specific cognitive mechanisms linking justice orientations to support for democracy. The next two chapters build on these insights to conduct statistical tests of this relationship using the survey data collected in the Muslim world.
Conceptions of Justice
The interviews demonstrate that the Islamist youth define justice with a broad set of concepts, including equality, rights, entitlement, economic distribution, and oppression.21 Conceptions of justice are at the center of a crowded semantic field among the religious youth, as has been the case in the writings of Islamist intellectuals as demonstrated in Chapter 5. Of these concepts, equality appears to be an essential dimension of conceptions of justice. However, this egalitarian outlook is rarely related to economic distribution or financial aspects of social justice as in the Western tradition.22 For example, Cüneyt, a twenty-five-year-old doctor, defines justice as “equality in opportunity and equality in legal matters,” whereas Türkan, a thirty-four-year-old female dorm manager, states that justice is “equality in having the right to live, or in equal distribution. It is everyone’s right to use the opportunities, regardless of their race, ethnic origin, or religion.”
Those affiliated with the new Islamist movements also recognize equality as a central element of justice, but they define it using such notions as deserved reward or punishment (desert), right, entitlement, and conscience. The interviewees from the Islamist groups also explicitly relates justice to political reality and power relations. One interviewee’s response succinctly captures this perspective: “Justice (adalet) shares the same root with the word equivalent (muadil). It means equivalent and maybe even equality. We separate equality and justice, but in fact, these are not different from each other. Justice is about the perception that all human beings are equal and at the same level without one trying to establish authority or sovereignty over the others by despotic means” (Kemal). Similarly, Murat (graduate student) also invokes power relations: “It is easy to be just or care about equality when one is powerless. What is important is one’s behavior toward the weak once they obtain power.” Most interviewees eschew defining justice in terms of absolute equality. One of the former members of the Anticapitalist Muslims movement was highly critical of this attitude and presented an alternative view:
We grew up among the Islamists in Turkey. We were told that equality is a problem for the leftists, and justice is a concern for the Islamists. The main focus of Islamists has been on justice at the expense of treating equality with a left-phobic (solfobik) mindset. In his book El-Mufredat, Râgıb el-İsfahânî argues that justice can be maintained only when equality is present. El-İsfahânî is a highly respected source among Islamists, so how come they say “justice matters, but equality does not.” I do not understand (Ferdi).
While few interviewees define justice in egalitarian terms, most of them refer to such terms as “deserving,” “to have the right to something,” or “entitlement.” In this sense, justice is similar to desert. Some interviewees define justice as “to treat the others as they deserve it” (Ayşen), “to provide the rights to someone as s/he is entitled to” (Ferit), or “to take the rightful entitlements” (Şener).
For some interviewees, to talk and care about justice is a means of criticizing the existing power relations and status quo. For example, when asked about the opposite of justice, many choose the Koranic term zulüm. Among its other meanings, this Arabic word also means to displace or not put something in its right place. Zulüm is also interchangeably used with such political terms as oppression and tyranny. Kadir defines zulüm as “to prevent someone from getting what s/he is entitled to or to violate a person’s rights.” Murat states that “zulüm is directly linked to power. It is about having the mindset of ‘I have power, so I can do anything,’” a statement echoing other interviewees’ mindset:
Zulüm can be about taking a kid’s candy by force or the state oppression against its citizens. In essence, it is the tyranny of power (Şener).
The opposite of justice is wrongfulness. Maybe repression or being repressed, imposition, or tyranny [zulüm] (Talat).
As these excerpts from the interviews reveal, the Koranic term zulüm plays a vital role in Islamist youths’ narratives as they form their attitudes about justice and power relations. The cleavage between ethical and realist outlooks seems to resurface in contemporary Islamists’ worldviews. As stated earlier, the lineage of this cleavage goes back to the first political divisions in the early Muslim community and in the medieval compromise of the classical Islamic state.23 According to this cleavage, justice and tyranny represent polar ends. Since there will be oppression and tyranny in the lack of justice, one can legitimize rebellion against the unjust ruler or justify the executive constraint (classical Islamic state) to prevent zulüm. This position is evident in a long line of intellectual tradition, including Khawarij, Qadarites, Muʿtazila, constitutionalists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and contemporary Islamists. Although traditional ulema had also occasionally opposed tyranny,24 political authorities eventually co-opted them to serve the state.25 Based on this background, two questions require further investigation to understand the perceptions of the religious youth. First, are these perceptions formed according to the Islamic conceptions of justice? Second, do Islamic conceptions of justice shape political preferences?
Most interviewees cite justice as a universal value, but they also give the lion’s share to Islamic tradition as the primary determinant of conceptions of justice. They bring evidence from the Koran, the Prophet’s life, and the rightly guided caliphs when asked about justice in Islam. For example, Türkan states, “All religions have something to say about justice. You do not have to belong to a specific religion to carry a feeling of justice. . . . Islam, however, preaches justice for all regardless of religion, language, or race.” Tarık is more specific about the significance of justice in Islam: “According to my definition of an Islamic order, justice will inevitably be served, I will call Islam, justice. There is a saying which states, ‘state’s religion is justice.’ I feel very close to this position.” The Islamist position that equates Islam with justice emerges very prominently among the interviewees. Similar to the Islamists of the twentieth century,26 the new Islamist youth continues to use “justice” as a catchall phrase and a panacea for all social and political problems:
In Islam, justice refers to an individual’s conscience about knowing her limits and obeying the just. It is about avoidance from engaging in tyranny. Justice is criticism toward tyranny, as seen in the Koranic argument against the religious leaders who play God’s role. I prefer to think about justice in terms of servitude to God (kulluk). . . . I believe Islam can establish justice in this sense. . . . At least this notion of servitude will remove the tyranny. I am mainly interested in the social implications of this notion. I am trying to look from a general perspective. We can establish justice only with Islam (Şener).
The notion of servitude (kulluk) comes up in almost all interviews. The participants view servitude to God as an essential principle within Islam’s cosmological hierarchy that creates absolute equality among God’s servants (kul). This approach is reminiscent of Qutb and Shariati’s conceptions of justice.27 In the above quote, Şener also refers to conscience as an important precondition for justice. As discussed in the previous chapters, one legacy of the political justice trajectory concerns free will, individual autonomy, and human dignity as conditions resulting from man’s vicegerent status. While not explicitly referring to the historical events that brought about this legacy, many interviewees invoke individual conscience and freedom from servitude to others as significant requisites of Islamic justice in their responses.
The interviews also reveal that the Islamist youth use novel concepts to define justice. In addition to the role of man within a divine hierarchy, conscience, and equality, “being a just witness” or the “just testimony” (adil şahitlik)28 are also frequently cited as elements of Islamic justice by the interviewees:
When I think about justice in Islam, I remember the verse about “just testimony.” I remember the verse warning about the “hatred of other nations” and the recommendation about “treating the other as your own.” There is also the equality aspect. I am thinking about the verse about devotion (takva). This one establishes equality among human beings in their relation to God, but equality is not always possible among human beings [in other aspects]. (Talat).
The interviewees mention equality among human beings as a universal value when describing justice as “just testimony.” They also believe that just testimony or just witness principle implies pluralist outlooks and tolerance. This principle also motivates political action, as some respondents stated that they would engage in various civil and political acts to counter an unjust ruler because they want to be just witnesses. Thus, in addition to informing attitudes about political preferences, a unique manifestation of the Islamic justice conception may bring about increased civic engagement among the Islamic youth who care about justice as a core ethical value of their religion. Chapter 8 tests this relationship and finds statistical evidence confirming the relationship between perceptions of justice and protest behavior using survey data collected during the Arab Spring.
Justice and Political Attitudes
Although most interviewees inform their value orientations using Islamic justice principles, these orientations do not necessarily engender support for democracy or Islamic governance. Most interviewees demonstrate a healthy dose of skepticism about different governance formulas, whether an Islamic state or a Muslim democracy. However, the in-depth interviews and my ethnographic observation reveal that they prefer secular democracy as the most viable political path for social justice implementation. In contrast, they view the authoritarian system as un-Islamic and unjust.
Interviewees were highly critical of political systems presented as Islamic states. Respondents brought up Saudi Arabia and Iran as cases of authoritarian government. The repressive policies of these states were a common point of criticism across different conversations. Opinions ranged from total rejection of Islamic statehood to conditional acceptance of this model with significant skepticism. The respondents frequently emphasize the need for alternative applications. For example, Talat, a nineteen-year-old college student, expresses his distaste of the “state” as a political institution and questions the notion of Islamic government:
I reject this notion of the state according to Islamic principles. In the expression “lā ʾilāha ʾillā -llāh,” the “ilāha” [gods] also refer to the “state.”. . . We need to reject this notion of state. I mean, a categorical rejection. For example, we need to do so when we are supporting the oppressed [mazlum]. If the state is in an equation, we need to approach the state from minus one and directly oppose it. Those states that describe themselves as “Islamic” are simply executing things per the definition of the state; they are directly, and by definition, producing zulüm. I reject the state according to the just testimony principle [adil şahitlik].
Others voice skepticism about using Islam as an adjective for describing the state (Ferdi), refer to the utopian nature of the prophetic society (Hale), or mention the difficulty of implementing such a political model in modern societies (Filiz). Kadir succinctly summarizes this last point: “When we talk about an Islamic state, we are referring to the modern state, a highly complex structure, a powerful mechanism that is likely to use force against its citizens. Religion cannot be more than a tool that legitimizes this kind of policy.” Under such skepticism, the interviewees disassociate the implementation of justice from the Islamic state as its provider.
The respondents also hold a great deal of cynicism about the possibility of implementing justice policies in political systems using religious justifications for legitimacy. Kadir makes this position very clear when he says, “The provision of justice is not about state policies. This superstition about the state is one of the most common mistakes of Muslims. Unless the society becomes just, it is impossible to provide justice, especially with a state that uses a religious label.” Filiz expresses a similar opinion from a different perspective: “The provision of justice entirely depends on the person who executes policies; it depends on the perspective. It does not matter what the label of the state is or whether Muslims hold political power. If justice is not implemented in society, it does not matter how you label the state.”
By and large, members of new Islamist movements oppose “Islamic state” models due to their potential to inhibit just governance and facilitate oppressive policies. This finding echoes the scholarship that makes a case against the Islamic government, Islamist political models, and state control of religion.29 In addition, putting the goal of justice above Islamic state models, as many interviewees do, is reminiscent of critical medieval ulema’s political preferences, particularly of Ibn Taymiyya, who view justice as the most important principle and essence of politics.
The conversations with the Islamist youth reveal an interesting divergence between the opinions of interviewees who are active in civil platforms and other interviewees who are highly devout but are not active in Islamist organizations. The latter group believes that justice can be established in a regime ruled according to the principles of Islam or a model depicted as Islamic state. For example, when asked about whether justice can be achieved in a government ruled by Islamic principles, Türkan expresses a strong opinion: “Absolutely, justice can be established in this system. During the prophet’s time and the reign of the rightly-guided caliphs, an Islamic state was in place. Ömer is best known for his just policies.” However, this acceptance is conditional on the existence of a “true Islamic state that is not repressive but a state that maintains universal values” (Ayşen).
In contrast, Islamist youth active in civil platforms voice substantial doubts about establishing justice even in a government abiding by Islamic principles. These doubts arise from the disagreement about Islamic principles, the lack of trust toward the rulers, or the practical impossibility of justice maintenance. Ferit believes that “Islamic principle means it will be a state governed according to the stereotypes of the sunni tradition, and hence establishing justice will be very difficult. They will use şura (blah blah) to do things clandestinely.” Ediz argues that it will be easier to quiet the opposition in this kind of political system. Hale presents a sophisticated argument about the sustainability of justice even in the existence of an Islamic government:
These kinds of societies can emerge only when decisions are made according to a social contract, when consultative mechanisms allow participation of all, or when there are leaders who are there to serve and who can take criticism [that] are in control rather than the leaders who only care about staying in power. Whenever this society prefers growth and development over justice, then it cannot establish justice.30 We can establish justice for a moment, but this can change ten years later. This is like Moses leaving for Mount Sinai and coming back to a corrupt society.
While the interviewees apply their sophisticated accounts of religion, politics, and justice to inform their perceptions of democracy, this is not a linear process. Some skepticism emerges about Islamic democracy or Muslim democracy as governance models suitable for justice implementation. Many respondents view democracy as a Western project and voice their reservations about implementing democracy in Turkish society. Based on their perceptions of the ruling AKP’s use and abuse of majoritarian institutions, some respondents condemn the majoritarian interpretation of democracy.
The interviews also include references to contemporary Islamists such as Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, and Mawdudi. However, rather than unquestionably accepting the theoretical models presented by these thinkers, the interviewees ask many questions about the utility of “democracy” or its “Islamic” character. For example, Ediz says, “I do not think there is anything that Islam can add to democracy.” Kemal states, “democracy emerged due to certain contextual factors. Therefore, it can be problematic to assign a universal character [Islam] to democracy.” Notwithstanding these critical stances, most interviewees think that Islam and democracy are compatible. For example, Ferdi argues that “if democracy is truly implemented and if all human beings and their property are protected, Islam and democracy can coexist in this system. I do not think these concepts are separate. I believe the principles of these concepts are the same.”
Does the Islamist conception of justice inform preferences about democratic, Islamic, and authoritarian governance? To answer this question, the interviewees were presented with four regime types and were asked to choose one according to their Islamic conception of justice:
•Secular democratic
•Secular authoritarian
•Democratic regime with Islamic principles and a religious ruler
•Autocratic regime with Islamic principles and a religious ruler
Most interviewees preferred a secular democratic regime because they believe that this regime is most conducive to implementing Islamic justice. They also believe that this outcome will be contingent on several factors, including the interpretation of Islamic values, societal actors, and political realities. For example, Şener argues, “There will be many factors here. You can establish justice also in other regimes. However, justice is more likely to emerge due to political struggles among different groups in a secular democratic regime.” This point echoes An-Náim’s argument stating that democracy can be acceptable to religious Muslims in secular systems where Muslims freely deliberate on and contribute to the policy according to their religious values.31 However, some others make a strong statement against the possibility of establishing justice in a democratic system:
Some people argue that democracy is polytheism (şirk). Recently, I have suspicions about democracy as an ideal regime. Let us talk about an example. Let us assume that the society [majority] came to an unjust decision. What can you do against this in a democracy? . . . Let us say Islamist democrats are in power. For example, let us assume that our current president [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan] is a democrat, he is a Muslim, and he did everything according to the election results. However, this does not make me feel that the society I live in is just (Hale).
Despite visible skepticism, democracy appears to be the most preferred regime type among the respondents for several reasons. First, it is seen as “the lesser of two evils.” Second, interviewees view it as a better alternative for establishing justice. Third, they believe that its working principles are more compatible with Islamic conceptions of justice. For example, Filiz states, “I believe that democracy can be more comprehensive about these concepts (about social justice in the whole society) than monarchy. It will be easier to establish justice in a democracy.” Murat most succinctly expresses this position:
I believe democracy will be more just than other systems. Various religions will have different notions of justice. A secular democracy will also differ in its justice conception. If we consider justice in a secular democracy, this may be viewed as injustice relative to the perception of justice in a given religion. Regardless, I still believe that establishing justice will be more likely in a secular democracy. And this will be compatible with Islam.
Kemal voices a more reserved opinion and believes that justice will be realized if democracy is defined as “government by people.” Meanwhile, Kadir believes that while authoritarian regimes may also implement justice, it will be easier to achieve this goal in democracies. Nevertheless, like many of his peers, he appears to be very concerned about a religious leader’s possibility of exploiting democracy and causing injustice:
You can implement justice in authoritarian systems, too. For example, there could be a just king who uses his authority in a very just way. He can build a just system encompassing the poorest and the most disadvantaged people. In a democratic system, a religious or secular person can establish justice. I have one reservation about the possibility of exploitation of religion. A religious person can be just today, but tomorrow, he may justify injustice and oppression with religion. Therefore, I believe justice can be best served in a secular democratic system (Kadir).
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter shows that, rather than formalistic approval of a regime type, the Islamist youth are mainly concerned with the realities of the political world and substantive outcomes of different regimes. The Islamic conception of justice emerges as the dominant discourse in shaping their political attitudes. In effect, justice almost serves as a yardstick for evaluating the desirability of a regime. Based on Turkey’s existing political reality, the interviewees demonstrate their cynicism about democracy, even if the ruler is a devout person. The Islamist youth take an ethical position prioritizing such notions as desert, equality in servitude, and opposition to tyranny. This position stands in sharp contrast to the pure power-seeking agenda and corrupt practices of rulers who use Islam as a political instrument of power games. In the interviews, not a single respondent agreed to support a religious but unjust ruler. All of them find protest acceptable against an unjust ruler regardless of his religious devotion or the ruler’s use of Islamic discourse. At the same time, they criticize democracy with a healthy dose of skepticism akin to “critical citizens”32 of advanced democracies.
The in-depth interviews revealed that Islamist youth define justice as a general principle and explicitly link it to the resistance against oppression. Most of the time, the concept of justice is juxtaposed with Islam and used as a term that encompasses freedom, social harmony, human dignity, and equality in servitude to God. The terms zulüm and individual responsibility expressed in terms of being a just witness are especially prominent in Islamist discourses of justice. The analysis of the interviews, thus, lends support to the theoretical proposition about the lasting influence of different lineages of Islamic justice.
The interviews also shed some light on the puzzle of Islam and support for democracy by depicting specific cognitive mechanisms. The essentialist argument theorizes an inherent incompatibility between Muslim culture and democracy and, hence, implies that the religious will be less supportive of democracy.33 The interviews with the Islamist youth reveal that essentialists and their critics may be oversimplifying the problem at hand. Rather than asking whether Muslim culture or being religious affects their support for democracy, we need to understand the different ideological positions that generate a reservoir of attitudes that may be in favor of or against democratic (or autocratic) government.